POTTER,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
hereinafter
called
the
appellant,
from
a
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
dated
November
20,
1052,
allowing
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
by
the
appellant
dated
January
10,
1952,
whereby
the
appellant
added
to
the
income
of
the
res-
pondent
for
the
taxation
year
of
1950
the
sum
of
$4,000.00
which
had
been
deducted
by
the
respondent
from
his
income
for
that
year
as
a
payment
made
to
his
former
wife,
Jean
Isobel
Armstrong,
on
June
30,
1950,
allegedly
pursuant
to
a
decree
nisi
of
a
judge
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario
in
an
action
or
proceeding
for
divorce,
for
the
maintenance
of
Jane
Isobel
Armstrong,
a
child
of
his
marriage
to
the
said
Jean
Isobel
Armstrong,
which
decree
was
granted
the
28th
day
of
September,
1948,
and
which
amount
the
respondent
claimed
to
be
entitled
to
deduct
under
the
provisions
of
Section
11(1)
(j)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
formerly
Section
11(1)
(1)
thereof.
The
said
decree
nisi
ordered
and
adjudged
that
the
marriage
solemnized
between
the
respondent
and
his
former
wife,
Jean
Isobel
Armstrong,
at
the
City
of
Toronto
in
the
Province
of
Ontario
on
the
25th
day
of
February,
1933,
be
dissolved
unless
sufficient
cause
be
shown
to
the
Court
within
six
months
from
the
date
thereof
why
the
judgment
should
not
be
made
absolute,
and
contained
the
following
provision
:
“And
this
Court
doth
further
order
and
adjudge
that
the
Defendant
John
James
Armstrong,
do
pay
to
the
Plaintiff
the
sum
of
One
Hundred
Dollars
($100.00),
each
and
every
month
for
the
maintenance
of
Jane
Isobel
Armstrong
the
infant
child
of
the
Plaintiff
and
the
Defendant
John
James
Armstrong,
until
the
said
child
attains
the
age
of
sixteen
years,
or
until
this
court
doth
otherwise
order,
the
first
of
such
payments
to
become
due
and
payable
on
the
1st
day
of
October,
A.D.
1948.”
The
decree
was
made
absolute
on
May
9,
1949.
Payments
were
made
by
the
respondent
under
the
decree
nisi
until
on
or
before
the
30th
day
of
June,
1950,
when,
following
negotiations
between
the
respondent
and
the
solicitor
for
his
former
wife,
she
agreed
to
accept
a
cash
payment
of
$4,000.00
in
full
satisfaction
of
all
her
claims
under
the
said
decree
nisi.
The
sum
of
$4,000.00
was
paid
by
the
respondent,
and
his
former
wife
executed
under
seal
the
following
document:
“June
30th,
1950.
I
hereby
acknowledge
receipt
of
the
sum
of
Four
Thousand
Dollars
($4,000.00)
from
John
James
Armstrong
in
full
settlement
of
all
payments
now
due
or
which
shall
hereafter
become
due
under
the
Judgment
of
the
Honourable
Mr.
Justice
Treleaven,
dated
the
21st
day
of
September,
1948,
whereby
the
sum
of
One
Hundred
Dollars
($100.00)
a
month
was
required
to
be
paid
to
me
for
the
maintenance
of
Jane
Armstrong
and
I
hereby
release
the
said
John
James
Armstrong
from
any
further
liability
under
the
said
Judgment.
|
(Sgd.)
Arlene
Martin
|
(Sgd.)
Isobel
Armstrong
L.S.”
|
By
his
Notice
of
Assessment
dated
January
10,
1952,
the
appellant
disallowed
the
payment
of
$4,000.00
as
‘‘
Alimony
Disallowed,
$4,000.00”
and
endorsed
on
the
back
of
the
said
notice
were
the
words
“Lump
Sum
Payments
of
alimony
not
an
allowable
Expense’’.
The
respondent
gave
Notice
of
Objection
on
January
15,
1952,
and
the
appellant
by
Notification
by
the
Minister
dated
April
29,
1952,
agreed
to
reduce
the
interest
on
the
instalment
payments
from
$102.20
to
$97.51
but
confirmed
the
said
assessment
in
other
respects
as
having
been
made
“in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Act
and
in
particular
on
the
ground
that
the
amount
of
$4,000.00
paid
by
the
taxpayer
was
not
a
payment
on
a
periodic
basis
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(j)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
11
of
the
Act;
that
interest
of
$97.51
has
been
levied
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Act.’’
On
May
9,
1952,
the
respondent
appealed
to
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board,
which
appeal
was
heard
November
18,
1952,
and
the
Judgment
of
the
Board
was
delivered
on
November
20,
1952,
allowing
the
appeal.
The
appellant
appealed
to
this
Court.
Section
11(1)
(j)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
as
follows:
“11.
(1)
Notwithstanding
paragraphs
(a),
(b)
and
(h)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
12,
the
following
amounts
may
be
deducted
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
:
(j)
an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
in
an
action
or
proceeding
for
divorce
or
judicial
separation
or
pursuant
to
a
written
separation
agreement
as
alimony
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
for
the
maintenance
of
the
recipient
thereof,
children
of
the
marriage,
if
he
is
living
apart
from
the
spouse
or
former
spouse
to
whom
he
is
required
to
make
the
payment,”
Reasons
for
Judgment
in
appeals
numbers
84251
and
84252,
both
between
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
appellant,
and
Alfred
Owen
Torrance
Beardmore,
respondent,
have
recently
been
filed,
and
in
the
judgment
in
the
first-mentioned
appeal
Section
11(1)
(j)
was
set
out
as
follows:
Section
11(1)
(j)
permits
a
deduction
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
of
:
1.
an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
2.
pursuant
to
(a)
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
in
an
action
or
proceeding
for
divorce
or
judicial
separation
agreement
(b)
a
written
separation
agreement
3.
as
alimony
or
other
allowance
4.
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
5.
for
the
maintenance
of
(a)
the
recipient
thereof,
(b)
children
of
the
marriage,
or
(c)
both
the
recipient
and
children
of
the
marriage,
6.
if
he
is
living
apart
from
the
spouse
or
former
spouse
to
whom
he
is
required
to
make
the
payment.
By
the
decree
nisi
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario
a
legal
obligation
was
imposed
on
the
respondent
to
pay
to
his
former
wife
the
sum
of
$100.00
per
month
for
the
maintenance
of
Jane
Isob
el
Armstrong,
the
infant
child
of
the
respondent
and
his
former
wife,
until
the
child
attains
the
age
of
16
years
or
until
the
Court
should
otherwise
order.
It
was
not
decreed
as
alimony
but
as
an
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis.
The
infant
child
was,
as
stated
in
the
said
decree,
born
October
12,
1939,
and
at
the
time
of
the
granting
of
the
said
decree
was
within
two
weeks
of
nine
years
of
age,
and
by
the
said
decree
the
respondent’s
former
wife
was
awarded
the
sole
custody
and
control
of
the
said
child.
At
the
time
the
sum
of
$4,000.00
was
paid
and
the
receipt
and
release
executed
by
the
respondent’s
former
wife
on
June
30,
1950,
the
child
was
within
about
four
months
of
her
11th
birthday.
As
the
child
will
attain
the
age
of
16
years
on
the
12th
of
October,
1955,
the
respondent
was,
at
the
time
of
payment
of
the
sum
of
$4,000.00,
bound
to
make
monthly
payments
of
$100.00
each
under
the
decree
nisi
for
a
further
period
of
five
years,
four
and
a
half
months,
and
while
the
sum
of
$4,000.00
would
be
the
equivalent
of
forty
monthly
payments
it
exceeded
at
the
time
it
was
paid
the
then-present
value
of
that
number
of
payments,
and
the
uncertainty
of
the
lives
of
both
the
respondent
and
the
child
were
no
doubt
matters
considered.
It
is
clear
that
the
amount
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
deduct
from
his
income
under
Section
11(1)
(j)
of
the
Act
must
be
paid
by
him
either
(a)
by
reason
of
a
legal
obligation
imposed
upon
him
by
a
competent
tribunal
acting
in
an
action
or
proceeding
for
divorce
or
judicial
separation,
or
(b)
by
reason
of
a
legal
obligation
undertaken
by
him
upon
signing
a
written
separation.
In
my
opinion,
the
word
‘‘pursuant’’,
as
used
in
Section
11
(1)
(j),
means
“by
reason
of’’
a
legal
obligation
so
imposed
or
undertaken.
The
payments
must
be
made
either
as
alimony
or
other
allowance,
payable
on
a
periodic
basis,
but
the
section
does
not
say
that,
to
be
entitled
to
deduct
the
payments,
they
must
be
made
at
the
exact
times
and
in
the
exact
amounts
specified
in
the
decree
of
the
competent
tribunal
or
the
written
separation
agreement.
The
words
“alimony
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis’’
can
be
taken
as
being
descriptive
of
the
decree
or
separation
agreement,
that
is,
a
decree
awarding
alimony
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
or
a
separation
agreement
providing
for
the
payment
of
an
allowance
on
a
periodic
basis,
and
not
necessarily
as
requiring
strict
compliance
with
the
terms
of
the
decree
or
agreement
to
be
entitled
to
deduct
payments,
and
a
lump
sum
payment
may
be
made
in
full
satisfaction
or
discharge
of
the
legal
obligation
imposed
by
it
and
still
be
pursuant
to
such
decree.
The
respondent,
without
doubt,
otherwise
comes
within
all
the
other
provisions
of
the
subsection.
The
decree
of
a
competent
tribunal
was
made
in
an
action
or
proceeding
for
divorce,
providing
for
the
payment
of
an
allowance
for
the
support
of
the
infant
child
of
the
marriage
on
a
periodic
basis,
and
the
respondent
was
living
apart
from
the
spouse
to
whom
he
was
required
to
make
the
payments.
While
the
revenue
may
suffer
to
some
extent
in
the
year
in
which
the
payment
of
$4,000.00
was
made,
yet
if
the
respondent
lives
for
the
period
during
which
he
would
otherwise
be
bound
to
make
payments,
he
will
for
the
years
subsequent
to
1950
be
unable
to
deduct
from
his
income
the
sum
of
$1,200.00
each
year
for
the
maintenance
of
the
child.
I
therefore
hold
that
the
sum
of
$4,000.00
was
properly
deducted
by
the
respondent
from
his
income
for
the
taxation
year
1950,
within
the
provisions
of
Section
11(1)
(j)
of
the
Act.
The
appeal
will,
therefore,
be
dismissed
and
the
assessment
varied
by
deducting
from
the
assessed
income
of
the
respondent
of
$10,628.10
for
the
taxation
year
1950
the
sum
of
$4,000.00
and
by
reducing
the
tax
payable
accordingly,
and
the
respondent
will
have
his
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.