Gibson,
J:—The
appellant
appeals
from
assessments
made
against
him
respecting
the
years
1958
to
1962
inclusive,
by
which
he
was
made
liable
for
income
tax
(a)
on
certain
bonuses
or
discounts
received
in
second
mortgage
transactions
during
those
years;
(b)
on
the
receipt
by
him
of
$28,896.71
in
a
transaction
with
Associated
Investors
of
Canada
Limited;
and
(c)
on
cer-
tain
monies
paid
out
in
1958,
1959
and
1960,
which
were
claimed
by
him
as
deductions
from
income
under
Section
27(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
charitable
donations,
but
denied
as
such
by
the
respondent.
During
the
years
1958
to
1962
the
appellant
owned
the
equity
shares
and
controlled
Associated
Investors
of
Canada
Limited.
That
company
engaged
publicly
in
the
business
of
selling
annuities,
investments,
contracts
and
pensions,
among
other
things.
It
received
part
of
its
capital
to
carry
on
its
business
from
the
public.
It
invested
its
capital
in
government
bonds
and
in
real
estate
mortgages
to
earn
its
income.
In
carrying
on
its
business
it
was
subject
to
certain
Province
of
Alberta
legislation.
One
provision
of
such
legislation
prescribed
that
the
maximum
loan
on
the
security
of
a
first
mortgage
on
real
estate
that
such
a
company
as
Associated
Investors
of
Canada
Limited
was
permitted
to
make
to
a
borrower
could
not
exceed
60
per
cent
(later
changed
to
66-⅔
per
cent
during
the
relevant
years),
of
the
appraised
value
of
the
same.
During
those
years
that
company
made
a
very
substantial
number
of
first
mortgage
loans
on
real
estate
and,
in
order
to
enable
the
borrowers
to
borrow
substantially
greater
sums
than
60
per
cent
of
appraised
value,
in
each
of
these
transactions
the
appellant
advanced
monies
on
the
security
of
a
second
mortgage
on
the
same
real
estate,
in
each
of
which
mortgages
there
was
provided
a
substantial
bonus
or
discount
in
respect
to
the
principal
sum
payable.
The
evidence
is
that
in
the
respective
years
the
monies
representing
such
bonuses
or
discounts
received
by
the
appellant
were
as
follows:
in
the
year
1958,
$2,560.82;
in
the
year
1959,
$6,732.31;
in
the
year
1960,
$8,084.19;
in
the
year
1961,
$4,156.16;
and
in
the
year
1962,
$1,026.87.
In
my
view,
during
these
years
on
this
evidence
the
appellant
patently
was
in
the
money-lending
business
and
these
discounts
or
bonuses
received
by
him
were
taxable
income
and
not
accretions
to
capital.
(See
Scott
v.
M.N.R.,
[1963]
S.C.R.
223;
[1963]
C.T.C.
176.)
In
1961,
however,
the
appellant
went
completely
out
of
the
money-lending
business.
He
sold
his
whole
portfolio
of
second
mortgages
to
Associated
Investors
of
Canada
Limited.
The
total
balance
of
principal
owing
on
these
mortgages
in
his
portfolio
at
that
time
was
$300,327.60.
The
sale
price
for
them
was
$111,036.73.
The
appellant
had
actually
originally
advanced
this
latter
sum
on
these
mortgages,
but
this
sum
has
no
other
significance
because
if
all
the
payments
on
these
mortgages
made
by
the
borrowers
and
received
by
the
appellant
up
to
the
date
of
this
sale
were
deducted
from
this
sum
and
if
nothing
was
deducted
from
the
bonus
or
discount
account,
so
to
speak,
of
these
mortgages,
then
there
would
have
still
been
owing
to
the
appellant
at
the
date
of
this
sale
the
principal
sum
of
$82,140.02.
The
difference
between
this
latter
sum
and
$111,036.73,
namely
$28,896.71,
the
respondent
submits
is
a
partial
realization
of
the
bonus
or
discount
sums
incorporated
1
in
the
said
face
values
of
the
balance
of
principal
owing
on
total
of
these
second
mortgages
at
the
date
of
the
sale,
namely
$300,327.60,
and
is
indistinguishable
from
the
discounts
or
bonuses
referred
to
earlier
in
these
reasons
and
is
therefore
taxable
income.
On
the
facts
of
this
case,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
said
sum
of
$28,896.71
was
not
a
receipt
by
the
appellant
of
any
part
of
the
discounts
or
bonuses
incorporated
in
the
principal
sums
payable
under
these
said
second
mortgages.
Instead,
it
was
part
of
the
purchase
monies
received
by
him
in
a
bona
fide
realization
sale
to
Associated
Investors
of
Canada
Limited
of
all
the
assets
of
his
substantial
money-lending
business
as
a
going
concern.
As
a
consequence,
no
part
of
the
sum
of
$111,036.73
was
taxable
income
of
the
appellant.
(Compare
Ted
Davy
Finance
Company
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1965]
Ex.
C.R.
20;
[1964]
C.T.C.
194
and
Dominion
Dairies
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1966]
C.T.C.
1.)
The
third
issue
on
this
appeal
concerns
payments
of
$300
in
each
of
the
years
1958,
1959
and
1960,
and
of
$3,000
in
1961
made
by
the
appellant
to
The
Salvation
Army
at
Edmonton,
Alberta,
and
claimed
by
him
as
deductions
from
income
as
charitable
donations.
On
this
issue,
Major
William
A.
J.
Hostey
of
The
Salvation
Army,
Edmonton,
gave
evidence.
He
stated
that
the
appellant
had
pointed
out
two
cases
of
persons
who
were
in
need
of
help,
and
after
investigation
he
was
of
opinion
that
their
needs
were
within
the
concept
of
the
general
welfare
work
of
The
Salvation
Amy,
that
the
appellant
paid
these
monies
to
The
Salvation
Army
to
help
these
persons
and
that
though
under
no
compulsion
or
no
direction
from
the
appellant
to
do
so,
The
Salvation
Army
did
in
fact
use
these
monies
for
the
welfare
needs
of
these
persons
who
were
suggested
by
the
appellant.
I
accept
the
evidence
of
Major
Hostey
and
I
am
of
opinion
that
the
appellant
in
law
paid
these
monies
to
The
Salvation
Army
and
therefore
was
entitled
to
deduct
these
monies
in
computing
his
taxable
income
for
the
said
relevant
years,
pursuant
to
Section
27(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
appeals
therefore
are
allowed
in
part.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
costs
of
these
appeals.