Morand,
J.:—This
application
arises
by
way
of
an
application
for
an
opinion
of
the
Court
upon
the
question
raised
in
a
special
case
concurred
in
by
the
parties
pursuant
to
Rule
126
of
the
Consolidated
Rules
of
Practice
and
deals
with
Section
126(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148.
The
said
section
reads
as
follows:
‘126.
(2)
The
Minister
may,
for
any
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
this
Act,
by
registered
letter
or
by
a
demand
served
personally,
require
from
any
person
(a)
any
information
or
additional
information,
including
a
return
of
income
or
a
supplementary
return,
or
(b)
production,
or
production
on
oath,
of
any
books,
letters,
accounts,
invoices,
statements
(financial
or
otherwise)
or
other
documents,
within
such
reasonable
time
as
may
be
stipulated
therein.”
Pursuant
to
the
said
section
the
Minister
issued
a
document
to
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
on
August
17,
1960
which
in
summary
stated
that
for
purposes
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
Section
126(2)
of
the
said
Act,
the
said
Minister
required
from
the
said
Bank
certain
information
and
production
of
documents
which
in
brief
cover
all
information
and
documents
covering
a
period
of
time
from
January
1,
1955
to
December
31,
1959,
of
all
dealings
between
the
Union
Bank
of
Switzerland
and
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce.
The
applicant,
the
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce,
issued
a
writ
on
September
15,
1960,
asking
for
declaration
that
the
requirement
was
unauthorized
and
of
no
force
and
effect
and
that
the
applicant
is
not
subject
to
the
penalty.
The
parties
then
agreed
to
state
a
special
case
for
the
opinion
of
the
Court:
The
special
case
in
brief
recites
the
facts
hereinbefore
set
out
and
agrees
that
the
applicant
has
failed
to
comply
with
the
requirement.
It
then
deals
with
the
amount
of
time
involved
in
obtaining
the
material
required
by
the
respondent
and
submits
the
following
question
for
the
opinion
of
the
Court:
“Is
the
Plaintiff
entitled
to
the
relief
claimed
in
the
Writ
of
Summons
herein,
namely:
a
declaration
that
it
is
not
under
any
obligation
to
furnish
the
information
or
produce
the
documents
relating
to
the
accounts
of
its
customer,
The
Union
Bank
of
Switzerland,
called
for
by
the
Requirement
for
Information
and
Production
of
Documents
hereinafter
described,
that
the
said
Requirement
is
unauthorized
and
is
of
no
force
or
effect
and
that
the
Plaintiff
is
not
subject
to
the
penalty
threatened
therein
for
failure
to
comply
therewith.’’
The
applicant
points
out
that
it
has
a
duty
not
to
disclose,
without
due
cause,
the
confidential
dealings
with
their
customers.
It
is,
however,
clearly
established
that
where
there
is
a
disclosure
under
compulsion
of
law
there
is
no
liability
upon
the
Bank.
This
was
agreed
by
the
parties
hereto
and
that
is
one
of
the
reasons
for
which
this
matter
comes
before
the
Court.
It
therefore
follows
that
if
an
order
for
disclosure
is
made
the
Bank
has
satisfied
the
onus
upon
itself
regarding
disclosure
with
reference
to
confidential
dealings.
It
is
the
fundamental
rule
of
interpretation
that
where
a
section
of
a
statute
is
being
interpreted
it
is
to
be
given
its
natural
and
ordinary
sense
even
though
the
result
may
appear
harsh,
arbitrary,
burdensome
or
even
contrary
to
some
established
rule
of
law.
Section
126(2)
on
its
face
appears
to
be
quite
clear
and
unambiguous
and
I
summarize
as
follows:
The
Minister
may
for
any
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
this
Act
require
from
any
person,
any
information,
etc.
It
therefore
appears
clear
that
on
reading
of
the
section
the
intention
of
the
Legislature
was
quite
clear
that
the
Minister
was
to
have
the
powers
as
clearly
set
out
in
the
section.
This
section
is
found
under
the
heading
‘‘Investigations’’
and
is
part
of
a
section
of
the
Act
dealing
with
the
powers
of
investigation.
Having
decided
that
the
section
of
the
Act
is
quite
clear,
it
then
becomes
necessary
to
decide
whether
the
Minister
has
acted
under
the
terms
of
the
section.
Firstly,
the
Minister
must
be
acting
for
a
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
the
enforcement
of
this
Act.
It
should
be
pointed
out
first
that
the
Minister
in
issuing
this
requirement
was
acting
in
an
administrative
or
executive
capacity
as
opposed
to
a
judicial
one.
It
was
admitted
on
the
hearing
of
this
motion
that
the
Minister
was
acting
in
good
faith
and
that
this
requirement
relates
to
a
genuine
and
serious
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
of
some
specific
person
or
persons;
that
the
Minister
had
good
reason
to
believe
that
such
person
or
persons
are
among
those
referred
to
in
the
special
case.
The
Minister
refused
to
state
who
the
person
or
persons
were
or
to
designate
the
person
or
persons
in
any
way,
shape
or
form.
It
being
admitted
and
not
disputed
that
the
Minister
was
acting
in
good
faith
and
the
requirement
specifically
stating
that
the
requirement
was
issued
for
purposes
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
it
necessarily
follows
that
he
does
require
the
information
in
question
for
a
purpose
“related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement’’
of
the
Act.
It
was
argued
extensively
before
me
that
the
mere
statement
by
the
Minister
that
he
has
such
a
purpose
is
not
sufficient
and
that
the
Court
must
be
satisfied
that
the
condition
precedent
is,
in
fact,
met.
On
the
grounds
above
stated
this
argument
must
fail.
In
addition
to
the
clear
words
of
the
section,
if
it
were
determined
that
in
every
case,
the
matter
should
go
before
the
Court
to
determine
whether
or
not
the
Minister
was
acting
for
any
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act,
there
would
be
complete
disruption
of
the
administration
of
the
department
resulting
in
delay
and
publicity.
In
any
event
the
cases
cited
to
me
suggesting
the
condition
precedent
must
be
proven
before
the
Court,
do
not,
in
my
opinion,
deal
with
an
action
of
this
nature
but
deal
with
cases
where
such
words
‘has
reasonable
cause
to
believe’’
and
‘‘is
satisfied
that
it
is
requisite’’,
etc.,
are
used
in
the
statute
before
the
Court.
It
was
further
argued
before
me
by
the
applicant
that
there
is
a
reasonable
inference
that
some
of
the
information
required
goes
beyond
any
purpose
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act
and
that
the
whole
requirement
is
bad.
With
due
respect
I
cannot
agree
with
this
argument
as
by
its
very
nature
the
Minister
must
obtain
much
irrelevant
material
in
obtaining
the
important
material
required
for
purposes
related
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act.
It
was
further
argued
before
me
that
Section
126(2),
despite
its
wide
language,
was
not
intended
to
permit
an
onerous
requirement
for
production
but
is
limited
to
obtaining
specified
information
and
production.
I
must
admit
this
argument
appealed
to
me,
as
to
use
the
vernacular,
it
seemed
unfair
that
the
Minister
could
go
on
a
“fishing
expedition’’
and
require
a
taxpayer
to
go
to
considerable
expense,
time
and
effort.
However,
the
Minister
alleges
that
he
requires
this
information
for
the
purposes
related
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Act
and
that
there
is
specific
information
which
he
desires.
I
am,
therefore,
unable
to
come
to
the
conclusion
that
it
is
a
‘‘fishing
expedition’’
but
find
that
the
Minister
does
require
certain
specific
information
and
feels
that
this
is
the
way
to
obtain
this
information.
Under
the
clear
and
very
wide
wording
of
the
Act
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
Legislature
did
intend
and
did
in
fact
give
this
authority
to
the
Minister.
Having
so
decided
it
is
the
decision
of
the
Court
that
the
plaintiff
is
not
entitled
to
the
relief
claimed
in
the
writ
of
summons
and
must
furnish
the
information
and
produce
the
documents
as
requested
in
the
requirement
dated
August
17,
1960
and
is
subject
to
the
penalty
threatened
therein
for
failure
to
comply
therewith.
Under
the
circumstances,
however,
in
so
far
as
the
penalty
section
is
concerned,
time
will
commence
to
run
from
the
issuance
of
this
judgment.
There
will
be
no
order
as
to
costs.
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