The
Assistant
Chairman:—The
appeal
of
Mr
John
Reid
from
an
assessment
of
his
1967
and
1968
taxation
years
was
heard
in
Montreal
on
November
2,
1972.
The
appellant
claimed
deductions
of
$5,504
for
1967
and
$4,387
for
1968
as
alimony
paid
to
his
former
wife.
Both
claims
were
disallowed.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
claimed
that
the
payments
were
made
by
reason
of
a
written
agreement
pursuant
to
paragraph
11(1)(l)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
were
therefore
admissible.
The
document
which
counsel
produced
as
a
written
agreement
is
headed
“Suggested
Child
Support”
(Exhibit
A-1).
It
is
undated
and
unsigned.
On
the
back
of
the
document
the
word
“accepted”
is
written
and
there
is
what
I
assume
to
be
Mr
John
Reid’s
signature.
No
date
is
mentioned
as
to
when
Mr
Reid’s
signature
was
apposed
to
the
document.
Paragraph
11(1)(l)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
refers
to
alimony
as
an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
pursuant
to
a
written
agreement.
These
words,
in
my
opinion,
must
be
interpreted
strictly
and
the
words
“written
agreement”
in
a
context
which
includes
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
must,
of
necessity,
mean
a
formal
agreement
between
the
parties
concerned.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
went
into
an
interesting
discussion
as
to
what
constitutes
a
“writing”
or
a
“written
document”
as
defined
by
the
Civil
Code
and
the
Interpretation
Act,
and
concluded
that
the
“Suggested
Child
Support”
document
(Exhibit
A-1)
was
a
“written
document”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
11(1)(l)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
my
opinion,
whether
the
said
document
is
a
“writing”
or
a
“written
document”
or
whether
the
appellant
did
or
did
not
pay
amounts
of
alimony
according
to
Exhibit
A-1,
it
cannot
be
considered
a
formal,
binding,
legally
acceptable
written
agreement
within
the
meaning
and
purpose
of
paragraph
11
(1)(l).
Case
law
is
quite
consistent
on
the
point
and,
to
my
mind,
rightly
so
when
one
considers
the
abuse
that
could
be
made
of
a
wider
interpretation
of
the
term
“written
agreement”.
Even
if
the
rules
of
interpretation
would
permit
a
wider
interpretation
to
include
letters,
memoranda
and
suggestions
between
husband
and
wife,
which
I
am
convinced
they
do
not,
the
whole
purpose
of
paragraph
11(1)(l)
would
be
jeopardized.
For
these
reasons
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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