The
Assistant
Chairman:—The
appeal
by
the
Estate
of
Wilfred
H
Genest
from
an
assessment
dated
February
16,
1970
regarding
the
aggregate
net
value
of
the
property
passing
on
the
death
of
Wilfrid
H
Genest,
imposing
tax
of
$9,691.53
including
interest,
was
heard
t.
Montreal
on
October
23,
1972.
The
late
Wilfrid
H
Genest
operated
an
unincorporated
business
under
the
name
of
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg.
On
January
2,
1951
an
application
was
made
to
the
Crown
Life
Insurance
Company
(hereinafter
called
“Crown
Life”)
for
a
$30,000
insurance
policy
on
the
life
of
Wilfrid
H
Genest
(Exhibit
A-
2).
Insurance
policy
No
566034
was
issued
on
February
2,
1951.
On
February
15,1951
Wilfrid
H
Genest
encumbered
the
said
policy
‘in
favour
of
the
Imperial
Bank
of
Canada
(hereinafter
called
“‘the
bank”)
as
collateral
for
a
loan
for
business
purposes
(Exhibit
A-3).
On
May
1,
1957
Mr
Genest
sold
his
lumber
business
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
(Exhibit
A-5).
On
June
15,
1967
Wilfrid
H
Genest
died,
and
respondent
added
to
the
aggregate
value
of
his
estate
the
$30,000
from
insurance
policy
No
566034.
In
its
notice
of
appeal
and
subsequently
in
its
pleading,
the
Estate
of
Wilfrid
H
Genest
contended
that
the
insurance
policy
issued
by
Crown
Life
was
not
held
by
the
de
cujus
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
paragraph
3(5)(a)
of
the
Estate
Tax
Act,
and
consequently
the
sum
of
$30,000
should
not
have
been
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value
of
the
property
passing
on
the
death
of
Wilfrid
H
Genest.
Counsel
for
respondent,
however,
contended
that
the
insurance
policy
had
never
left
the
property
of
the
de
cujus
and
that
he
alone,
immediately
before
his
death,
had
the
right
to
do
the
things
mentioned
in
paragraph
3(5)(a)
of
the
Act,
and
concluded
that
the
value
of
the
insurance
policy
had
rightly
been
included
in
the
calculation
of
the
aggregate
net
value
of
the
property
passing
on
the
death
of
W
H
Genest.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that,
when
insurance
policy
No
566034
was
issued
in.
the
name
of
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg
in
1951,
it
actually
was
Wilfrid
H
Genest
who
was
both
the
insured
and
the
owner,
and
his
legal
heirs
who
were
the
beneficiaries.
Since
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg
was
not
incorporated,
it
could
not
legally
enjoy
any..-
right
or
assume
any
responsibility.
No
stated
intention
(Exhibit
A-1,
section
13)
by
W
H
Genest
or
‘written
document
between
Mr
Genest
and
Crown
Life
could
give
W
H
Gen’est
Lumber
Enrg
legal
personality
or
confer
on
it
the
right
to
be
beneficiary
of
W
H
Genest’s
life
insurance
policy.
The
said
policy
was
therefore
part
of
the
property
of
the
de
cujus
at
the
time
it
was
issued.
Even
after
encumbering
the
policy
in
favour
of
the
bank
s
collateral
for
a
loan
for.
business
purposes
on
February
15,
1951,
the-de
cujus
still
retained
title
to
it.
At
that
time,
it
was
the
de
cujus
who
was
paying
the
premiums;
he
owned
the
insurance
and
retained
his
right—subject
to
certain
conditions—to
do
the
things
stipulated
in
paragraph
3(5)(a)
of
the
Act.
The
question
of
determining
whether
the
policy
was
assigned
became
more
complicated
the
moment
Mr
Genest
sold
his
business
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd.
At
the.
time
of
the
sale
there
is
no
doubt
that
the
new
company
assumed,
among
other
things,
responsibility
for
Mr
Genest’s
debt
to
the
bank,
which
according
to
the
evidence
amounted
to.
$45,000.
At
that
same
time,
was
there
a
transfer
or
assignment
of
ownership
of
the
insurance
policy
that
stood
as
collateral
for
the
loan
made
to
Mr
Genest,
a
loan
which
was
assumed
by
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd?
Counsel
for
respondent
contended
that
the
insurance
policy
had
never
been
assigned
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd,
and'
in
support
of
his
argument
he
submitted
that:
(1)
no
clause
in
the
agreement
produced
as
Exhibit
A-5
formally
stipulated
that
policy
No
566034
was
part
of
the
objects
on
sale
and
ownership
of
the
policy
had
never
been
transferred
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd;
(2)
Crown
Life
had
never
been
served
notice
that
the
de
cujus
was
assigning
the
said
policy
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd;
(3)
there
was
never
any
question
between
the
bank
and
the
de
cujus
that,
on
repayment
of
the
loan,
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
would
become
beneficiary
of
the
policy.
It
is
true
that
the
agreement
under
which
the
business
was
sold
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
did
not
specifically
mention
the
assignment
of
the
insurance
policy
to
this
company.
It
seems
that
no
written
notice
was
given
to
Crown
Life
that
the
policy
had
been
assigned
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd,
and
finally
no
written
notice
seems
to
have
been
given
to
the
bank
to
the
effect
that
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
would
become
beneficiary
of
the
policy
once
the
loan
was
repaid
to
the
bank.
Those
are
the
facts
that
militate
in
favour
of
respondent’s
submission
that
the
insurance
policy
had
not
been
assigned
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd.
On
the
other
hand,
it
is
impossible
to
ignore
another
series
of
facts
that
support
the
opposite
view,
namely
that
after
May
1,
1957
it
was
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
and
not
the
de
cujus
that
paid
the
premiums
on
the
insurance
policy.
Furthermore,
from
1957
to
1967
the
cash
surrender
value
of
the
said
insurance
policy
was
entered
on
the
financial
statements
of
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd.
Even
though
section
13
of
Exhibit
A-1
cannot
be
considered
strictly
legal,
it
nevertheless
constitutes
incipient
written
evidence
that
the
intention
of
the
de
cujus
and
Crown
Life
was
to
make,
not
the
insured
or
his
heirs,
but
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg
beneficiary
of
the
insurance
policy.
The
insurance
company
accepted
and
cashed
the
premium
payments
made
by
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
from
May
1,
1957
until
the
death
of
Wilfrid
H
Genest
on
June
15,
1967
without
raising
any
objection.
The
bank,
which
had
served
notice
to
Crown
Life
on
February
15,
1951
that
Mr
Genest’s
life
insurance
policy
had
been
assigned
to
it
as
collateral
for
a
loan
made
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg
[sic]
(Exhibit
A-4),
accepted
the
transfer
from
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg
[sic]
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
of
the
debt
for
which
insurance
policy
No
566034
had
been
given
as
collateral.
For
a
period
of
ten
years
the
bank
had
never
worried
about
or
objected
to
having
as
collateral
an
insurance
policy
whose
beneficiary
was
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Enrg,
whereas
it
was
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
that
was
responsible
for
the
debt
after
May
1,
1957.
Finally,
after
Mr
Genest’s
death,
a
cheque
in
the
amount
of
$34,511.13
covering
the
principal
and
dividends
of
the
said
life
insurance
policy
of
the
de
cujus
was
made
out
by
Crown
Life
in
the
names
of
G
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
and
the
bank
without
either
of
the
said
parties
immediately
concerned
raising
any
objection.
It
can
therefore
be
deduced
that
the
insurance
company,
which
is
free
to
apply
its
regulations
as
it
sees
fit,
having
accepted
the
premiums
on
the
insurance
policy
from
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
since
1957,
was
satisfied
that
the
joint
beneficiaries
were
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
and
the
bank.
There
is
no
evidence
to
indicate
that
the
legal
heirs
of
the
de
cujus
considered
themselves
the
beneficiaries
of
insurance
policy
No
566034
or
that
they
objected
to
the
cheque
for
$34,511.13
being
made
out
jointly
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
and
the
bank.
In
my
opinion
these
facts
indicate
that
the
intention
of
the
de
cujus
to
assign
ownership
of
the
insurance
policy
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
was
recognized
and
accepted
by
all
parties
concerned,
namely
the
insurance
company,
the
bank,
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
and
the
legal
heirs
of
the
de
cujus.
The
intention
of
the
de
cujus
and
the
tacit
acceptance
by
the
parties
immediately
concerned,
as
well
as
their
conduct
for
several
years
in
the
administration
of
their
respective
affairs
Imply,
in
my
opinion,
that
there
was
a
de
facto
assignment
of
insurance
policy
No
566034
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd.
Although
it
has
been
noted
that
there
was
no
clause
specifying
that
the
insurance
policy
was
one
of
the
assets
assigned
by
the
de
cujus
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd,
and
although
the
evidence
does
not
include
any
written
notice
to
the
insurance
company
or
to
the
bank
concerning
the
assignment
of
the
insurance
policy,
the
fact
nonetheless
remains
that
no
evidence
has
been
adduced
to
negate
the
existence
or
validity
of
the
agreement
between
the
parties
concerned
regarding
the
assignment
of
the
policy,
which
was
followed
to
the
letter
by
them
for
a
period
of
ten
years.
Although
formal
written
documents
confirming
that
the
insurance
policy
was
assigned
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
are
lacking,
the
facts
do
indicate
that
the
intention
was
certainly
there
and
that
there
was
a
de
facto
assignment
of
the
said
policy
which
was
recognized
and
accepted
by
all
the
parties
concerned,
and
everyone
acted
for
a
number
of
years
as
though
the
insurance
policy
had
been
assigned
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd
without
any
objection
being
raised.
I
believe
that
the
facts
in
the
case
before
us
are
quite
different
from
those
in
Perras
v
Chadwick
and
Company
Ltd.
and
London
Life
insurance
Co,
[1954]
BR
526,
in
which
Bissonnette,
J
says
at
page
529:
(Translation)
...
The
insurance
policy
was
res
inter
alios
acta
between
the
insured
and
the
insurer,
so
that
no
valid
and
legal
assignment
could
be
made
to
Chadwick
and
Company
Limited
without
a
formal
notice
to
the
mise
en
cause
and
without
the
latter’s
acceptance
of
such
an
assignment.
In
the
case
now
before
us,
it
seems
clear
to
me
that
all
the
facts
and
the
actions
of
Crown
Life
confirm
that
the
latter
recognized
and
accepted
the
assignment
of
the
insurance
policy
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd.
A
matter
discussed
by
Bissonnette,
J
in
the
Perras
case
(supra)
which
does
not
apply
here
is
the
question
of
whom
the
insurance
policy
should
be
returned
to
once
the
bank
had
been
fully
repaid.
In
the
Perras
case
the
defendant
could
not
avail
itself
of
any
assignment
of
rights.
But
in
the
case
that
concerns
us,
not
only
do
the
facts
show
that
the
policy
was
assigned
to
W
H
Genest
Lumber
Ltd,
but
since
that
company
had
paid
Mr
Genest’s
life
insurance
premiums
since
1957,
it
could
in
my
opinion
have
raised
a
legal
objection
if
the
insurance
benefits
on
the
death
of
Mr
Genest
had
been
paid
to.
his
legal
heirs.
I
therefore
conclude
that
the
de
cujus
was
not
in
possession
of
insurance
policy
No
566034
immediately
before
his
death,
that
he
did
not
have
the
right
to
do
the
things
mentioned
in
paragraph
3(5)(a)
of
the
Act,
and
that
the
$30,000
benefit
payable
under
the
terms
of
Wilfrid
H
Genest’s
life
insurance
policy
should
not
have
been
included
in
the
calculation
of
the
aggregate
net
value
of
his
estate.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed.
Appeal
allowed.