The
Assistant
Chairman:—These
are
the
appeals
of
Myer
D
Brody
from
assessments
of
the
appellant’s
1969
and
1970
taxation
years
in
which
amounts
of
$3,882.50
and
$5,879.50
respectively,
claimed.
by
the
appellant
as
medical
expenses
in
those
yéars,
were
disallowed
by
the
Minister
on
the
grounds
that
these
amounts
were
not
medical
expenses
but
tuition
fees
paid
on
behalf
of
the
appellant’s
son.
The
appellant
is
the
father
of
Mark
Brody,
an
18-year
old
boy,
who
is
a
severe
dyslexic.
In
the
years
pertinent
to
these
appeals
Mark
Brody
was
confined
to
the
Vanguard
School
for
which
the
appellant
paid
$3,882.50
in
1969
and
$5,879.50
in
1970.
The
appellant
claims
that
these
expenditures
were
for
services
necessary
for
the
treatment
and
diagnosis
of
Mark
Brody
and
that
they
are
deductible
expenditures
within
the
meaning
of
section
27
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
respondent,
on
the
other
hand,
claims
that
the
Vanguard
School
is
neither
a
nursing
home
nor
a
private
hospital
and
that
Mark
Brody
did
not
receive
any
laboratory,
radiological
or
other
diagnostic
services
while
at
school.
The
respondent
holds
that
the
Vanguard
School
is
an
educational
institution
which
specializes
in
the
teaching
of
children
with
severe
handicaps
and
consequently
the
sums
paid
by
the
appellant
are
tuition
fees
and
not
medical
expenses
as
described
in
section
27(1
){c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
order
to
determine
the
nature
of
the
treatment
provided
to
his
son
at
the
Vanguard
school,
the
appellant
was
asked
to
obtain
and
forward
to
the
Board
the
attending
doctor’s
report
describing
the
precise
treatments
given
his
son
during
the
years
pertinent
to
this
appeal.
By
letter
dated
April
4,
1973
the
appellant
stated
that
the
required
information
would
be
submitted
to
the
Board
in
May
of
1973.
The
appellant,
however,
has
failed
to
submit
this
report.
These
appeals
are
identical
with
that
of
Donald
M
Lawson
v
MNR,
[1971]
Tax
ABC
833;
71
DTC
572,
which
was
heard
by
W
O
Davis,
Esq,
QC,
then
a
Member
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board.
Subsequently
the
present
Chairman
of
the
Board,
K
A
Flanigan,
Esq,
QC
was
seized
with
the
appeals
of
Donald
M
Lawson
for
the
taxation
years
1967,
1968
and
1969
on
the
very
same
issue.
After
thorough
and
sympathetic
consideration
of
all
the
aspects
of
the
appeals,
both
presiding
Members^
who
were
bound
to
apply
the
Act
as
written,
dismissed
the
appeals
most
reluctantly.
There
is
nothing
in
the
case
at
bar
which
differs
essentially
from
the
facts
and
arguments
presented
in
the
Donald
M
Lawson
appeal,
and
there
is
no
way
that
the
circumstances
of
the
appeal
under
consideration
can
fall
within
the
meaning
of
section
27
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
that
was
applicable
in
1969
and
1970.
Although
the
statute
has
since
been
amended
to
permit
deductions
of
this
nature,
it
is
beyond
the
jurisdiction
and
the
power
of
the
Board
to
ignore
the
state
of
the
law
at
the
time
pertinent
to
this
appeal.
To
apply
the
subsequently
amended
section
of
the
Act
in
this
case
would,
in
my
Opinion,
be
contrary
to
the
principles
of
elementary
justice
and
unfair
to
those
whose
appeals
had
to
be
decided,
and
were
decided,
on
the
basis
of
the
Act
as
then
written.
For
these
reasons,
I
have
reluctantly
come
to
the
conclusion
that
I
have
no
alternative
but
to
dismiss
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.