Judge
K
A
Flanigan
(orally:
July
26,
1974):—This
is
an
appeal
by
LeRoy
R
Creamer
against
the
reassessment
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
the
1972
taxation
year.
The
appeal
seems
quite
simple
on
its
face,
but
it
has
far-reaching
ramifications
affecting
not
only
this
taxpayer
but
perhaps
hundreds
more.
The
question
is
whether
or
not
he
is
entitled
under
paragraph
8(1)(g)
of
the
1972
Act,
which
is
basically
the
same
as
subsection
11(7)
of
the
former
Act,
to
claim
as
an
expense
moneys
expended
by
him
for
meals
while
travelling
away
from
the
municipality
where
the
employer’s
establishment
is.
The
facts
are
that
the
appellant
is
employed
by
Imperial
Oil
Limited,
and
is
employed
particularly
as
a
route
salesman,
driving
all
sorts
of
vehicles
necessary
to
deliver
the
company’s
product
to
retailers
or
other
company
depots.
He
travels
generally
throughout
southern
New
Brunswick,
and
is
not
paid
for
any
expenses
incurred
in
purchasing
his
meals
unless
he
works
in
excess
of
10
hours,
in
which
case
he
says
he
gets
a
meal
ticket.
The
respondent’s
case
is
based
clearly
on
the
wording
of
paragraph
8(1
)(g),
and
he
alleges
that
the
appellant
is
not
employed
by
a
person
whose
principal
business
is
passenger
or
goods,
or
passenger
and
goods,
transport.
There
has
been
filed
as
Exhibit
R-1
the
1972
annual
report
of
Imperial
Oil
Limited,
and
I
have
heard
the
testimony
of
Mr
Matthews,
the
terminal
manager
at
Saint
John,
and
also
the
evidence
of
Mr
Creamer.
The
appellant
relies
heavily
on
the
case
of
D
R
Anderson
v
MNR,
[1969]
Tax
ABC
913;
69
DTC
636.
Anderson
was
a
marine
engineer
employed
by
the
Province
of
British
Columbia
who
worked
on
a
ferry
operating
between
Vancouver
Island
and
the
mainland.
He
deducted
a
sum
of
money
spent
for
noon
meals
while
on
the
ferry,
and
this
was
disallowed
under
the
then
subsection
11(7).
On
appeal
the
deduction
was
allowed
on
the
basis
that
the
government
which
operated
the
ferry
operated
through
persons
whose
duty
it
was
to
administer
and
conduct
a
department
under
which
his
employment
fell.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
has
pointed
out
findings
of
fact
in
that
case
that
could
distinguish
it
from
the
case
presently
before
me.
As
is
said
so
often,
each
case
depends
upon
its
own
set
of
facts,
particularly
this
type
of
case,
and
one
almost
has
to
deal
with
each
individual
rather
than
individuals
as
a
group.
It
seems
to
me
that
Imperial
Oil
Limited—whose
main
revenue,
or
more
than
50%
of
it,
is
derived
from
petroleum
products
as
distinguished
from
crude
oil
and
natural
gas—is
engaged
in
delivering
these
products
from
its
refineries,
through
its
storage
depots,
to
the
ultimate
retailer
and/or
consumer.
It
seems
to
me
that
one
cannot
separate
the
production
of
the
eventual
retail
product
from
the
chain
of
services
necessary
to
turn
that
product
into
revenue.
Therefore,
in
my
view,
the
transportation
of
that
product
is
part
and
parcel
of
the
main
business
of
imperial
Oil
Limited,
because
without
the
transportation
of
its
product
to
its
retailers
and
consumers
there
would
be
no,
or
very
little
revenue.
I
think
that
the
definition
of
“person”,
under
the
new
Act
as
well
as
the
old,
which
includes
a
corporate
body,
allows
Imperial
Oil
Limited
to
fit
into
paragraph
8(1
)(g)
as
an
employer,
and
a
person
who
employs
LeRoy
Creamer
in
a
portion
of
its
principal
business
operation
that
I
outlined
earlier.
Therefore,
on
all
the
evidence
in
this
particular
case,
I
think
that
the
appeal
should
be
allowed,
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed.
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