Judge
Flanigan:—This
is
an
application
by
Marvin
Shore
as
trustee
of
the
estate
of
Winegarden
Paving
Co
Limited,
bankrupt,
for
an
extension
of
time
for
filing
notices
of
objection
under
the
provisions
of
section
167(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
chapter
63
(and
amendments
thereto).
As
was
pointed
out
by
me
in
Savary
Beach
Lands
Ltd
and
Savary
Resort
Properties
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1972]
CTC
2608;
72
DTC
1497,
applications
such
as
this
should
not
be
granted
as
a
matter
of
course
but
should
only
be
granted
under
unusual
circumstances.
A
great
many
applications
have
come
before
the
Board
in
the
past
two
years
and,
in
most
instances,
have
involved
a
question
of
late
filing
by
a
matter
of
days
or
weeks,
and
it
has
been
the
practice
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
in
a
good
many
of
these
instances,
to
take
no
position
and
for
the
Board
to
allow
the
applications.
The
facts
revealed
in
this
application
are
somewhat
more
complicated
in
that,
on
the
30th
day
of
July,
1973,
as
attested
by
Exhibit
A-1,
the
corporate
entity
Winegarden
Paving
Co
Limited
made
an
assignment
for
the
benefit
of
its
creditors.
Following
a
general
meeting
of
the
creditors,
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
in
order
to
protect
its
interest,
then
filed
or
served
notices
of
reassessment
on
the
bankrupt
company
on
August
15,
1973.
It
then
follows
that
the
time
for
filing
notices
of
objection
thereto
expired
in
mid-November
1973.
Nothing
transpired,
so
far
as
this
Board
is
concerned,
until
a
Notice
of
Application
was
filed
with
it
on
March
8,
1974,
asking
for
this
extension.
It
is
true
that
solicitors
did
not
enter
the
picture
until
December
of
1973
and
that
within
three
months
thereafter
the
application
which
is
before
me
was
filed.
However,
the
evidence
indicates
that
Mr
Shore,
who
was
appointed
trustee
of
the
bankrupt
estate,
was
a
chartered
accountant
with
a
firm
of
chartered
accountants
in
this
city;
that
some
discussions
took
place,
or
perhaps
a
considerable
number
of
discussions
took
place,
with
officials
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
at
its
District
Taxation
Office
in
London,
Ontario,
and
that,
pursuant
to
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
following
the
seizure
of
the
company’s
records
in
April
of
1972,
the
requirements
of
section
231,
I
think
it
was,
of
the
Act
were
complied
with
in
that
the
local
office
served
an
inventory
of
the
records
seized
on
Mr
Winegarden
(who
was
a
shareholder),
Mr
McKinley
(who
was
the
accountant
of
the
firm),
and
Mr
Stewart
(who
was
the
vice-president).
It
was
subsequent
to
the
service
of
this
inventory
on
the
offices
of
the
subsequent
bankrupt
that
Mr
Shore
and
others
had
meetings
with
the
officials
of
the
district
office.
There
is
some
evidence
from
Mr
Haggerty,
a
witness
called
on
behalf
of
the
Minister,
that
a
discussion
took
place
in
his
presence
and
in
the
presence
of
Messrs
Winegarden,
Stewart
and
Shore,
indicating
that
they
would
have
to
take
steps
to
reverse
the
action
taken
by
the
Department
in
the
reassessments,
or
words
to
that
effect.
It
is
quite
evident
from
the
evidence
of
Mr
Stewart,
who
was
called
on
behalf
of
the
applicant,
that
Mr
Shore
did
not
at
any
time
consider
filing
Notices
of
Objection,
since
he
felt
it
would
be
useless
because
100%
success
would
have
to
be
obtained
in
the
appeal
procedure
before
the
ordinary
creditors
would
benefit.
The
ordinary
creditors
are
the
only
persons
for
whom
I
feel
concern
in
this
matter.
It
seems
to
me
that
in
the
months
that
passed
after
the
seizure
of
the
company’s
records,
during
which
the
assignment
was
made
for
the
benefit
of
creditors,
a
professional
chartered
accountant
was
appointed
as
trustee
and
the
intervention
of
the
taxation
office
with
the
accountant
and
other
members
of
his
firm
took
place,
the
principals
did
nothing
to
protect
their
own
interests.
Therefore,
if
I
am
to
grant
any
relief,
it
is
in
the
interests
of
the
ordinary
creditors.
However,
the
evidence
of
Mr
Stewart
is
that
the
total
assets
of
the
company
a
the
time
of
the
bankruptcy
amounted
to
$12,000,
while
its
liabilities,
excluding
the
tax
liability,
amounted
to
$23,000.
So
if,
without
considering
the
merits
of
any
subsequent
appeal,
one
were
to
disregard
the
tax
liability,
it
is
still
difficult
to
see
how
any
benefit
could
accrue
to
the
ordinary
creditors.
In
the
circumstances
of
this
application,
I
do
not
consider
the
bankruptcy
to
be
an
extraordinary
occurrence,
particularly
when
a
firm
of
professional
accountants
was
involved
in
the
negotiations
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
one
of
whom
was
the
trustee.
I
therefore
find
that
this
application
is
brought
at
the
insistence
of
the
shareholders
and
officers
of
the
bankrupt
in
an
attempt
to
take
some
steps
to
protect
themselves
from
any
liability,
real
or
imaginary,
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
and
not
with
the
best
interests,
or
the
sole
interest,
of
the
ordinary
creditors
in
mind.
On
all
the
evidence,
I
am
not
satisfied
that
this
is
a
case
where
discretion
should
be
exercised
in
favour
of
the
applicant,
and
the
application
is
therefore
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.
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