Cattanach,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
by
way
of
statement
of
claim
by
the
plaintiff
from
an
assessment
to
income
tax
for
its
1971
taxation
year
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
Prior
to
trial
the
parties
agreed
upon
a
statement
of
facts
as
follows:
Agreed
Statement
of
Facts
The
parties
hereto,
by
their
respective
solicitors,
hereby
admit
the
following
facts,
provided
that
such
admission
is
made
for
the
purpose
of
this
appeal
only
and
may
not
be
used
against
either
party
on
any
other
occasion
or
by
another
party.
1.
The
Plaintiff
is
a
corporation
having
its
head
office
and
principal
piace
of
business
at
Montreal,
in
the
Province
of
Quebec
and
is
engaged
in
the
electronics
and
related
business.
2.
In
each
of
its
taxation
years
from
1968
through
1971
the
Plaintiff
was
liable
to
tax
by
the
Province
of
Quebec
under
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act,
RSQ
1964,
c
67,
as
amended.
3.
During
the
same
period
the
Plaintiff
was
a
company
engaged
in
the
operation
of
a
manufacturing
or
processing
business
in
the
Province
of
Quebec
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
16a(2)
of
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act,
and,
in
conformity
with
the
limitations
and
conditions
imposed
therein,
deducted
in
computing
its
net
revenue
for
purposes
of
the
said
Act
an
amount
in
respect
of
“investments”
made
by
it
in
such
business,
as
defined
in
paragraph
16a(1)(c),
which
deduction
was
made
in
respect
of
the
acquisition
of
new
machinery
included
in
class
8
of
Schedule
B
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations.
4.
Such
deductions
resulted
in
a
reduction
of
Plaintiff's
net
revenue
for
purposes
of
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
as
follows:
|
Year
|
Amount
|
|
1968
|
$
48,495
|
|
1969
|
172,820
|
|
1970
|
178,164
|
|
1971
|
427,413
|
|
$826,892
|
5.
The
Plaintiff
paid
$91,166
less
tax
under
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
for
the
taxation
years
in
question
than
it
would
have
paid
in
the
absence
of
the
deduction
contemplated
in
section
16a
of
the
said
Act,
as
follows:
|
Total
deductions
claimed
|
$826,892
|
|
apply
tax
rate
of
12%
under
|
|
|
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
|
|
|
Quebec
tax
reduction
claimed
|
|
99,227
|
|
less:
adjustments
per
assessments
|
|
|
1968
taxation
year
|
$
81
|
|
|
1969
taxation
year
|
7,980
(
|
8,061)
|
|
Net
Quebec
tax
reduction
|
$
91,166
|
6.
In
computing
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
to
the
Plaintiff
of
class
8
depreciable
property
owned
by
it
as
at
the
end
of
its
1971
taxation
year
for
purposes
of
computing
its
income
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Plaintiff
did
not
take
into
account
the
net
Quebec
tax
reduction
as
determined
in
paragraph
5
above.
7.
By
Notice
of
Re-assessment
dated
Mar
8,
1973
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
added
to
the
Plaintiff’s
income
for
its
1971
taxation
year,
inter
alia,
the
amount
of
$18,233
which
was
described
as
excess
capital
cost
allowance
in
respect
of
class
8
depreciable
property,
and
which
was
determined
by
reducing
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
property
in
class
8
by
$91,166.
8.
The
Plaintiff
duly
objected
to
the
said
re-assessment
by
notice
dated
May
29,
1973
and
the
re-assessment
was
confirmed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
by
notification
dated
September
25,
1973.
The
plaintiff
in
its
1971
taxation
year,
and
in
its
antecedent
taxation
years,
was
subject
to
tax
by
the
Province
of
Quebec
under
the
Corporation
Tax
Act
(RSQ
1964,
c
67),
hereinafter
sometimes
referred
to
as
“the
provincial
Act”.
Under
that
Act
the
scheme
of
taxation
is
similar
to
that
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
(RSC
1952,
c
148).
The
provincial
Act
imposes
upon
every
company
subject
to
that
Act
an
annual
tax
equivalent
to
12%
of
the
net
revenue
in
each
of
its
financial
years.
Net
revenue
under
the
provincial
Act
is
analogous
to
taxable
income
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
that
in
each
instance
the
taxpayer
first
determines
its
income
or
profits
taking
into
account
those
deductions
permitted
by
law
in
earning
that
profit
and
when
that
amount
is
determined
then
that
amount
may
be
reduced
by
deductions
permitted
under
the
respective
statutes.
Under
the
provincial
Act
the
deduction
which
gives
rise
to
the
controversy
in
this
appeal
is
a
deduction
under
section
16a,
added
to
the
provincial
Act
by
SQ
1967-68,
c
28,
section
1,
which
reads:
16a.
(1)
For
the
purposes
of
this
section
the
following
expressions
and
words
mean:
(a)
“company”:
in
addition
to
its
ordinary
meaning,
a
company
contemplated
in
sub-paragraph
(a)
of
paragraph
4
of
section
2,
except
a
company
engaged
in
a
business
excluded
in
sub-paragraph
(b);
(b)
“manufacturing
or
processing
business”:
a
manufacturing
or
processing
business
within
the
meaning
of
the
regulations,
except
however
any
business
for
the
operation
of
gas
or
oil
wells,
or
for
mining,
logging
or
farming
operations,
any
construction
or
fishery
business
and
any
business
whose
principal
activity
is
the
wrapping,
packaging,
washing
or
sorting
of
products
or
merchandise;
(c)
“investment”:
the
portion
exceeding
$50,000
of
the
amounts
of
money
which
have
been
invested
by
a
company
in
a
manufacturing
or
processing
business,
during
any
of
its
financial
years,
for
the
construction
or
extension
of
works
or
manufactories
or
the
purchase
of
new
machinery,
tools
or
equipment
for
operating
works
or
manufactories,
to
the
extent
allowed
by
the
regulations.
(2)
Every
company
engaged
in
the
operation
of
a
manufacturing
or
processing
business
in
the
Province
of
Quebec
may,
in
computing
its
net
revenue,
deduct
an
amount
equal
to
thirty
per
cent
of
the
investments
made
by
it
in
such
business
during
the
period
commencing
on
the
1st
of
April
1968
and
ending
on
the
31st
of
March
1971.
(3)
Any
amount
which
may
be
deducted
under
this
section
during
a
financial
year
but
is
not
deducted
may
be
deducted
during
subsequent
financial
years.
(4)
The
amount
which
a
company
may
deduct
under
this
section
for
one
of
its
financial
years
shall
not
exceed
one-half
of
its
net
revenue
established
for
the
financial
year
concerned
before
such
deduction
is
made.
(5)
The
tax
reduction
obtained
under
this
section
shall
not
exceed
twelve
per
cent
of
the
amount
which
may
be
so
deducted
in
computing
the
net
revenue.
(6)
No
subsidy
or
premium
paid
to
a
company
under
the
Regional
Industrial
Development
Assistance
Act
(17
Elizabeth
Il,
chapter
27)
or
under
an
equivalent
plan
within
the
meaning
of
such
act
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
company’s
revenue,
and
it
shall
not
reduce
the
cost
of
any
property
for
the
purpose
of
the
capital
cost
allowance.
Section
163
quoted
above
was
amended
by
SQ
1971,
c
23,
section
1
as
follows:
1.
Section
16a
of
the
Corporation
Tax
Act
(Revised
Statutes,
1964,
chapter
67),
enacted
by
section
1
of
chapter
28
of
the
statutes
of
1968,
is
amended:
(a)
by
replacing
paragraph
(c)
of
subsection
(1)
by
the
following:
(c)
“investment”:
the
sum
of
the
amounts
of
money
which
have
been
invested
by
a
company
in
a
manufacturing
or
processing
business,
during
any
of
its
financial
years,
for
the
construction
or
extension
of
works
or
manufactories
or
the
purchase
of
new
machinery,
tools
or
equipment
for
operating
works
or
manufactories,
to
the
extent
allowed
by
the
regulations
but
solely
with
respect
to
the
portion
of
such
sum
which
exceeds
$50,000
if
such
amounts
were
invested
during
the
period
commencing
on
the
1st
of
April
1968
and
ending
on
the
31st
of
March
1971,
and
if
such
amounts
were
invested
during
the
period
beginning
on
the
1st
of
April
1971
and
ending
on
the
31st
of
March
1974,
with
respect
to
the
entire
sum
to
be
invested,
up
to
$10,000,000,
provided
however
that
the
sum
so
invested
is
at
least
$150,000;
(b)
by
inserting
after
subsection
(2)
the
following:
2a.
Every
company
which
is
engaged
in
the
operation
of
a
manufacturing
or
processing
business
in
the
province
of
Quebec
and
which
makes
an
investment
contemplated
in
paragraph
(a)
of
section
2
of
the
Québec
Industrial
Development
Assistance
Act
(1971,
chapter
64)
may,
if
a
certificate
has
been
issued
with
respect
to
such
investment
by
the
Minister
of
Industry
and
Commerce
in
accordance
with
subsection
(2b),
in
computing
its
net
revenue,
deduct:
(a)
an
amount
equal
to
thirty
per
cent
of
such
investment
if
it
was
made
in
zone
1
during
the
period
commencing
on
the
1st
of
April
1971
and
ending
on
the
31st
of
March
1974,
(b)
an
amount
equal
to
fifty
per
cent
of
such
investment
if
it
was
made
in
zone
Il
during
the
period
contemplated
in
paragraph
(a),
or
(c)
an
amount
equal
to
one
hundred
per
cent
of
such
investment
if
it
was
made
in
zone
III
during
the
period
contemplated
in
paragraph
(a).
2b.
A
company
may
avail
itself
of
the
advantages
provided
for
in
subsection
(2a)
provided
that
a
certificate
has
been
issued
to
it
by
the
Minister
of
Industry
and
Commerce
that
the
investment
with
respect
to
which
it
claims
such
advantages
is
subject
to
the
application
of
paragraph
(a)
of
section
2
of
the
Québec
Industrial
Development
Assistance
Act;
such
certificate
must
mention
whether
the
company
is
making
the
investments
which
entitle
it
to
avail
itself
of
the
advantages
provided
in
subsection
(2a)
in
zone
I,
zone
II
or
in
zone
III.
(d)
by
inserting
after
the
word
“under”
in
the
second
line
of
subsection
(6)
the
following:
“the
Regional
Development
Incentives
Act
(Statutes
of
Canada,
1968/69,
chapter
56);
or
lt
is
noted
that
in
the
amending
Act,
the
designation
proceeds
from
1(b)
to
1(d).
There
is
no
paragraph
designated
1(c)
which
was
apparently
omitted.
There
is
no
dispute
between
the
parties
that
in
the
plaintiff’s
1968
to
1971
taxation
years
the
plaintiff
satisfied
the
conditions
precedent
to
its
eligibility
as
outlined
in
paragraphs
16a(1)(a),
(b)
and
(c)
in
computing
its
net
revenue
for
the
purpose
of
the
provincial
Act
to
deduct
the
amount
expended
for
investments,
as
defined
in
paragraph
16a(1)(c),
for
its
1968,
1969
and
1970
taxation
years
and
for
its
1971
taxation
year
as
defined
in
paragraph
16a(1)(c)
as
amended
by
paragraph
1(a),
SQ
1971,
c
23.
In
computing
its
net
revenue
for
the
purpose
of
taxation
under
the
provincial
Act
the
plaintiff
took
advantage
of
subsection
16a(2)
with
respect
to
its
1968,
1969
and
1970
taxation
years,
and
with
respect
to
its
taxation
year
1971,
the
year
presently
under
review,
the
plaintiff
took
advantage
of
subsection
16a(2a)
to
compute
its
net
revenue.
By
doing
so
the
deductions
resulted
in
a
reduction
of
the
plaintiff’s
net
revenue
for
the
purposes
of
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
as
set
forth
in
paragraph
4
of
the
agreed
statement
of
facts.
This,
in
turn,
resulted
in
a
net
tax
reduction
to
the
plaintiff
under
the
provincial
Act
in
the
amount
of
$91,166,
the
compilation
of
which
is
outlined
in
paragraph
5
of
the
agreed
statement
of
facts.
There
is
no
dispute
between
the
parties
as
to
the
accuracy
of
this
amount.
Under
paragraph
11
(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
deduct
in
computing
its
income
for
a
taxation
year
such
amount
of
the
capital
cost
to
the
taxpayer
of
property
as
is
allowed
by
regulation.
By
Regulation
1100(1)(a)(viii)
a
taxpayer
in
computing
his
income
in
each
taxation
year
may
deduct
in
respect
of
Class
8
property
20%
of
the
capital
cost
of
that
property.
In
Schedule
B,
Class
8
property
is
defined
as
property
that
is
a
tangible
capital
asset
that
is
not
included
in
another
class
in
the
Schedule.
The
plaintiff
claimed
the
full
allowance
outlined
in
Regulation
1100(1
)(a)(viii)
and
in
Schedule
B.
In
assessing
the
plaintiff
as
he
did
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
did
so
on
the
assumption
that
the
deductions
made
by
the
plaintiff
in
computing
its
net
revenue
under
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act,
and
the
resultant
tax
saving
thereunder
by
the
plaintiff,
which
was
in
the
amount
of
$91,166,
was
in
respect
of
or
for
the
acquisition
of
property
and
therefore
the
capital
cost
of
that
property
to
the
taxpayer
is
deemed
to
be
the
capital
cost
thereof
minus
the
amount
of
the
grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance
received
by
the
plaintiff
from
the
Quebec
Government
under
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act,
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
20(6)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Accordingly
the
Minister
computed
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
the
property
at
$18,233
less
than
the
amount
claimed
and
assessed
the
plaintiff
accordingly.
The
amount
of
$18,233
by
which
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
was
reduced
was
arrived
at
by
the
simple
mathematical
process
of
taking
20%
of
the
Quebec
corporation
tax
saving
of
$91,166.
Again
there
is
no
dispute
between
the
parties
as
to
the
accuracy
of
that
figure.
The
dispute
between
the
parties,
and
the
crucial
issue
in
this
appeal,
is
whether
the
reduction
in
tax
as
a
consequence
of
the
deduction
in
net
revenue
enjoyed
by
the
plaintiff
under
section
16a
of
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
constitutes
a
“grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance”
within
the
meaning
of
those
words
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Paragraph
20(6)(h)
reads:
20.
(6)
For
the
purpose
of
this
section
and
regulations
made
under
paragraph
(a)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
11,
the
following
rules
apply:
(h)
where
a
taxpayer
has
received
or
is
entitled
to
receive
from
a
government,
municipality.
or
other
public
authority,
in
respect
of
or
for
the
acquisition
of
property,
a
grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance
other
than
an
amount
authorized
to
be
paid
under
an
Appropriation
Act
and
on
terms
and
conditions
approved
by
the
Treasury
Board
for
the
purpose
of
advancing
or
sustaining
the
technological
capability
of
Canadian
manufacturing
or
other
industry,
the
capital
cost
of
the
property
shall
be
deemed
to
be
the
capital
cost
thereof
to
the
taxpayer
minus
the
amount
of
the
grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance;
It
is
abundantly
clear
the
object
of
the
Legislature
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
in
enacting
16a
of
the
Corporation
Tax
Act
in
1967-68
and
by
the
subsequent
amendment
of
that
section
was
to
induce
those
engaged
in
the
manufacturing
and
processing
businesses
of
newly
conceived
products,
products
not
yet
manufactured
in
the
Province,
or
if
manufactured
in
the
Province
not
manufactured
in
sufficient
quantity
to
supply
domestic
and
international
markets,
to
locate
within
the
boundaries
of
Quebec.
To
induce
such
persons
to
do
so
concessions
are
held
out.
The
flat
rate
of
tax
under
the
Corporation
Tax
Act
is
12%
on
a
company’s
annual
net
revenue.
The
inducement
held
out
is
that
expenditures
laid
out
for
the
construction
of
factories
or
the
acquisition
of
machinery
and
equipment
may
be
deducted
from
net
revenue.
While
the
flat
rate
of
tax
of
12%
is
still
applicable
to
net
revenue
it
is
applicable
to
a
net
revenue
which
has
been
reduced.
The
result
is,
in
effect,
the
exaction
of
a
lesser
tax
than
would
otherwise
be
applicable
or
in
other
words,
a
reduction
in
tax.
This
legislation
may
be
termed
incentive.
On
the
other
hand
paragraph
20(6)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
may
be
termed
countervailing
legislation.
The
section
recognizes
that
a
taxpayer
may
receive
from
a
government,
municipality
or
other
public
authority
a
“grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance”
in
respect
of
or
for
the
acquisition
of
property
and,
in
that
event,
the
capital
cost
of
the
property
shall
be
deemed
to
be
the
capital
cost
thereof
to
the
taxpayer
minus
the
amount
of
the
“grant,
subsidy,
or
other
assistance”.
This
results
in
a
lesser
capital
cost
allowance
being
deductible
with
an
accordingly
increased
income
tax
being
payable.
The
determination
of
the
present
appeal
falls
upon
the
interpretation
of
paragraph
20(6)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
more
particularly
whether
the
tax
concession
which
enured
to
the
plaintiff
under
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
is
‘‘a
grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance”
within
the
meaning
of
those
words
as
used
in
paragraph
20(6)(h).
A
statute,
or
a
section
thereof,
must
be
construed
by
what
appears
to
have
been
the
intention
of
the
legislature
but
that
intention
must
be
ascertained
from
the
words
of
the
statute
and
not
from
any
general
inferences
to
be
drawn
as
to
the
object
of
the
statute.
It
is
axiomatic
that
the
words
used
in
a
statute
are
to
be
given
their
plain
and
ordinary
meaning
but
that
plain
and
ordinary
meaning
may
have
a
peculiar
meaning
dictated
by
the
context
in
which
the
words
are
used.
In
the
present
appeal
it
is
conceded
by
counsel
for
the
parties
that
the
words
“other
assistance”
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
are
general
words
and
construed
in
their
ordinary
meaning
are
sufficiently
broad,
standing
alone,
to
include
the
tax
concession
under
the
Quebec
Corporation
Tax
Act
enjoyed
by
the
plaintiff.
However
the
question
is
whether
the
general
words
“other
assistance”
are
to
be
construed
in
a
sense
restricted
to
things
ejusdem
generis
with
those
which
have
been
mentioned
before,
that
is
“grant”
and
“subsidy”.
If
the
particular
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”,
presuming
the
word
“grant”
to
be
a
particular
word,
exhaust
the
whole
genus
then
the
general
words
“other
assistance”
refer
to
some
larger
genus.
In
my
opinion
those
two
words
are
not
exhaustive
and
I
form
that
opinion
because
a
plethora
of
synonyms
occur
to
me
such
as
pecuniary
aid,
allowance,
bonus,
bounty,
gift,
financial
support,
amongst
many
others.
The
etymological
meaning
of
a
word
is
not
necessarily
the
meaning
of
the
word
which
the
context
requires
and
dictionaries
may
be
resorted
to
for
the
purpose
of
ascertaining
the
use
of
a
word
in
popular
language.
For
this
purpose
counsel
have
referred
me
to
standard
dictionaries,
it
being
conceded
that
the
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”
are
used
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
in
their
popular
sense
and
not
as
terms
of
art.
In
The
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary
(3rd
ed)
“grant”
is
defined
as
“3.
An
authoritative
bestowal
or
conferring
of
a
right,
etc;
c.
a
gift
or
assignment
of
money
etc
out
of
a
fund”.
In
addition
it
also
has
the
legal
meaning
of
a
conveyance
by
deed.
In
Jowitt,
The
Dictionary
of
English
Law,
“grant”
is
defined
as
“the
term
commonly
applied
to
rights
created
or
transferred
by
the
Crown,
eg,
grants
of
pensions,
patents,
charters,
franchises.
It
is
also
used
in
references
to
public
money
devoted
to
special
purposes”.
In
Funk
and
Wagnall’s
Dictionary
“subsidy”
is
defined
as
“1.
Pecuniary
aid
directly
granted
by
government
to
an
individual
or
private
commercial
enterprise
deemed
beneficial
to
the
public”.
“Subsidy”
is
defined
in
The
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary
(3rd
ed)
as:
“3.
A
grant
or
contribution
of
money.
c.
Financial
aid
furnished
by
a
state
or
a
public
corporation
in
furtherance
of
an
undertaking
or
the
upkeep
of
a
thing”.
Counsel
for
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
submitted
that
the
word
“grant”
has
in
itself
a
very
broad
meaning
and
for
that
reason
it
is
a
general
word.
From
that
premise
he
then
argued
that,
in
the
words
“grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance”,
there
was
but
one
specific
word,
that
is
“subsidy”,
and
relied
upon
United
Towns
Electric
Co
Ltd
v
Attorney-
General
for
Newfoundland,
[1939]
1
All
ER
423,
where
Lord
Thankerton
held
that
the
principle
of
ejusdem
generis
did
not
apply
in
that
‘a
single
species—for
example,
water
rates—does
not
constitute
a
genus”.
I
do
not
accept
the
premise
upon
which
counsel
for
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
founds
his
argument.
In
my
view
the
word
“grant”
as
used
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
is
not
a
general
word
but
in
view
of
its
dictionary
meaning
it
is
a
particular
word.
Again
referring
to
the
dictionary
meanings
of
the
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”
there
is
one
common
thread
throughout,
that
is
a
gift
or
assignment
of
money
by
government
or
public
authority
out
of
public
funds
to
a
private
or
individual
or
commercial
enterprise
deemed
to
be
beneficial
to
the
public
interest.
Subject
to
minor
refinements
the
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”
appear
from
their
dictionary
meanings
to
be
almost
synonymous.
I
am
of
the
view
that
rules
of
interpretation
or
canons
of
construction
which
have
been
established
judicially
must
be
applied
where
pertinent
and
in
so
saying
I
do
so
fully
cognizant
that
such
rules,
particularly
the
principle
of
ejusdem
generis,
are
a
useful
servant
but
a
dangerous
master.
The
ejusdem
generis
doctrine
is
as
old
as
Bacon’s
maxims.
That
rule,
which
I
repeat,
is
that
where
general
words
follow
an
enumeration
of
particular
things
they
do
not
introduce
changes
of
a
different
character.
In
my
judgment
the
familiar
rule—that
where
there
are
general
words
following
particular
and
specific
words
all
of
one
genus,
the
general
words
are
presumed
to
be
restricted
to
the
same
genus
as
the
particular
words—applies
to
the
words
“grant,
subsidy
or
other
assistance”
as
used
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
this
section
there
are
the
specific
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”
followed
by
the
general
words
“or
other
assistance”.
The
fact
is
that
the
general
words
“or
other
assistance”
can
hardly
avoid
being
ancillary
in
nature
to
the
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”.
It
seems
to
me
that
where
there
are
ancillary
words
of
this
nature
it
is
a
sound
rule
not
to
give
such
a
construction
to
the
ancillary
words
as
will
wipe
out
the
significance
of
the
particular
words
which
antecede
them.
As
I
have
said
before,
the
constant
and
dominating
feature
in
the
words
“grant”
and
“subsidy”
is
that
each
contemplates
the
gift
of
money
from
a
fund
by
government
to
a
person
for
the
public
weal.
Something
concrete
and
tangible
is
to
be
bestowed.
For
the
reasons
I
have
expressed
the
general
words
“or
other
assistance”
must
be
coloured
by
the
meaning
of
those
words.
In
the
present
instance
what
happened
was
that
the
Government
of
Quebec,
for
reasons
of
public
policy,
deemed
it
fit
to
forbear
from
exacting
from
companies
which
met
certain
prescribed
conditions,
as
the
plaintiff
did,
a
greater
tax
under
the
Corporation
Tax
Act
than
might
otherwise
have
been
done.
This
forbearance
to
exact
a
maximum
tax
as
an
inducement
to
manufacturers
is
different
from
the
act
of
making
a
grant
or
subsidy
available
to
such
persons
to
encourage
them
to
locate
in
the
Province
for
which
reason
I
conclude
that
the
tax
advantage
made
available
by
the
Quebec
government
to
the
plaintiff
is
not
“other
assistance”
within
the
limited
sense
of
those
words
as
used
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
While
it
is
not
conclusive
and
was
not
the
subject
of
comment
by
counsel
there
is
a
modicum
of
confirmation,
upon
which
I
do
not
rely,
in
reaching
the
conclusion
I
have
in
that
the
words
“a
grant,
subsidy,
or
other
assistance”
in
paragraph
20(6)(h)
are
immediately
followed
by
an
exception
which
governs
those
antecedent
words,
expressed
in
the
language
“other
than
an
amount
authorized
to
be
paid
'.
.
.”.
Those
words
constitute
an
exception
to
a
grant,
subsidy,
or
other
assistance
and
since
they
contemplate
the
payment
of
a
monetary
amount
they
are
susceptible
of
and
give
credence
to
the
interpretation
that
“grant”,
“subsidy”,
and
“other
assistance”
also
contemplate
the
active
payment
of
a
monetary
amount
rather
than
a
passive
forbearance
from
exacting
a
maximum
tax
which
would
otherwise
be
exigible.
If
the
intention
of
Parliament
had
been
otherwise
it
would
have
been
a
relatively
simple
matter
to
make
that
intention
abundantly
clear
by
the
use
of
appropriate
language
and
thereby
remove
any
ambiguity.
For
the
reasons
which
I
have
expressed
it
follows
that
the
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
its
taxable
costs.
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