Delmer
E
Taylor:—This
is
an
appeal
from
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1970,
1971,
1972
and
1973.
The
matter
at
issue
results
from
an
interpretation
placed
on
a
partnership
agreement
between
the
appellant
and
his
partners,
which
calls
for
division
of
profits
in
a
certain
manner,
and
therefore
the
responsibility
for
payment
of
appropriate
income
tax
by
the
partners
involved.
The
appellant
claims
in
his
Notice
of
Appeal
that
the
partnership
agreement
requires
that
“monies
received
on
admitting
a
new
partner
and
paid
to
a
retiring
partner
are
to
be
regarded
as
an
allocation
of
income”,
and
therefore
by
deduction,
in
either
situation,
taxable
in
the
hands
of
the
recipient,
or
at
least
not
taxable
in
the
hands
of
a
non-recipient.
The
respondent
assumed
in
reassessing
the
appellant
that:
(a)
the
amount
paid
by
the
appellant
to
a
retiring
partner
was
not
based
on
accounts
receivable;
(b)
the
amount
referred
to
in
paragraph
(a)
above
has
no
relation
to
the
assets
or
income
of
the
partnership
subject
to
the
provisions
of
paragraph
(c)
hereinafter;
(c)
a
partner’s
interest
on
retirement
was
determined
by
calculating
the
lesser
of:
(i)
the
percentage
of
three
prior
years’
average
income
of
the
appellant;
or
(ii)
initial
capital
contribution.
The
respondent
relies,
inter
alia,
upon
paragraph
12(1)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148
as
amended,
and
paragraph
18(1
)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended.
The
appellant
is
a
medical
doctor
practising
his
profession
in
Dawson
Creek,
British
Columbia
as
one
of
several
partners
in
the
Dawson
Creek
Medical
Clinic.
The
clinic
has
operated
as
a
“continuing”
partnership
since
approximately
1961
with
changes
from
time
to
time
in
the
doctors
involved
in
the
partnership,
and
with
adjustments
on
occasions
in
the
terms
and
conditions
of
the
partnership
arrangements.
Under
other
circumstances,
the
very
nature
of
this
“continuing”
partnership
might
be
a
subject
of
review,
but
in
my
opinion
it
does
not
enter
into
a
determination
of
the
question
before
the
Board
at
this
time.
The
major
item
of
evidence
submitted
was
Exhibit
A-1,
an
“agreement
made
the
1st
day
of
January
AD
1967”,
which
stands
as
the
basis
for
the
arrangements
between
the
partners.
The
Department
of
National
Revenue
has
added
back
to
the
income
of
the
appellant'for
the
years
in
question
his
proportionate
share
of
the
amounts
paid
in
the
same
years
to
a
retiring
partner;
the
claim
of
the
respondent
being
that
these
payments
to
the
retiring
partner
were
on
account
of
the
return
of
capital
invested,
and
therefore
not
deductible
in
arriving
at
the
net
taxable
income
to
be
apportioned
among
the
remaining
partners.
It
is
obvious
that
if
all
partners
agreed
on
the
proper
interpretation
of
the
partnership
document,
and
if
this
understanding
was
not
inconsistent
with
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
there
would
be
no
issue
before
the
Board.
It
appears,
however,
that
the
retiring
partner
is
content
with
the
ruling
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
since
it
means
he
has
no
income
tax
liability,
while
the
remaining
partners,
at
least
to
the
extent
represented
by
the
appellant,
are
not
satisfied
with
the
ruling
of
the
Department
because
of
the
income
tax
liability
involved.
In
essence,
the
Board
has
been
requested
to
interpret
the
partnership
agreement
in
this
respect.
It
was
observed
at
the
hearing
that
it
might
have
been
more
appropriate
if
other
interested
parties,
including
the
dissident
partner,
had
been
joined
in
the
appeal
so
that
all
evidence
might
have
been
heard
in
common.
Since
this
was
not
done,
this
decision
will
relate
only
to
the
matter
of
the
appellant’s
contention
regarding
the
reassessments
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
no
attempt
will
be
made
to
interpret
the
partnership
agreement
or
to
examine
the
question
of
its
legality,
which
was
also
raised
at
the
hearing.
In
the
partnership
document
referred
to
as
Exhibit
A-1,
there
are
two
sections
significant
to
this
matter—the
clause
dealing
with
the
admission
of
partners,
and
the
ones
dealing
with
the
retirement
of
partners.
These
are
respectively
clause
33
and
clauses
23,
24
and
25
and
are
quoted
in
their
entirety.
33.
New
partners
may
be
admitted
to
the
partnership
upon
the
consent
in
writing
of
not
less
than
three-quarters
(34)
of
the
partners
and
upon
admission
shall
be
deemed
to
be
full
partners
in
the
same
manner
as
though
they
were
parties
to
this
agreement
and
they
shall
subscribe
their
names
to
this
agreement
and
this
agreement
and
any
amendments
hereto.
shall
continue
to
be
in
full
force
and
effect
and
binding
upon
all
parties.
New
partners
shall
pay
to
the
partners
of
the
partnership
at
the
time
of
admission
jointly,
the
sum
of
Ten
Thousand
($10,000.00)
Dollars,
provided
that
if
the
new
partnership
shall
have
been
employed
by
the
partnership
on
a
salary
for
a
period
of
eighteen
(18)
months,
the
new
partner
shall
pay
to
the
partners
the
sum
of
Seven
Thousand
Five
Hundred
($7,500.00)
Dollars
and
if
any
partner
shall
have
been
employed
by
the
partnership
on
salary
for
a
term
of
two
(2)
years
or
more,
the
new
partner
shall
pay
the
sum
of
Five
Thousand
($5,000.00)
Dollars.
23.
Upon
the
death
or
retirement
of
any
partner
or
partners
the
remaining
partners
shall
purchase
the
interest
of
the
deceased
or
retiring
partner
or
partners.
The
interest
of
the
deceased
or
retiring
partner
shall
be
paid
in
four
(4)
equal
instalments,
the
first
instalment
to
be
paid
forthwith
upon
the
death
or
retirement
of
the
partner
and
the
remainder
in
three
(3)
equal
annual
instalments
on
the
anniversary
date
of
the
death
or
retirement.
Provided,
however,
that
if
the
partners
are
required
by
the
terms
of
this
agreement
to
purchase
the
interest
of
more
than
two
deceased
or
retiring
partners
at
any
time,
the
effective
date
of
purchase
shall
be
the
date
of
death
or
retirement,
but
the
payment
of
the
interest
of
any
deceased
or
retiring
partner
in
excess
of
two
shall
be
postponed
and
shall
be
paid
consecutively
according
to
the
date
of
death
or
retirement.
The
first
payment
to
be
paid
one
(1)
year
following
the
date
of
the
final
payment
to
a
prior
deceased
or
retiring
partner.
24.
The
parties
hereto
mutually
covenant
and
agree
that
upon
the
death
of
any
one
or
more
of
them,
the
survivor
or
survivors
shall
purchase
and
the
estate
of
the
deceased
partner
or
partners
shall
sell,
the
interest
of
the
deceased
in
the
partnership
to
the
survivor
or
survivors.
There
shall
be
no
benefit
of
survivorship
between
the
partners
and
the
personal
representatives
of
any
partner
who
dies
shall
be
entitled
to
the
share
of
such
partner.
The
value
of
the
interest
of
the
deceased
partner
shall
be
arrived
at
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
next
following
paragraph.
25.
Upon
the
death
or
retirement
of
any
partner,
his
interest
in
the
partnership
shall
be
calculated
in
the
following
manner:—
1.
His
average
annual
income
from
the
partnership
during
the
preceding
three
(3)
years
or
during
the
period
that
he
was
a
member
of
the
partnership,
whichever
is
less,
shall
be
reduced
by
twenty-five
(25%)
per
cent.
2.
One-tenth
(1/10)
of
the
amount
arrived
at
by
the
preceding
calculation
shall
be
multiplied
by
the
number
of
years
that
such
deceased
or
retiring
partner
has
been
a
member
of
the
partnership
up
to
a
maximum
of
ten
(10)
years.
Provided,
however,
that
the
value
of
the
interest
of
a
deceased
or
retiring
partner
shall
not
be
less
than
the
amount
the
deceased
or
retiring
partner
paid
to
become
a
partner.
The
original
intention
of
the
partners
in
agreeing
to
these
clauses
remains
very
much
in
doubt,
and
since
the
appellant
himself,
and
the
retired
partner
who
has
received
funds
for
his
interest,
were
two
of
the
original
signing
partners,
there
is
little
value
to
be
gained
in
pursuing
the
matter
in
a
purely
academic
manner.
It
is
difficult
to
determine
what
might
have
been
the
results
or
what
might
now
be
the
Situation
if
a
more
literal
meaning
of
these
sections
had
been
followed.
What
is
not
in
doubt,
however,
is
precisely
that
which
did
happen,
and
that
it
provided
proportionate
benefits
or
disbenefits
to
all
concerned.
The
important
words
in
clause
33
are:
“new
partners
shall
pay
to
the
partners
of
the
partnership
at
the
time
of
admission
jointly,
the
sum
of
Ten
Thousand
($10,000.00)
Dollars
.
.
.
.”
Evidence
provided
to
the
Board
showed
that
no
doctor
had
ever
been
admitted
as
a
partner
who
had
not
previously
been
employed
as
a
doctor
by
the
partnership,
thereby
contributing
in
some
substantial
manner
to
the
accumulation
of
the
accounts
receivable
up
to
the
date
of
his
admission
to
partnership;
and
that
in
fact
no
doctor
had
ever
paid
in
cash
or
property,
anything
on
admission
to
the
partnership.
The
amounts
referred
to
in
Clause
33,
and
which
under
certain
other
circumstances
might
have
been
regarded
as
contributions
to
capital,
were
in
practice
only
a
reduction
of
that
newly
admitted
partner’s
share
in
the
cash
receipts
from
the
date
of
his
admission
until
the
reduction
totalled
the
amount
referred
to
in
the
admission
clause
pertaining
to
his
case—ie
$10,000,
$7,500
or
$5,000.
He
did
not
have
these
non-received
amounts
credited
to
him
as
income,
and
he
did
not
pay
income
tax
on
them.
They
were
credited
to
the
income
of
the
former
partners,
who
paid
income
tax
on
them,
and
represented
nothing
more
or
less
than
an
estimate
of
the
unwithdrawn
and
often
yet
uncollected
accounts
receivable
interest
of
the
former
partners,
in
excess
of
the
interest
of
the
newly-admitted
partner,
at
the
date
of
his
admission.
Specific
examination
of
the
income
tax
returns
of
the
appellant
together
with
sworn
testimony
from
the
witnesses
confirmed
this
point.
The
use
of
the
amounts
involved
from
clause
33,
ie
$10,000,
$7,500
or
$5,000,
although
based
on
the
only
asset
available
to
the
partnership,
its
accounts
receivable,
nevertheless
was
only
for
convenience
and
simplicity
in
calculation
and
in
maintaining
the
basics
of
an
ongoing
business.
With
regard
to
the
provision
dealing
with
retirement
from
the
partnership,
clauses
23,
24
and
25,
it
can
reasonably
be
assumed,
as
is
the
claim
of
the
appellant,
that
the
converse
situation
would
obtain.
The
retiring
partner
would
be
accorded
his
interest
in
the
accumulated
accounts
receivable
at
the
date
of
retirement,
and
again
for
convenience
and
simplicity
calculated
according
to
the
formula
in
clause
25,
and
paid
according
to
clause
23.
That
this
amount
of
the
retiring
partner’s
interest
may
be
regarded
in
somewhat
the
same
light
as
the
admission
provision
under
clause
33,
is
supported
by
the
section
of
clause
25
which
reads
as
follows:
Provided,
however,
that
the
value
of
the
interest
of
a
deceased
or
retiring
partner
shall
not
be
less
than
the
amount
the
deceased
or
retiring
partner
paid
to
become
partner.
Without
determining
a
matter
which
is
not
before
this
Board
(that
is
the
liability
for
income
tax
of
a
retiring
partner
on
the
funds
received
after
his
retirement
from
the
partnership),
it
can
be
determined
that
at
the
minimum,
these
payments
should
not
be
taxable
income
in
the
hands
of
the
appellant.
These
amounts
were
received
in
cash
by
the
retiring
partner,
and
therefore
differ
quite
markedly
from
the
calculated
amounts
determined
for
admission
under
clause
33.
As
a
matter
of
clarification
it
should
be
pointed
out
that
probably
the
genesis
of
this
appeal
was
through
the
inclusion
as
an
expense
item
in
the
Statements
of
Income
of
the
partnership
of
certain
amounts
annually
described
as
“Separation
payment
to
retiring
partners’.
It
was
explained
to
the
Board
by
the
accountant
responsible
that
this
was
probably
not
the
best
way
of
showing
this
amount,
and
the
amount
should
have
been
shown
on
the
Statement
of
Partners
Accounts
as
distribution
of
income
to
the
retired
partners.
It
was
apparently
because
of
this
accounting
difference
that
the
respondent
added
the
proportionate
share
of
this
amount
back
to
the
appellant's
income.
The
appellant
had
originally
filed
his
personal
income
tax
return
correctly,
by
allowing
in
the
return
an
adjustment
for
this
accounting
treatment.
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed.