Delmer
E
Taylor
(orally:
March
28,
1977):—This
is
an
appeal
from
R
M
Helm
with
respect
to
the
1974
taxation
year
as
a
result
of
the
disallowance
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
of
an
amount
of
$600
claimed
as
an
education
deduction
by
the
appellant.
The
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
is
brought
into
question,
both
by
the
appellant
and
the
respondent,
is
paragraph
110(9)(b)
and
the
matter
at
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
received
or
did
not
receive
any
amount
in
connection
with
his
employment
or
function
with
the
University
of
Manitoba
in
research
work,
which
would
disqualify
him
under
that
section.
General
agreement
has
been
put
forth
by
both
the
appellant
and
counsel
for
the
respondent
on
all
matters
except
that
point.
The
appellant’s
position
is
that
he
did
not
receive
the
grant,
directly
or
specifically,
but
only
as
part
of
a
larger,
overall
program.
There
seems
to
be
no
disagreement
on
that
point
with
the
respondent.
But
there
was
this
larger
program
for
which
some
grant
was
received
by
the
University,
and
the
view
of
the
respondent
is
that,
in
fact,
the
participation
by
the
appellant
in
that
larger
amount
did
thereby
constitute,
in
effect,
a
sub-grant
or
a
grant
by
some
kind
of
definition.
For
the
record
it
would
be
worthwhile
reading
the
section
at
issue:
110.
(9)
For
the
purposes
of
paragraphs
(1)(g)
and
(h),
(b)
“qualifying
educational
program”
means
a
program
of
not
less
than
3
consecutive
weeks
duration
that
provides
that
each
student
taking
the
program
spend
not
less
than
10
hours
per
week
on
courses
or
work
in
the
program,
but,
in
relation
to
any
particular
student,
does
not
include
any
such
program
(i)
if
the
student
received,
from
a
person
with
whom
he
was
dealing
at
arm’s
length,
any
allowance,
benefit,
grant
or
reimbursement
for
expenses
in
respect
of
the
program,
other
than.
.
.
.
There
are
two
sections
which
follow
dealing
with
certain
exceptions
which
are
not
relevant
to
this
appeal.
The
Board
has
determined
from
the
appellant
that
he
does
not
consider
this
amount
a
scholarship,
fellowship
or
a
bursary.
Neither
does
the
appellant
appear
to
consider
the
amount
as
income
such
as
salary
or
wages
associated
with
his
particular
work
at
the
University.
However,
there
is
no
doubt
in
the
mind
of
the
Board
that
whether
or
not
this
was
a
grant,
it
was
at
least
an
allowance
or
a
benefit.
Further,
if
not
covered
under
the
particular
section
of
the
Act
argued
here
(110(9)(b)(i)),
then
one
would
need
to
look
very
carefully
at
clause
(b)(ii)(A)
of
the
same
section
which
reads
as
follows:
(ii)
if
the
program
was
taken
by
the
student
(A)
during
a
period
in
respect
of
which
he
received
income
from
an
office
or
employment,
.
.
.
In
the
opinion
of
the
Board,
the
funds
received
by
the
appellant
are
clearly
covered
by
either
one
or
both
sections—as
an
allowance
or
a
benefit
(110(9)(b)(i)),
or
in
connection
with
income
received
from
an
office
or
employment
(110(9)(b)(ii)).
The
appellant
cannot
logically
claim
complete
immunity.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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