Roland
St-Onge
(orally:
November
15,
1976):—The
appeal
of
Ronald
E
Volk
came
before
me
on
November
15,
1976
at
the
City
of
Winnipeg,
Manitoba.
It
involves
different
amounts
paid
by
the
appellant
to
his
wife
for
the
benefit
of
his
children
in
the
1972
and
1973
taxation
years.
In
those
years
the
appellant
first
entered
into
a
separation
agreement,
which
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1,
dated
October
18,
1972,
under
which
he
paid
$55
per
week
as
maintenance
to
his
wife
and
$50
for
his
children,
which
amounts
were
allowed
by
the
respondent
as
deductions
pursuant
to
paragraph
60(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63.
In
addition
to
the
above-mentioned
amounts,
the
appellant
claimed
as
deductions
the
sums
of
$3,604.04
and
$3,504.01
for
his
1972
and
1973
taxation
years
respectively,
which
amounts
were
paid
for
maintaining
the
residence,
at
58
Glencoe
Avenue
in
Winnipeg,
occupied
by
his
wife
and
children.
The
respondent
refused
to
allow
such
deductions
on
the
grounds
that
they
were
not
paid
as
(1)
alimony,
(2)
on
a
periodic
basis,
and
(3)
to
his
wife
for
her
maintenance
and
that
of
the
children
of
the
marriage.
The
appellant
testified
that
the
written
separation
agreement
took
effect
on
July
19,
1972,
when
he
signed
it,
and
from
which
date
he
paid
$105
per
week
to
his
wife
as
maintenance
and
to
Mr
and
Mrs
Dold
some
$150
a
month
as
a
mortgage
payment.
He
also
testified
that
his
wife
was
not
present
when
he
signed
the
written
separation
agreement
and
that
her
signature
was
not
on
the
said
document
as
of
that
day.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that
the
written
separation
agreement
was
executed
on
July
19,
1972
because,
at
that
time,
both
parties
had
fully
agreed
to
all
the
terms
of
the
written
agreement.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
it
is
self-evident
that
the
written
separation
agreement
was
not
signed
by
the
appellant’s
wife
until
October
18,
1972
and,
consequently,
was
completed
on
that
date.
For
this
reason,
the
appellant
is
not
entitled
to
deduct
any
payments
made
prior
to
October
18,
1972.
As
for
the
mortgage
payments,
it
is
well
established
now,
especially
since
the
decision
in
Attorney-General
of
Canada
v
Weaver,
[1975]
CTC
646;
75
DTC
5462,
that
such
payments
can
in
no
way
whatsoever
be
considered
as
alimony
payments.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
those
mortgage
payments
constitute
an
increase
in
the
assets
of
the
appellant,
since
they
are
payments
for
a
residence
in
which
he
holds
an
interest
as
a
joint
tenant.
I
would
like
to
refer
to
paragraph
60(b)
which
reads:
60.
There
may
be
deducted
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(b)
an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year,
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
pursuant
to
a
written
agreement,
as
alimony
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
for
the
maintenance
of
the
recipient
thereof,
children
of
the
marriage,
or
both
the
recipient
and
children
of
the
marriage,
if
he
was
living
apart
from,
and
was
separated
pursuant
to
a
divorce,
judicial
separation
or
written
separation
agreement
from,
his
spouse
or
former
spouse
to
whom
he
was
required
to
make
the
payment
at
the
time
the
payment
was
made
and
throughout
the
remainder
of
the
year;
In
order
to
be
able
to
benefit
from
this
section,
the
appellant
must
comply
strictly
with
this
section.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
I
consider
that
the
appellant
failed
to
bring
himself
within
this
section
and,
for
this
reason,
I
have
to
dismiss
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.