Delmer
E
Taylor:—This
is
an
appeal
against
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
year
1975
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
a
deduction
in
the
amount
of
$450
for
child
care
expenses.
The
appellant,
a
man,
contended
that
section
63
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
discriminatory
in
that
it
allows
the
deduction
claimed
to
a
woman
but
not
to
a
man
under
similar
circumstances,
and
that.
it
thereby
violated
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights.
The
respondent
relied
upon:
(a)
the
provisions
of
section
63
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148,
as
amended
by
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
in
that
the
appellant
did
not
meet
the
qualifications
required
for
the
deduction;
and
(b)
upon
sections
1
and
2
of
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights
in
that
section
63
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
does
not
discriminate
as
to
the
right
of
the
individual
to
equality
before
the
law
and
the
protection
of
the
law
by
reason
of
sex.
The
appellant
is
a
lawyer
whose
wife,
during
the
year
in
question,
was
a
student.
There
is
apparently
no
dispute
that
expenses
were
incurred
by
the
appellant
for
care
of
the
couple’s
child.
The
dispute
is
only
that
the
appellant
did
not
meet
any
of
the
criteria
which
are
applied
to
a
man
under
paragraph
63(1
)(b)
of
the
Act.
There
are
no
similar
criteria,
in
fact
no
qualifying
provisions
at
all,
which
apply
to
a
woman
under
paragraph
63(1)(a)
of
the
Act.
In
addition
to
requesting
that
the
Board
declare
section
63
of
the
Act
“inoperative”
on
the
above
alleged
grounds
of
discrimination,
the
appellant
asked
that
the
Board
exercise
its
own
discretion
and
allow
to
him
the
deduction
which
was
clearly
provided
for,
in
his
opinion,
to
a
woman
in
similar
circumstances.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
no
discrimination
was
involved
since
Parliament
had
merely
established
a
certain
class
of
men
under
section
63
(those
to
whom
the
provisions
could
be
applied)
and
within
that
class
so
defined
there
was
no
discrimination—all
would
be
treated
equally.
Further,
he
argued
that
Parliament
could
enact
specific:
legislation
giving.
certain
allowances
and
exemptions
where
the
reason
for
so
doing
was
sound—and
in
this
instance
Parliament’s
intent
had
not
been
to
deny
the
deduction
to
certain
men,
but
to
provide
for
it
to
certain
others.
Finally,
counsel
stated
that
even
if
the
Board
found
that
section
63
of
the
Act
was
discriminatory,
the
Board
had
no
power
to
allow
the
deduction
to
the
appellant
since
he
clearly
did
not
qualify,
even
by
his
own
admission.
Counsel
referred
the
Board
to
several
cases
touching
on
the
matter
but
relied
heavily
upon
Regina
v
Drybones,
9
DLR
(3d)
473.
The
Board
appreciates
the
complexity
of
the
argument
presented
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
but
the
Board
is
thoroughly
impressed
by
the
direct
simplicity
of
the
argument
presented
by
the
appellant.
By
any
reasonable
standards
section
63
of
the
Act
makes
a
distinction
in
treatment
between
(a)
a
woman
and
(b)
a
man,
and
the
implementation
of
that
distinction
provides
the
deduction
in
a
completely
unqualified
manner
to
a
woman,
but
in
a
highly
qualified
manner
to
a
man.
It
would
indeed
be
difficult
to
reach
a
conclusion
that
all
men
and
all
women
were
being
dealth
with
in
an
equal
manner
under
this
section,
and
I
have
failed
to
find
substance
in
the
argument
of
counsel
for
the
respondent
regarding
the
basis
upon
which
he
concluded
that
Parliament
intended
that
simply
by
creating
a
class
of
men,
and
treating
all
within
that
class
equally
would
avoid
the
contention
of
this
appellant
that
the
section
of
the
Act
involved
is
applied
differently
to
men
and
women
in
general.
Nevertheless,
my
reading
of
the
relevant
case
law
leads
me
to
the
view
that,
for
a
sound
and
acknowledged
purpose,
it
is
within
the
powers
of
Parliament
to
make
a
distinction
such
as
that
expressed
in
this
section
of
the
Act.
The
fact
that
in
the
pleadings
of
this
particular
case
that
purpose
has
not
been
made
clear
does
not,
however,
in
my
opinion,
allow
to
this
Board
the
right
to
declare
this
section
of
the
Act
inoperative,
or
in
violation
of
the
Bill
of
Bights.
This
Board
can
only
determine
whether
or
not
the
appellant
meets
the
criteria
which
would
allow
him
such
deduction
and
it
has
never
been
the
appellant’s
contention
that
he
did
meet
the
relevant
provisions
under
paragraph
63(1
)(b)
of
the
Act
which
apply
to
a
man.
The
appeal
is
therefore
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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