The
Chairman
[TRANSLATION]:—This
is
an
appeal
by
Ghislain
M
Gauthier
against
an
assessment
for
the
1974
taxation
year.
The
source
of
the
dispute
in
this
case
concerns
contributions
made
by
the
tax-
payer
in
1973
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
in
excess
of
the
amount
allowed
him
by
the
Income
Tax
Act.
No
deduction
was
allowed
for
these
contributions.
Facts
In
1973
the
taxpayer
was
employed
by
a
company
which
did
not
have
a
compulsory
retirement
or
pension
plan,
and
he
therefore
chose
to
create
a
pension
fund
for
himself
by
contributing
$4,000
to
a
Royal
Trust
registered
retirement
savings
plan,
as
the
Act
permitted
him
to
do
in
the
circumstances.
For
this
purpose
he
made
an
initial
payment
of
$2,500,
with
the
intention
of
making
up
the
balance
of
the
authorized
amount
later
in
1973
by
paying
a
further
$1,500
into
the
registered
retirement
savings
plan.
However,
during
1973
the
taxpayer
left
his
former
job
and
was
hired
by
the
Department
of
the
Environment,
where
the
retirement
and
pension
plan
is
compulsory
and
automatic.
In
the
circumstances,
the
taxpayer
was
authorized
by
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
deduct
only
$2,500
from
his
income.
Thus
for
the
taxation
year
1973,
since
the
taxpayer
had
already
paid
$2,500
into
the
Royal
Trust
registered
retirement
Savings
plan,
he
had
paid
an
excess
of
$1,423.90
into
the
government
pension
fund,
and
the
said
sum
was
not
deductible
for
the
1973
taxation
year.
The
taxpayer
stated
that
the
representatives
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
had
told
him
that
he
could
deduct
the
overpayment
of
$1,423.90
in
1973
by
spreading
it
over
the
three
following
years,
adding
a
fraction
of
the
amount
of
the
overpayment
to
the
Royal
Trust
registered
retirement
savings
plan
so
as
not
to
exceed
the
amount
of
$2,500
which
he
was
allowed
to
deduct
annually.
The
taxpayer
did
this.
For
the
taxation
year
1974
the
taxpayer
added
to
the
amount
of
his
contributions
to
the
government
retirement
fund
($1,875.09)
part
of
the
amount
of
$1,423.90
overpaid
in
1973
to
the
Royal
Trust
registered
retirement
savings
plan,
namely
$624.91,
so
that
he
would
contribute
a
total
of
$2,500
to
the
two
retirement
savings
plans.
In
1975
and
1976
he
applied
the
amounts
of
$480
and
$318
respectively,
in
the
same
way
and
for
the
same
reasons.
By
notice
of
assessment
dated
August
5,
1975
the
respondent,
considering
that
the
overpayment
of
contributions
had
been
made
during
the
calendar
year
1973
in
the
amount
of
$1,423.90,
refused
to
allow
the
sum
of
$624.91
as
a
deductible
contribution
to
a
retirement
savings
plan
for
the
taxation
year
1974.
The
taxpayer
stated
that
since
the
date
of
assessment
for
1974,
from
August
5,
1975
to
February
14,
1977,
the
efforts
of
both
parties
involved
in
the
dispute
had
failed
to
resolve
the
problem.
Submissions
The
taxpayer
maintained
that
after
paying
the
amount
of
$2,500
into
the
Royal
Trust
registered
retirement
savings
plan
he
could
not
avoid
contributing
to
the
government
retirement
fund,
since
this
was
a
condition
of
work.
Knowing
that
in
the
circumstances
he
would
only
be
able
to
deduct
the
amount
of
$2,500,
the
taxpayer
admitted
that
in
1973
he
had
paid
an
excess
of
$1,423.90
into
a
retirement
savings
plan
and
that
this
amount
was
taxable
in
1973.
The
taxpayer
stated
under
oath
that
he
had
followed
to
the
letter
the
instructions
received
from
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
in
leaving
the
amount
of
$1,423.90
in
the
retirement
savings
plan,
but
spreading
the
surplus
over
a
period
of
three
subsequent
years.
The
appellant
alleged
that
even
though
he
cannot
be
considered
to
be
at
fault
at
any
stage
of
these
transactions,
the
Minister’s
assessment
dated
August
5,
1975
caused
him
significant
and
serious
injury.
The
taxpayer
maintained
that
according
to
the
Act
he
was
entitled
to
deduct
from
his
income
in
1974
a
maximum
amount
of
$2,500
for
retirement
savings
contributions,
and
he
planned
to
do
this
by
applying
to
his
Royal
Trust
registered
retirement
savings
plan
the
amount
of
$624.91
(part
of
the
amount
overpaid
in
1973)
which
the
Department
had
told
him
was
deductible.
The
taxpayer
alleged
that
in
subsequently
disallowing
this
deduction,
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
not
only
changed
its
mind
about
whether
the
amount
of
$624.91
was
deductible,
but
also
prevented
him
from
contributing
to
the
retirement
savings
fund
the
full
amount
of
$2,500
which
would
have
allowed
him
to
benefit
from
deducting
this
amount.
The
taxpayer
also
maintained
that
he
did
not
withdraw
the
amount
of
$1,423.90
overpaid
in
1973
from
the
retirement
savings
plan,
and
since
he
could
not
deduct
this
amount
from
his
income,
the
taxation
of
the
benefits
which
he
receives
from
the
retirement
savings
plan
will
constitute
double
taxation
to
the
amount
of
this
overpayment.
The
taxpayer
therefore
asked
for
permission
to
withdraw
from
his
retirement
savings
plan
the
overpayment
of
$1,423.90
made
in
1973,
without
being
required
to
pay
tax
a
second
time.
Even
though
the
only
taxation
year
in
question
here
is
1974,
the
amount
under
dispute
is
only
$624.91
and
the
Board’s
decision
cannot
go
beyond
the
appeal
brought
before
it,
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
decision
made
on
this
case
could
affect
the
appellant’s
assessment
in
subsequent
years
so
far
as
this
same
transaction
is
concerned.
After
examining.
the
facts
in
this
case
and
analyzing
the
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
dealing
with
registered
retirement
savings
plans,
and
taking
into
account
the
legislator’s
obvious
intention
to
encourage
taxpayers
to
build.
up
a
retirement
fund,
I
think
it
is
impossible
to
conclude
that
he
foresaw
and
intended
under
any
circumstances
that,
in
the
application
of
these
sections,
a
taxpayer
should
be
taxed
twice
when
he
was
actually
trying
to
build
up
a
retirement
fund
for
himself.
It
may
be
that
the
wording
of
the
sections
dealing
with
registered
retirement
savings
plans
is
not
clear
enough,
and
that
the
application
of
these
sections
gives
rise
to
real
anomalies
between
the.
literal
application
of
the
Act
and
the
obvious
aim
of
the
legislation.
In
my
opinion,
the
Board
should
indicate
in
its
reasons
for
judgment
what
appear
to
it
to
be
contradictory
and
inequitable
results
of
the
application
of
these
sections,
results
which
were
certainly
not
intended
or
foreseen
by
the
legislator.
Along
the
same
lines,
the
old
maxim
that
ignorance
of
the
law
is
no
excuse
for
breaking
it
is
doubtless
still
valid,
but
the
law
must
be
clearly
established
before
this
maxim
can
be
applied
if
the
fundamental
principles
of
natural
justice
are
to
be
respected.
In
administrative
legislation
the
law
often
seems
to
be
much
more
nebulous
than
where
criminal
or
civil
law
is
concerned,
to
the
point
where,
at
least
in
dealing
with
the
Income
Tax
Act,
even
the
officers
in
charge
of
administering
the
Act
very
often
appear
unable
to
give
correct
and
authoritative
advice
to
a
taxpayer
who
is
honestly
trying
to
understand
the
Act
and
the
procedure
to
follow
in
order
to
comply
with
it.
In
such
circumstances
can
the
taxpayer
in
all
justice
be
accused
of
ignorance
of
the
Act
and
made
to
bear
the
same
responsibility
as
if
he
had
deliberately
broken
a
clear
and
precise
law?
It
is
easy
to
understand
why
the
Minister
cannot
be
held
responsible
for
his
employees’
mistakes,
and
there
can
be
no
doubt
that
this
principle
is
necessary
and
must
continue
to
exist.
The
fact
remains,
however,
that
applying
this
principle
in
all
circumstances
without
exception
sometimes
causes
very
significant
injury
to
the
taxpayer,
or
even
serious
injustice.
It
seems
to
me
under
the
circumstances
that
the
legislator’s
intent
Should
be
clarified,
thus
enabling
the
Department’s
employees
to
know
the
extent
of
the
Act
and
to
give
accurate
and
confident
advice
to
taxpayers
seeking
information
about
the
Act
and
the
procedures
they
must
follow.
In
the
case
before
the
Board
it
is
not
a
question
of
sympathy
or
even
of
fairness.
In
my
view,
a
serious
question
of
law
arises,
namely
whether
it
is
legally
possible
to.
hold
a
taxpayer
responsible
for
not
complying
with
the
provisions
of
an
Act
which
contains
a
contradiction,
the
application
of
which
is
unclear
and
concerning
which
the
taxpayer
received
and
meticulously
followed
the
instructions
of
the
very
people
who
are
supposed
to
apply
it.
The
facts
of
this
appeal
are
exactly
designed
to
reveal,
even
through
an
obiter
dictum,
what
seems
to
me
to
be
an
uncertainty
within
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
itself
as
to
the
wording
and
application
of
certain
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
uncertainty
can
and
should
only
be
corrected
at
its
source.
In
his
notice
of
appeal
the
taxpayer
asks
the
Board
to
authorize
him
to
withdraw
from
his
retirement
savings
plan
the
amount
overpaid
in
1973
which
he
was
not
allowed
to
deduct,,
and
not
to
tax
the
amount
a
second
time.
It
is
clear
that
the
appellant
has
not
yet
withdrawn
the
amount
from
the
retirement
savings
plan,
and
it
follows
that
he
has
not
yet
incurred
double
taxation.
In
my
opinion
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Board,
which
here
has
before
it
an
appeal
against
an
assessment
for
the
1974
taxation
year,
in
which
the
issue
is
whether
an
amount
of
$624.91
can
be
deducted
as
a
contribution
to
a
retirement
savings
plan,
cannot
authorize
the
taxpayer
to
withdraw
an
amount
of
$1,423.90
from
the
retirement
savings
plan
without
being
taxed.
The
respondent’s
submission,
to
the
effect
that
since
the
excess
contribution
of
$1,423.90
had
been
paid
into
a
retirement
savings
plan
during
the
year
1973,
a
part
of
this
amount
($624.91)
cannot
be
allowed
as
a
contribution
to
a
retirement
savings
plan
made
during
1974,
is
without
doubt
correct
in
law.
However,
this
legal
conclusion
points
up
a
significant
anomaly.
It
is
clear
that
the
amount
of
$1,423.90
paid
into
a
retirement
savings
plan
in
excess
in
1973
was
taxable
in
1973.
If
the
respondent
had,
in
his
assessment,
taxed
the
full
amount
of
$1,423.90
in
1973,
then
if
the
taxpayer
withdrew
the
amount
from
the
retirement
savings
plan
in
1973
or
later
received
payments
from
the
retirement
savings
plan,
he
would
have
to
pay
tax
a
second
time
on
the
amount
of
$1,423.90.
Even
though
the
taxpayer
has
left
the
disallowed
amount
of
$1,423.90
in
his
retirement
savings
plan,
he
will
still
have
to
pay
tax
on
the
same
amount
for
the
second
time
when
the
plan
matures;
not
to
mention
the
fact
that
by
following
the
Department’s
instructions.
the
taxpayer
was
deprived
of
the
opportunity
to
contribute
an
additional
sum
to
his
retirement
savings
plan
and
take
advantage
of
the
$2,
500
maximum
deduction
to
which
he
was
entitled
in
1974.
What
are
we
to
conclude?
That
the
respondent
is
right
in
law
but
the
appellant
is
still
not
wrong?
Although
such
a
conclusion
would
be
a
strong
indication
that
there
is
a
fundamental
problem
in
the
Act
or
in
the
way
it
is
applied,
it
is
legally
impossible
for
the
Board
to
make
such
a
finding.
Decision
For
these
reasons,
the
Board
has
no
alternative
but
to
dismiss
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.