Delmer
E
Taylor:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
the
City
of
Vancouver,
British
Columbia,
on
June
26,
1979,
against
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
year
1967
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
as
a
deduction
an
amount
of
$1,446.95
claimed
by
the
taxpayer
against
investment
income
earned.
The
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
paragraphs
18(1)(a),
18(1)(b)
and
20(1)(bb)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended.
Background
The
taxpayer
inherited
a
substantial
portfolio
of
investments
and
incurred
the
following
expenses
servicing
these
investments:
Investment
Services—$943.24
Telephone
Charges—
503.71
$1,446.95
Contentions
The
position
of
the
appellant
was
as
follows:
—
In
order
to
maintain
her
investment
portfolio
in
good
standing
for
the
purpose
of
ensuring
a
proper
return
of
income
the
taxpayer
subscribed
for
various
investment
services,
and
kept
in
continual
contact
with
various
brokers
by
a
business
telephone
specifically
used
for
that
purpose.
—The
expenses
were
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
and
are
therefore
deductible
pursuant
to
paragraph
18(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
assertions
of
the
respondent
were
the
following:
—The
Investment
Services
subscribed
to
by
the
appellant
provided
her
with
information
with
respect
to
general
economic
trends
and
developments
based
on
which
she
could
maintain
or
alter
her
investment
portfolio.
—The
amount
paid
for
the
said
Investment
Services
was
not
an
amount
paid
by
the
appellant
to
a
person
for
advice
as
to
the
advisability
of
purchasing
or
selling
a
specific
share
or
security
of
the
appellant.
—The
expenses
were
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
maintaining
the
appellant’s
investment
portfolio
in
good
standing
and
not
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
therefrom.
—The
expenses
were
an
outlay
on
account
of
capital.
Evidence
The
taxpayer
relied
upon
the
advice
and
guidance
of
her
husband,
Mr
Lawrence
W
Beadle,
a
lawyer
in
professional
practice.
He
gave
testimony
that
prior
to
this
investment
portfolio
he
had
known
little
if
anything
about
the
market,
but
by
studying
and
using
the
publications
purchased
he
gave
himself
a
“crash
course”
in
the
investment
field
which,
in
his
view,
resulted
in
a
substantial
improvement
in
the
earnings
and
earnings
capability
of
the
portfolio.
The
telephone
expense
claimed
was
for
a
special
private
line
used
only
for
conversations
with
brokers,
virtually
a
“hot
line”
never
used
by
anyone
other
than
himself
and
then
for
investment
purposes.
Argument
The
relative
position
of
the
parties
is
demonstrated
by
the
following
excerpts
from
the
submissions
of
counsel:
For
the
appellant:
Mrs
Beadle
was
attempting
to
improve
her
income,
and
at
the
same
time
the
capital
may
have
been
improved
hopefully,
not
always,
but
hopefully.
They
tie
in,
one
with
the
other,
and
it
was
just
an
ordinary
expense
incurred
to
earn
income,
whether
it
be
an
income
account
or
a
capital
account,
and
amounts
incurred
in
this
nature
should
be
deductible.
.
in
connection
with
this
issue
of
capital
outlay,
I
wish
to
point
out
that
there
has
been
a
dramatic
change
in
recent
years
as
to
what
constitutes
a
capital
outlay.
Originally,
Canadian
and
English
courts
adopted
rigid
attitudes
as
to
what
would
constitute
a
capital
outlay.
One
of
the
first
cases
to
take
a
less
rigid
approach
was
the
decision
of
President
Jackett
in
Algoma
Central
Railway
v
MNR,
[1976]
CTC
130;
67
DTC
5091,
and
that
case
sort
of
started
a
trend
which
continued
to
this
day,
and
the
courts
adopted
a
much
more
lenient
attitude
as
to
what
should
be
deductible
under
paragraph
12(1)(b).
.
.
.
expenses
related
to
it
might
at
first
blush
appear
to
be
items
related
to
capital,
but
.
.
.
the
courts
have
said
we’re
prepared
to
recognize
that
since
there’s
an
income
element
connected
therewith,
we
won’t
apply
the
narrow,
rigid
approach
of
holding
that
the
items
were
capital
nature,
and
therefore
the
expenses
were
deductible.
For
the
respondent:
.
.
.
the
expenses
incurred
by
Mr
Beadle
were
an
expenditure
to
provide,
enlarge
or
alter
his
portfolio,
which
was
the
machinery
for
his
profit
earnings,
and
it
was
not
incurred
in
the
actual
operation
of
the
portfolio,
the
administering,
but
it
was
incurred
to
give
him
greater
knowledge
in
the
administration
of
the
portfolio,
to
guide
him.
..
.
by
subscribing
to
these
investment
publications,
Mr
Beadle
tried
to
acquire
such
a
fund
of
knowledge
that
he
could
draw
on—when
the
need
arose
in
administering,
and
that
therefore
he
did
acquire
an
asset
or
an
advantage
of
a
lasting
nature,
because
he
obviously
through
the
years
of
this
intensive
reading
gained
an
incredible
knowledge
of
the
workings
of
the
market
and
economic
trends
in
general.
It
is
therefore,
the
Minister’s
submission
that
this
is
a
capital
expenditure
and
it
falls
within
paragraph
18(1)(b).
Findings
The
question
in
this
appeal
is
simply
whether
or
not
there
was
a
capital
element—any
capital
element—which
remained
to
the
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
as
a
result
of
the
expenditures.
In
my
view
that
has
been
answered
definitively
and
affirmatively
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
in
the
quotations
noted
above.
Counsel
provided
extensive
judifical
reference
upon
which
it
was
contended
the
Board
might
hold
that
even
accepting
the
existence
of
a
capital
element
in
the
expenditures
did
not
place
it
outside
the
ambit
of
a
deductible
expense.
I
have
been
unable
to
discern
in
the
more
recent
jurisprudence
the
perspective
put
forward
by
counsel
and,
by
way
of
contrast
and
clarification,
I
would
make
reference
to
the
case
of
Her
Majesty
The
Queen,
v
Baine,
Johnston
&
Company
Limited,
[1977]
CTC
556;
77
DTC
5394.
At
the
Tax
Review
Board
level
(unpublished),
that
appeal
was
allowed—a
determination
that
no
substantial
asset
of
a
continuing
or
capital
nature
had
been
acquired.
That
view
was
not
accepted
by
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
the
expenditure
was
held
to
include
a
capital
element,
and
the
Minister’s
assessment
was
reinstated.
Comments
to
be
found
at
pp
558
and
5396
respectively
in
the
judgment
of
Addy,
J
are
significant:
It
has
been
held
previously
that
in
certain
cases
where
the
only
thing
purchased
is
a
portfolio
list
of
clients
and
file
copies
of
current
insurance
policies
in
force
in
the
name
of
the
clients,
the
cost
of
same
is
deductible
as
a
current
operational
expense.
(Refer
Harbord
Investments
Limited
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
717;
70
DTC
1488.)
However,
whether
or
not,
as
stated
in
that
case,
it
is
to
be
considered
as
settled
law
that
an
expenditure
for
a
list
of
customers,
which
includes
file
copies
of
current
insurance
policies,
is
nevertheless
to
be
considered
as
a
current
operational
expense,
it
is
clear
that,
where
the
goodwill
of
the
business
is
included
as
part
of
the
assets
transferred,
the
transaction
is
regarded
as
the
sale
of
a
business
as
a
going
concern
and
the
whole
expenditure
is
considered
to
be
of
a
capital
nature.
.
..
The
mere
fact
that
work
was
required
on
the
part
of
the
purchaser
subsequent
to
the
purchase
to
generate
income
from
the
portfolios
purchased,
does
not
prevent
the
assets
purchased
from
being
of
a
capital
nature
for
it
is
very
seldom
that
any
capital
asset
will
of
itself
generate
income
without
additional
time,
effort
and
money
being
expended
by
the
owner.
.
.
.
.
.
.
the
Defendant
has
failed
to
discharge
the
onus
cast
upon
it
of
establishing
in
either
case
that
the
expenditure
did
not
include
assets
and
advantages
for
the
enduring
benefit
of
its
trade
in
insurance
and
was
therefore
not
in
the
nature
of
a
capital
expenditure,
(italics
mine)
The
case,
in
my
view,
is
actually
much
more
favourable
to
the
taxing
authority
from
a
factual
standpoint
than
the
case
of
Cumberland
Investments
Limited
v
Her
Majesty
The
Queen,
[1973]
CTC
821;
74
DTC
6001
wherein
my
brother
Heald
held
against
the
taxpayer.
His
decision
in
that
case
was
unanimously
upheld
by
our
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
(refer
[1975]
CTC
439;
75
DTC
5309).
It
would
appear
from
the
above
that
the
learned
Justice
determined
that
at
least
some,
and
possibly
all,
of
the
expenditures
claimed
could
be
regarded
as
on
account
of
capital
and
he
therefore
viewed
the
entire
amount
as
covered
by
paragraph
18(1)(b),
as
not
deductible.
In
the
instant
case,
it
might
be
reasonable
to
conclude
that
the
expenditures
in
question
produced
some
current
results,
perhaps
even
increased
income,
but
it
is
just
as
clear
that
there
was
some
element
therein
with
benefits
of
longer
duration—an
improvement
in
the
investment
portfolio
itself,
added
knowledge
for
Mr
Beadle,
or
both.
Viewing
the
appeal
from
the
perspective
of
the
law
outlines
in
Baine,
Johnstone
(supra),
I
reach
the
conclusion
on
the
facts
that
the
expenditures
claimed
provided
to
the
taxpayer
“assets
or
advantages
for
the
enduring
benefit
of
its
trade’’,
and
therefore
are
precluded
as
a
deduction
by
virtue
of
paragraph
18(1)(b)
of
the
Act.
Decision
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.