Urie,
J:—The
hearing
of
the
appeal
was
adjourned
following
the
conclusion
of
argument
to
permit
the
Court
to
consider
counsel’s
submissions.
We
have
done
so
and
have,
as
well,
reviewed
the
evidence
at
trial
and
the
reasons
for
judgment
of
the
learned
trial
judge.
We
are
all
of
the
opinion
that
his
careful
and
thorough
analysis
of
the
evidence
is
substantially
accurate
and
provides
ample
support
for
his
findings
of
fact.
The
determination
which
he
was
called
upon
to
make
was
whether
or
not
the
appellant’s
Perry
workings
at
its
mine
site
in
the
Val
d’Or
region
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
constituted
a
new
mine,
separate
and
apart
from
its
Springer
mine
in
the
same
vicinity
or
whether
it
was
merely
an
extension
of
the
latter.
Essentially
that
determination
is
one
of
fact
to
which
is
applied
the
appropriate
principles
derived
from
the
jurisprudence
relating
to
the
meaning
of
“mine”
for
the
purposes
of
determining
entitlement
to
the
exemption
from
income
tax
provided
by
subsection
83(5)*
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
it
read
in
the
taxation
years
1967
and
1968.
It
is
common
ground
that
the
leading
cases
on
the
interpretation
of
that
section
are
MNR
v
Maclean
Mining
Company
Limited,
[1970]
SCR
877;
[1970]
CTC
264;
70
DTC
6199,
and
MNR
v
Bethlehem
Copper
Corporation
Ltd,
[1975]
2
SCR
790;
[1974]
CTC
707;
74
DTC
6520.
The
trial
judge
found,
properly
in
our
view,
that
the
facts
in
the
case
at
bar
differ
from
those
prevailing
in
either
of
those
authorities
and
occupy
a
middle
ground
between
them.
He
considered
and
applied
the
principles
derived
from
those
cases
to
the
facts
as
he
found
them
and
held,
in
effect,
that
the
operations
of
the
Springer
mine
and
Perry
workings
were
so
integrated
that
it
could
not
be
said
that
the
latter
constituted
a
mine
separate
and
apart
from
the
former.
In
our
view,
the
fact
that
some
of
the
facilities
available
to
the
Perry
workings
exclusively
might
have
enabled
it
to
function,
although
at
a
somewhat
lower
level
of
production,
is
not
sufficient
to
persuade
us
that
the
trial
judge
erred
in
concluding
that
the
Perry
workings
did
not
constitute
a
separate
mine
for
the
purposes
of
subsection
83(5).
The
question
which
he
had
to
decide
on
the
evidence
adduced
before
him
was
not
whether
the
workings
could
have
operated
as
separate
entities
but
whether
the
mining
was
so
conducted
in
fact.
Accordingly,
the
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
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