Lamarre
Proulx
T.C.J.:
These
two
appeals
in
respect
of
the
appellant’s
fiscal
year
ending
December
31,
1989,
were
heard
together.
The
issue
in
appeal
96-1738(IT)G
is
whether
a
gain
made
on
the
disposition
of
real
property
owned
by
the
appellant
was
a
capital
gain
or
business
income.
Appeal
96-2154(IT)G
concerns
a
capital
dividend
surplus,
so
its
outcome
depends
on
the
outcome
of
appeal
96-1738(IT)G.
These
reasons
for
judgment
will
therefore
deal
with
appeal
96-1738(IT)G.
The
facts
on
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(“the
Minister”)
relied
in
assessing
the
appellant
are
set
out
in
paragraphs
6
to
18
of
the
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal
(“the
Reply”):
[TRANSLATION]
6.
The
appellant
is
part
of
a
group
of
related
companies
in
which
the
common
denominator
is
the
Zaidan
family.
7.
The
companies
work
in
real
estate,
and
the
appellant
and
a
number
of
the
companies
acquired
and
disposed
of
real
property
during
the
years
before
and
after
the
taxation
year
at
issue.
8.
The
Zaidan
family
includes
Michael
[sic]
Zaidan,
the
father,
and
Joseph
Zaidan,
his
son.
9.
Until
1987,
the
appellant’s
shareholders
were
companies
controlled
by
Michael
Zaidan.
10.
In
1987,
Joseph
Zaidan
became
the
appellant’s
principal
shareholder
with
almost
87
percent
of
the
appellant’s
common
shares.
11.
In
August
1984,
a
group
of
companies
purchased
some
rental
property
with
a
total
of
368
units
in
London,
Ontario.
The
property
was
known
as
“Thames
Valley
Property”
(hereinafter
“the
Property”).
12.
According
to
the
purchase
contract,
the
purchasers
of
the
Property
were
the
following
taxpayers:
|
PURCHASER
|
PERCENTAGE
|
SIGNER
OF
THE
|
|
ACQUIRED
|
DEED
FOR
THE
|
|
PURCHASER
|
|
Midanco
Inc.
|
26.5%
|
Joseph
Zaidan
|
|
Zaidan
Properties
Ltd.
|
50.0%
|
Michael
Zaidan
|
|
97794
Canada
Inc.
|
15.0%
|
Michael
Zaidan
|
|
Zaidan
Entreprises
Inc.
|
5.0%
|
Michael
Zaidan
|
|
Les
immeubles
A.M.E.
|
|
|
Inc.
|
3.5%
|
Joseph
Zaidan
|
13.
The
acquisition
cost
of
the
Property
was
$3,725,000.
It
was
financed
through
mortgages.
14.
In
May
1988,
Zaidan
Properties
Ltd.,
97794
Canada
Inc.
and
Zaidan
Entreprises
Inc.
—
the
companies
represented
by
Michael
Zaidan
at
the
time
of
the
purchase
—
sold
their
interests
in
the
Property
to
the
appellant
for
a
total
of
$4,340,000;
15.
The
appellant’s
interest
in
the
Property
thus
rose
from
26.5
percent
in
1984
to
96.5
percent
in
1988;
the
other
3.5%
was
still
owned
by
Immeubles
A.M.E.
Inc.
16.
Shortly
thereafter,
in
November
1988,
an
offer
to
purchase
was
made
to
the
appellant,
which
agreed
to
sell
its
interest
in
the
Property
for
$11,180,000.
17.
The
transaction
occurred
in
January
1989,
and
the
appellant
reported
a
|
capital
gain
as
follows
when
it
filed
its
tax
return
for
that
year:
|
|
Proceeds
of
disposition:
|
$11,180,000
|
|
Adjusted
cost
base:
|
$3,803,279
|
|
Expenses:
|
$371,267
|
|
Capital
gain:
|
$7,005,462
|
|
Taxable
capital
gain:
A
|
$4,670,30
|
18.
At
the
time
the
Property
was
acquired,
the
appellant
was
thinking
of
reselling
it
at
a
profit,
and
that
possibility
was
a
motivating
factor
in
the
acquisition
of
the
Property.
The
grounds
for
appeal
are
set
out
as
follows
in
paragraph
7
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal:
[TRANSLATION]
(a)
THAT
the
capital
gain
reported
by
the
Appellant
is
really
a
capital
gain
and
not
business
income;
(b)
THAT
the
Respondent
should
not
have
disallowed
the
capital
losses;
(c)
THAT
the
Respondent
should
not
have
revised
the
quantum
of
the
cap-
ital
losses;
(d)
THAT
the
Respondent
has
not
explained
the
changes
she
made,
with
the
result
that
she
has
the
burden
of
proof
in
this
case;
(e)
THAT
the
Respondent
assessed
the
Appellant
on
the
basis
of
an
audit
report
by
Revenu
Québec,
that
the
Respondent
made
the
assessment
without
doing
an
audit
and
that
the
assessment
is
therefore
void
ab
initio;
(f)
THAT
at
the
objection
stage,
the
Appellant
submitted
its
minute
book,
a
letter
by
Joseph
Zaidan
explaining
what
the
Appellant
intended
and
a
series
of
documents;
the
Respondent
did
not
consider
them....
Youssef
Zaidan,
the
appellant’s
principal
shareholder
and
president,
Vicky
Martin,
a
former
manager
of
the
property
in
question,
and
Frank
Falbo,
an
officer
from
Revenue
Canada’s
Objections
Directorate,
were
called
to
testify
by
counsel
for
the
appellant.
Mr.
Falbo
was
also
called
by
counsel
for
the
respondent.
The
appellant
was
incorporated
as
Zaidan
&
Kfoury
Constructions
Ltd.
under
Part
I
of
the
Quebec
Companies
Act
on
August
27,
1969.
It
is
part
of
a
group
of
corporations
with
related
shareholders,
which
can
be
called
the
Zaidan
group.
Exhibit
A-2
is
a
chart
showing
the
corporations
that
made
up
the
group
in
1987.
Exhibit
A-3,
the
appellant’s
minute
book,
shows
that
in
1969,
Michel
Zaidan,
Youssef’s
father,
was
the
president,
Philippe
R.
Kfoury
was
the
treasurer
and
Joseph
Zaidan
was
the
vice-president.
This
Joseph
Zaidan
is
not
the
same
person
as
Youssef
Zaidan,
the
appellant’s
current
president,
who
also
occasionally
uses
the
given
name
Joseph.
A
variety
of
real
estate
transactions
can
be
found
in
the
minute
book.
For
instance,
on
September
10,
1969,
the
appellant
purchased
some
vacant
land
in
Dollard-des-Ormeaux
from
Selected
Realties
Limited.
The
price
was
payable
through
the
issue
of
common
and
preferred
shares
in
the
appellant.
On
August
22,
1972,
the
appellant
purchased
1,000,000
square
feet
of
land
from
Zaidan
Corporation
Ltd.
On
November
10,
1977,
a
resolution
of
the
appellant
authorized
Joseph
Zaidan
to
negotiate
and
sign
a
new
hypothec
on
the
land
and
buildings
it
owned
at
170-180
Dorchester
Street.
A
resolution
of
the
appellant
dated
March
17,
1975,
states
the
following,
inter
alia:
[TRANSLATION]
The
president
submitted
a
statement
of
the
properties
sold
by
the
company
since
1971.
He
said
that
the
sales
were
closed
and
signed
on
the
company’s
behalf
by
Youssef
Zaidan.
Henry
Zaidan
or
Charles
Zabbal
pursuant
to
the
general
resolution
of
March
27,
1973,
or
special
resolutions
prepared
by
the
officiating
notaries.
The
president
added
that
it
would
be
expensive
for
the
company
to
have
all
the
deeds
checked
to
determine
whether
those
who
signed
them
had
the
authority
to
do
so
and,
in
the
case
of
special
resolutions,
to
trace
the
resolutions.
He
therefore
moved
that
the
sales
in
question
be
ratified
all
at
once.
The
list
of
properties
built
by
the
corporation
that
is
appended
to
the
resolution
shows
that
there
were
about
65
homes,
with
prices
ranging
from
$15,000
to
$20,000.
According
to
the
minute
book
(Exhibit
A-3),
Joseph
Zaidan
resigned
from
the
board
of
directors
on
May
3,
1971.
Youssef
Zaidan
became
a
member
of
the
appellant’s
board
of
directors
and
was
appointed
secretary
of
the
corporation.
On
March
27,
1973,
both
he
and
his
father,
Michel
Zaidan,
the
appellant’s
president,
had
authority
to
bind
the
corporation.
On
July
1,
1973,
Philippe
Kfoury
resigned
as
a
director
of
the
corporation.
On
March
17,
1975,
the
corporation
adopted
a
resolution
to
change
its
name
to
Corporation
immobilière
et
d’investissements
Midanco
Ltée
-
Midanco
Investment
and
Realty
Corp.
Ltd.
The
name
change
was
officially
approved
on
July
18,
1975.
On
February
15,
1989,
the
corporation
changed
its
name
again
to
the
one
it
currently
has.
According
to
Exhibit
A-l
(also
reproduced
at
Tab
27
of
Exhibit
R-1),
which
is
the
deed
of
purchase,
the
property
in
question
was
acquired
on
August
31,
1984,
for
$3,725,000
by
the
purchasers
referred
to
in
paragraph
12
of
the
Reply,
which
is
reproduced
in
paragraph
3
of
these
reasons.
The
property
consisted
of
apartment
buildings
in
the
city
of
London,
Ontario,
with
the
civic
addresses
621-645
Kipps
Lane
and
1166-1182
Adelaide.
It
was
known
as
Thames
Valley
Property
or
Thames
Park
Apartments
and
had
an
area
of
13.3
acres.
It
consisted
of
12
apartment
buildings
with
a
total
of
368
units.
The
property
was
sold
by
Seaway
Trust
Company
as
liquidator
of
the
property
in
receivership.
When
it
was
acquired,
it
was
in
a
serious
state
of
disrepair.
The
following
appears
in
a
letter
by
Youssef
Zaidan
filed
as
Exhibit
A-l
1
(or
Tab
76
of
Exhibit
R-5):
...When
we
acquired
the
property,
it
was
a
complete
disaster,
with
many
if
not
two
thirds
of
the
apartments
in
completely
non
habitable
states,
floods
and
other
damage
having
occurred
years
before
we
acquired
the
asset.
Our
development
work
was
phenomenal.
Appendix
A
to
the
financial
statements
(Tab
1
of
Exhibit
R-1)
shows
that
the
expenses
incurred
in
1985
and
1986
to
repair
and
maintain
the
property
were
relatively
minimal
at
$235,229
and
$178,240,
respectively.
For
the
other
years,
the
financial
statements
contain
no
specific
calculations
for
the
property
in
question.
According
to
page
4
of
a
report
in
a
letter
dated
October
12,
1984,
that
was
sent
to
the
purchasers
of
the
property
by
their
lawyers
(the
letter
is
part
of
Exhibit
A-l),
the
price
was
paid
by
means
of
two
mortgages:
one
for
$3,150,000
made
to
General
Trust
and
another
for
$850,000
made
by
Zaidan
Group
Ltd.
and
secured
against
property
it
owned
north
of
Kipps
Lane.
Exhibit
A-2
is
an
organization
chart
showing
the
corporations
in
the
Zaidan
group.
It
was
prepared
in
1987
for
the
purpose
of
reorganizing
the
group
and
transferring
property
in
accordance
with
section
85
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(“the
Act”).
Joseph
Zaidan
explained
that
this
butterfly
transaction
took
place
at
his
request
because
he
wanted
to
stop
having
to
share
the
management
of
the
Zaidan
group
with
his
father,
Michel
Zaidan.
On
April
4,
1988,
as
a
result
of
the
reorganization
of
the
Zaidan
group,
Youssef
Zaidan
became
the
appellant’s
only
director.
Exhibit
A-2
also
includes
the
deed
dated
May
1,
1988,
transferring
the
interests
of
the
purchasers
of
the
property
to
Midanco.
The
transfer
was
registered
on
May
16,
1988,
and
a
copy
of
the
registration
appears
in
Exhibit
A-2.
From
then
on,
the
appellant
had
a
96.5
percent
interest
and
Les
immeubles
A.M.E.
Inc.
had
a
3.5
percent
interest.
The
consideration
was
$4,340,000
(letter
of
January
18,
1996,
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1).
At
the
time
of
the
reorganization,
the
appellant
gave
up
its
entire
ownership
interest
in
a
building
at
1000
St-Antoine
and
acquired
50
percent
of
a
building
called
West
Lodge
and
97.5
percent
of
Thames
Valley
Property.
Exhibit
A-4
is
an
appraisal
of
Thames
Valley
Property
dated
October
14,
1986.
The
appraiser
found
that
the
market
value
of
the
property
was
$6,800,000.
According
to
Youssef
Zaidan,
the
appraisal
was
prepared
for
the
purpose
of
transferring
properties
between
the
members
of
the
Zaidan
family
and
not
for
the
purposes
of
the
substantial
mortgages
later
placed
on
the
property.
When
the
property
was
acquired,
General
Trust
held
a
mortgage
in
the
amount
of
$3,150,000.
At
the
time
of
the
sale,
it
held
a
mortgage
in
the
amount
of
$6,400,000.
Thames
Valley
Property
was
sold
for
$11,200,000
on
November
15,
1988.
The
deed
of
sale
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-5.
The
purchaser
agreed
to
assume
the
$540,000
first
mortgage
and
the
$6,400,000
second
mortgage.
The
vendor
agreed
to
take
a
$1,560,000
mortgage
on
the
balance
of
the
sale
price.
The
introductory
portion
of
clause
1
and
the
vendor’s
undertaking
at
the
end
of
the
contract
with
regard
to
the
real
estate
agents
for
the
vendor
and
the
purchaser
read
as
follows:
I.
The
Vendor
shall
sell
the
Real
Property
to
the
Purchaser
through
DISTRICT
REALTY
CORPORATION
and
JOHN
THIEL
REAL
ESTATE,
Agents
for
the
Vendor,
and
the
Purchaser,
subject
to
the
terms
and
conditions
herein
contained,
shall
purchase
the
Real
Property
from
the
Vendor
at
the
price
or
sum
of
ELEVEN
MILLION
TWO
HUNDRED
THOUSAND
($11,200,000)
DOLLARS
in
lawful
money
of
Canada
payable
as
follows:
[Vendor’s
undertaking]
IN
WITNESS
WHEREOF
THE
VENDOR
hereby
accepts
and
executes
this
agreement
and
in
consideration
of
having
procured
this
Agreement,
the
Vendor
agrees
with
DISTRICT
REALTY
CORPORATION
AND
JOHN
THIEL
REAL
ESTATE
as
Agents
for
the
Vendor
to
pay
a
commission
of
Three
(3%)
Percent
of
the
sale
price
herein
on
the
Closing
Date,
said
commission
to
be
split
equally
by
District
Realty
Corporation
and
John
Thiel
Real
Estate.
Should
the
deposit
paid
by
the
Purchaser
not
be
sufficient
to
pay
the
amount
of
fee
then
I
do
hereby
irrevocably
instruct
and
authorize
my
solicitor
to
pay
any
unpaid
balance
of
said
fee
out
of
the
proceeds
of
said
sale.
According
to
Youssef
Zaidan,
the
sale
was
unsolicited.
He
explained
that
he
retained
the
services
of
a
real
estate
agent
even
for
unsolicited
sales.
Youssef
Zaidan
explained
that
the
appellant
intended
to
keep
the
property
because
it
wanted
it
to
be
its
base
of
operations
in
Ontario;
the
property
was
to
serve
as
an
administrative
and
maintenance
office
for
all
the
properties
the
appellant
acquired
in
Ontario.
It
had
already
acquired
another
rental
property
not
very
far
away.
It
had,
inter
alia,
begun
some
work
and
hired
rental
agents
on
a
bonus
basis.
Vicky
Martin
managed
the
rental
activities
and
was
very
efficient.
According
to
Youssef
Zaidan,
the
appellant
had
problems
with
Ontario’s
rent
review
board.
It
was
also
under
pressure
from
one
of
its
bankers.
It
had
also
received
a
number
of
offers,
which
it
declined,
but
then
it
was
made
an
exceptional
offer
it
could
not
refuse.
The
written
answers
(filed
as
Exhibit
A-l
1)
he
gave
his
lawyer
on
November
6,
1995,
to
explain
why
Thames
Valley
Property
was
sold
did
not
change
when
he
testified.
He
explained
that
the
appellant
had
acquired
Thames
Valley
Property
to
strengthen
its
footing
in
Ontario.
It
already
owned
another
property
in
London,
Country
Lane
Apartments,
which
it
purchased
in
1980
and
sold
in
1989.
It
sold
Thames
Valley
Property
because
the
real
estate
market
had
gone
“insane”.
He
also
said
that
the
restora-
tion
of
the
property,
which
was
in
an
appalling
state
when
it
was
acquired,
had
required
a
phenomenal
amount
of
work.
He
further
stated
that
they
always,
except
in
a
few
special
cases,
intended
to
hold
on
to
assets
in
order
to
“derive
revenues”
from
them
and
that
they
never
bought
with
the
intention
of
reselling.
Exhibit
A-8
is
a
letter
dated
October
25,
1995,
from
F.
Falbo
of
Revenue
Canada’s
Appeals
Division
to
counsel
for
the
appellant.
A
Revenu
Québec
report
is
stapled
to
the
letter.
During
his
examination,
Mr.
Falbo
said
that
this
report
is
not
the
document
that
was
or
should
have
been
attached
to
the
letter,
because
what
was
supposed
to
be
attached
to
it
was
a
report
by
John
Wood.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
told
the
Court
categorically
that
the
Revenu
Québec
report
had
indeed
been
attached
to
Mr.
Falbo’s
letter,
not
the
report
by
John
Wood.
This
would
explain
what
was
stated
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal.
It
seems
strange
that
this
mistake
was
not
discovered
until
the
hearing.
The
report
states
the
following:
[TRANSLATION]
“...All
the
transactions
are
carried
out
in
similar
stages
from
one
company
to
another.
The
mortgages
are
always
from
General
Trust
of
Canada.
All
the
purchases,
without
exception,
are
at
very
modest
prices.
A
new
appraisal
is
performed
by
an
expert
one
year
after
the
purchase.
...
The
company
obtains
a
second
mortgage
from
General
Trust
equal
to
the
increase
in
value
determined
by
the
appraisal....”
Counsel
for
the
respondent
prepared
tables
on
the
purchase
and
sale
of
various
properties
by
12
corporations,
including
the
appellant.
She
used
those
tables
to
question
Mr.
Zaidan.
Each
of
the
corporations
is
related
in
some
way
to
the
appellant
or,
in
other
words,
is
part
of
the
Zaidan
group.
The
many
pieces
of
property
are
acquired
through
forced
sales,
as
a
result
of
a
change
in
a
government
assistance
program
or
for
another
such
reason.
The
table
shows
that
they
are
always
sold
at
a
substantial
gain.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
filed
extracts
from
Joseph
Zaidan’s
examination
for
discovery
at
Tab
28
of
Exhibit
R-l:
Q.
Right
now,
what
do
you
do?
A.
Right
now,
I
am
scrambling
to
stay
alive.
Q.
And
what
does
it
mean,
exactly?
A.
It
means
I
am
trying
to
get
back
into
real
estate
with
a
name
that
has
been
very
dirtied
by
many
people,
among
which
this
assessment,
and
I
am
trying
to
find
a
way
to
get
on
with
my
life.
Q.
And
in
1989,
what
were
you
doing
for
a
living?
A.
My
business
was
the
acquisition
of
real
estate
properties
which
we
would
basically
buy
and
hold,
or
buy
and
improve,
or
buy
and
develop.
Q.
And
what
do
you
mean
by
“buy
and
develop”?
A.
Meaning
we
would
buy
a
property,
it
would
be
in
a
very
bad
state,
we
would
fix
it
and
hold
on
to
it.
The
program
is
a
very
simple
one;
we
would
buy
buildings
that
need
work,
we
would
buy
them
at
a
good
price
to
compensate
for
the
risk
that
we
took,
and
we
would
hold
on
to
them
until
such
time
as
we
felt
it
was
unwise
to
hold
on
to
them
any
longer.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
began
his
oral
argument
with
two
statements
that
appear
to
be
inaccurate.
First,
he
said
that
Joseph
Zaidan
was
the
directing
mind
of
the
appellant
from
1984
to
1989.
However,
the
evidence
showed
that
Michel
Zaidan
was
the
appellant’s
president
from
1984
to
1988.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
also
said
that
the
appellant
had
paid
25
percent
in
cash,
when
in
fact
the
amount
by
which
the
purchase
price
exceeded
the
mortgage
was
also
borrowed
through
an
intercorporate
loan.
With
regard
to
the
first
point,
the
appellant’s
president
at
the
time
of
the
acquisition
did
not
testify.
In
any
event,
regardless
of
who
the
company’s
directing
mind
was
at
the
time
of
the
acquisition,
what
matters
is
the
corporate
intention
at
that
time,
which
depends
much
more
on
the
historical
context
in
which
the
acquisition
occurred
than
on
the
testimony
of
those
who
ran
the
company.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
referred,
inter
alia,
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal’s
decision
in
Hiwako
Investments
Ltd.
v.
R.
(1978),
78
D.T.C.
6281
(Fed.
C.A.).
According
to
the
summary
of
that
decision,
Hiwako’s
principal
shareholder,
a
German,
had
a
long
history
of
trading
in
real
estate
in
various
countries.
He
purchased
a
property
in
1967
and
resold
it
nine
months
later
at
a
very
large
profit.
The
Tax
Review
Board
and
the
Federal
Court
-
Trial
Division
dismissed
his
appeal.
The
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
allowed
it.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
referred
to
two
passages
from
the
decision:
I
do
not
read
the
evidence
in
this
case
as
being
open
to
an
inference
that
a
prospect
of
re-sale
at
a
profit
was
a
motivating
reason
for
the
purchase
and
l
do
not
read
the
learned
Trial
Judge’s
finding
of
fact
in
the
last
paragraph
of
his
judgment
as
amounting
to
more
than
a
finding
that
the
investment
was
in
a
profit
producing
property
that
would
increase
in
value
and
that
circumstances
in
the
future
might
dictate
a
change
in
investments.
...Had
the
alleged
assumption
been
that
there
was
an
expectation
on
the
part
of
the
purchaser,
at
the
time
of
purchase,
that,
in
the
event
that
the
investment
did
not
prove
to
be
profitable,
it
could
be
sold
at
a
profit,
and
that
such
expectation
was
one
of
the
factors
that
induced
him
to
make
the
purchase,
such
assumption,
if
not
disproved,
might
(I
do
not
say
that
it
would)
support
the
assessments
based
on
“trading”
if
not
disproved.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argued
that,
as
in
Hiwako,
the
appellant
simply
wanted
to
acquire
property
that
would
yield
a
good
return
and
that
resale
at
a
profit
was
not
the
reason
or
one
of
the
reasons
for
the
purchase.
He
also
argued
that
the
offer
to
purchase
had
not
been
solicited.
He
further
submitted
that
the
respondent
was
trying
to
prove
the
correctness
of
the
assessment
by
using
facts
that
differed
from
those
on
which
the
Minister
relied
in
making
the
assessment
and
that
the
burden
of
proof
was
therefore
on
the
respondent.
On
this
last
point,
counsel
for
the
appellant
attacked
the
Revenu
Québec
report
that
had
been
mistakenly
attached
to
Mr.
Falbo’s
letter
instead
of
John
Wood’s
report.
The
part
of
the
report
that
angered
counsel
for
the
appellant
is
the
statement
that
the
company
sells
to
a
related
company
before
selling
to
a
third
party,
since
in
the
case
at
bar
there
was
no
prior
sale
to
a
related
company.
There
was
a
disposition
to
the
appellant
as
part
of
a
butterfly
transaction.
It
is
my
view
that
these
are
not
grounds
for
reversing
the
burden
of
proof.
The
assessment
was
clearly
based
on
the
fact
that
the
property
in
question
was
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
resale
and
not
as
a
longterm
investment.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
referred
to
the
decision
by
Associate
Chief
Judge
Christie
of
this
Court
in
Leonard
Reeves
Inc.
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1985),
85
D.T.C.
419
(T.C.C.),
and
more
specifically
to
the
following
comments
at
page
422:
|
3,
|
The
direct
evidence
of
a
person
who
has
an
interest
in
the
outcome
of
an
|
|
appeal
regarding
the
intention
behind
a
transaction
or
series
of
transac
|
|
tions
is
not
determinative
of
the
existence
of
the
stated
intention.
Gener
|
|
ally
speaking
the
intention
is
to
be
ascertained
from
the
entire
course
of
|
|
conduct
and
relevant
circumstances
and
the
inferences
flowing
there
|
|
from:
Gairdner
Securities
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
52
DTC
1171
per
Cam
|
|
eron,
J.
at
1175
and
Racine
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
65
D.T.C.
5098
per
Noel,
J.
|
|
at
5103.
|
|
4.
|
A
consideration
of
statements
in
Articles
of
Incorporation
regarding
the
|
|
objects
of
the
corporation
or
restrictions
on
the
businesses
it
may
carry
|
|
on
is
not
helpful.
What
the
company
did
in
fact
is
paramount:
Regal
|
|
Heights
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
60
D.T.C.
1270
per
Judson,
J.
at
1272-3:
Gla
|
|
cier
Realties
Limited
v.
The
Queen,
80
D.T.C.
6243
per
Addy,
J.
at
|
|
6245.
The
same
is
true
with
respect
to
what
may
be
said
in
a
partnership
|
|
agreement
regarding
the
nature
of
the
partnership’s
business.
|
|
5.
|
Evidence
of
transactions
of
the
sale
and
purchase
of
real
estate
by
an
|
|
appellant
after
the
years
under
review
in
an
appeal
is
admissible:
Osler
|
Hammond
&
Nanton
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
63
D.T.C.
1119
per
Judson,
J.
at
1120:
G.
W.
Golden
Construction
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
67
D.T.C.
5080
per
Ritchie,
J.
at
5082
and
Fyke
v.
M.N.R.,
64
D.T.C.
5032
per
Cameron,
J.
at
5033.
The
weight
to
be
assigned
to
evidence
of
this
kind
will
depend
on
the
circumstances
of
particular
cases.
Evidence
of
an
intended
sale
and
purchase
that
for
some
reason
was
not
consummated
is
also
admissible.
The
comment
respecting
assignability
of
weight
also
applies
to
evidence
of
this
type.
6.
The
fact
that
real
estate
is
not
advertised
for
sale
and
that
an
offer
which
results
in
a
sale
and
purchase
is
unsolicited
is
not
preclusive
of
there
having
been
a
primary
intention
on
the
part
of
the
appellant
at
the
time
of
purchasing
the
property
to
sell
it
at
any
time
he
regarded
it
as
financially
favourable
to
do
so.
Lack
of
advertising
and
the
fact
of
an
unsolicited
offer
are
simply
matters
to
be
weighed
together
with
the
other
relevant
evidence:
Slater
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.,
66
D.T.C.
5047
at
5050.
7.
If
an
individual
who
is
an
appellant
has
a
history
of
trading
in
real
estate
or
if
the
appellant
is
a
corporation
that
is
controlled
by
such
a
person,
this
is
a
relevant
consideration
which
points
away
from
the
purchase
in
issue
being
made
with
the
primary
intention
of
securing
an
income-producing
asset:
Vaughan
Construction
Company
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
70
D.T.C.
6268
per
Laskin,
J.
(as
he
then
was)
at
6270
and
Slater
at
page
5051.
In
my
opinion,
the
evidence
showed
that
the
appellant’s
real
estate
activities
involve
either
acquiring
land
and
building
homes
on
it
to
sell
or
acquiring
properties
that
are
generally
in
poor
condition
and
renovating
and
reselling
them.
The
evidence
revealed
no
interest
in
rental
income.
The
entire
purchase
price
is
borrowed.
Moreover,
immediately
after
acquiring
property,
the
appellant
has
it
appraised
at
a
higher
value
and
takes
out
mortgages
on
it
for
the
maximum
amount.
That
is
what
it
did
with
regard
to
the
property
in
question.
The
steps
it
took
did
not
differ
from
the
modus
operandi
described
by
the
Revenu
Québec
investigator.
In
the
Hiwako
case
referred
to
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
the
property
in
question
was
purchased
following
a
long
search,
and
what
was
sought
was
rental
property
in
good
condition
that
would
yield
a
good
return.
Those
circumstances
are
very
different
from
the
ones
in
this
case,
where
the
property
was
acquired
from
a
trustee
and
was
in
a
seriously
deteriorated
condition,
the
repairs
carried
out
were
minor
and
a
mortgage
was
taken
out
on
the
property
at
almost
twice
the
amount
of
the
mortgage
taken
out
at
the
time
it
was
acquired.
As
for
the
argument
that
the
offer
to
purchase
was
not
solicited,
it
should
be
noted
that
this
fact
was
not
raised
in
the
appellant’s
Notice
of
Appeal.
As
stated
in
Leonard
Reeves
Inc.,
this
fact
is
not
determinative
but
of
course,
it
is
an
important
consideration;
if
it
is
true,
it
should
be
referred
to
in
the
notice
of
appeal.
When
Hiwako
was
heard
by
the
Federal
Court
-
Trial
Division
((1974),
74
D.T.C.
6360
(Fed.
T.D.)),
at
page
6367),
the
evidence
as
to
the
circumstances
in
which
the
purchaser
made
its
offer
to
Hiwako
was
complete.
In
the
case
at
bar,
we
have
only
the
testimony
of
Youssef
Zaidan
on
this
point.
Nothing
prevented
the
appellant
from
calling
the
real
estate
agents
involved
in
the
sale
as
witnesses.
I
conclude
that
the
acquisition
and
sale
of
the
property
in
question
were
the
acts
of
a
trader
in
this
market
and
that
the
gain
resulting
from
the
sale
was
business
income,
not
a
capital
gain.
The
assessment
was
therefore
properly
made
and
the
appeal
is
accordingly
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.