Beaubier
T.C.J.:
This
appeal
pursuant
to
the
General
Procedure
was
heard
at
Fredericton,
New
Brunswick
on
March
19,
1999.
Gregor
Hargrove,
who
was
the
only
officer
and
director
at
all
material
times
of
the
Appellant
(“MHL”),
was
the
only
witness.
For
1994
the
Appellant
claimed
reimbursement
for
payroll
expenses
pursuant
to
the
scientific
research
and
experimental
development
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
Respondent
admits
that
the
expenses
were
for
scientific
research
and
experimental
development,
but
denied
the
Appellant’s
claim
for
the
following
reasons:
1.
They
were
not
incurred
by
the
Appellant
in
its
own
right.
Rather,
they
were
incurred
as
agent
for
Riverbrand
Hardwoods
(1993)
Ltd.
(“Riverbrand”).
2.
The
Appellant
and
Riverbrand
are
not
related
corporations
as
required
by
subsection
37(1.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
appeal
followed.
MHL
was
incorporated
in
New
Brunswick
in
June,
1991.
It
manufactures
and
sells
maple
hardwood
floors
for
basketball
and
similar
sports
and
recreational
activities.
It
has
done
so
for
the
Barcelona
Olympics,
the
Chicago
Bulls’
arena
and
many
other
facilities.
It
obtained
its
maple
hardwood
from
small
wood
lot
operations
in
New
Brunswick,
but
the
supply
was
interrupted
in
the
winter
because
the
frozen
maple
could
not
be
cut
properly
then.
As
a
result,
MHL
instituted
research
to
enable
year-round
sawing
of
hardwood
maple
to
occur.
The
method
developed
is
now
in
use
at
two
mills
in
New
Brunswick.
To
resolve
the
winter
supply
problem,
MHL
spoke
to
the
local
wood
lot
association,
Carlton-Victoria
Wood
Producers,
and
through
it
met
with
other
New
Brunswick
wood
producer
associations.
Riverbrand
Hardwoods
(1993)
Ltd.
was
incorporated
in
August,
1993,
in
New
Brunswick
(Exhibit
AR-17).
On
October
1,
1993
a
Purchase
Agreement
(Exhibit
AR-24)
was
signed
in
Fredericton
to
close
on
October
12.
The
signatories
were
MHL,
Riverbrand,
Gregor
Hargrove
and
Woodlot
Owner
Holdings
Ltd.
(“WOHL”).
In
it:
(I)
MHL
(the
Vendor)
agreed
to
transfer
to
Riverbrand
its
business
carried
on
at
Woodstock
including
its
cash,
land,
prem-
ises,
machinery,
inventories,
receivables,
unfulfilled
orders,
inventories,
etc.,
prepaid
expenses
and
good
will
(See
paragraphs
1.05,
1.06,
2.01,
3.01
and
3.02)
for
102
shares
of
Riverbrand
plus
immediate
payment
of
$300,000
to
be
applied
on
MHL’s
debts
(Paragraphs
6.01,
7.02
and
Mr.
Hargrove’s
testimony).
(2)
WOHL
agreed
to
(a)
Pay
$300,000
immediately
for
69
shares.
(b)
Pay
$130,000
forty-five
days
later
for
a
further
29
shares.
(This
would
give
WOHL
98
shares,
or
49%
of
Riverbrand).
(c)
Loan
$231,000
more
to
Riverbrand
(Paragraphs
7.01,
7.02
and
7.03
and
Mr.
Hargrove’s
testimony).
In
fact
only
$270,000
of
the
first
$300,000
was
ever
paid
by
WOHL
to
Riverbrand
and
WOHL
did
not
loan
any
money
to
Riverbrand.
MHL
received
the
$270,000
and
applied
it
on
its
debts.
MHL
also
had
a
$200,000
forgivable
loan
from
the
Province
of
New
Brunswick
which
it
tried
to
transfer
to
Riverbrand.
This
loan’s
forgiveness
was
based
on
the
number
of
person
weeks
worked
and
still
required
about
17
weeks.
New
Brunswick
would
not
allow
this
to
be
assigned
to
Riverbrand
and
it
was
not.
WOHL
did
not
have
the
$231,000
to
lend
to
MHL
but
it
arranged
a
loan
to
Riverbrand
through
its
bank,
the
Bank
of
Montreal.
This
was
used
to
build
a
sawmill.
The
Bank
of
Montreal
paid
out
some
advances
on
this
loan,
but
before
the
sawmill
was
complete
it
stopped
advances,
seized
its
security
and
forced
Riverbrand
into
bankruptcy
by
an
assignment
in
bankruptcy
dated
November
14,
1995
(Exhibit
AR-33).
Mr.
Hargrove
testified
and
the
Court
accepts
it
as
true
that
no
shares
were
issued
to
WOHL
by
Riverbrand.
MHL
did
receive
its
102
common
shares
issued
from
Riverbrand
pursuant
to
subparagraph
6.01
(ii).
There
are
four
reasons
why
this
testimony
of
Mr.
Hargrove
is
accepted:
1.
Mr.
Hargrove
is
credible
and
is
believed.
2.
69
shares
were
to
be
issued
to
WOHL
for
$300,000
in
lump
figures
(see
subparagraph
7.02(i)).
It
only
paid
$270,000.
3.
New
Brunswick
law
is
that
only
fully
paid
shares
can
be
issued
by
a
corporation
(Business
Corporations
Act,
c.
B-9.1,
ss.
23(5)
and
(6).
4.
Mr.
Hargrove’s
testimony
could
have
been
refuted
by
testimony
or
by
certified
corporate
registry
documents
from
the
New
Brunswick
Corporations
Branch.
It
was
not
refuted.
Finally,
although
MHL
and
WOHL
were
authorized
to
nominate
directors
in
the
unexecuted
shareholders’
agreement
(which
names
additional
proposed
shareholders
over
and
above
the
parties
to
the
purchase
agreement)
there
is
no
evidence
that
any
directors
other
than
MHL’s
nominees
were
elected
as
directors
of
Riverbrand.
Mr.
Hargrove
admitted
that
MHL
elected
three
directors
and
denied
that
any
other
directors
were
elected.
No
corporate
documents
were
exhibited
to
establish
that
any
other
directors
were
elected.
WOHL
had
no
right
to
elect
directors
under
the
draft
shareholders’
agreement
until
it
owned
shares
in
Riverbrand.
On
the
evidence,
MHL
was
the
only
shareholder
of
Riverbrand.
Exhibit
AR-32,
dated
November
29,
1993
is
a
rough
unsigned
draft
of
minutes
of
a
purported
meeting
of
directors
of
Riverbrand
which
Mr.
Hargrove
first
saw
on
March
18,
1999.
At
best,
his
testimony
established
that
a
meeting
occurred,
but
not
that
WOHL’s
representatives
were
directors
of
Riverbrand.
The
evidence
is
that
Riverbrand
never
paid
any
of
the
employees
in
question
in
this
appeal.
The
payroll
in
question
was
paid
by
MHL.
MHL
issued
the
T-4’s,
the
T-4
summaries
and
the
separation
slips
and
paid
the
employment
insurance
for
the
workers
in
question.
Riverbrand
reported
to
Revenue
Canada
in
1994
that
it
had
no
employees
(Exhibit
AR-10).
As
a
result,
on
the
basis
of
the
evidence
before
the
Court,
MHL
was
the
employer
of
the
employees
in
respect
to
which
it
claimed
reimbursement
and
these
employees
conducted
the
scientific
research
and
experimental
development
in
question.
MHL
did
not
act
as
agent
of
Riverbrand.
The
evidence
is
that
no
reimbursement
of
the
wages
MHL
expended
was
paid
to
MHL
by
Riverbrand
or
was
claimed
by
MHL
in
Riverbrand’s
bankruptcy.
In
any
event,
on
the
evidence,
MHL
and
Riverbrand
were
related
corporations
under
the
Act,
with
the
result
that
MHL
is
entitled
to
claim
reimbursement
for
payroll
expenses
related
to
scientific
research
and
experimental
development
expenses
incurred
by
Riverbrand.
The
determination
as
to
whether
the
two
corporations
are
related
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act
hinges
on
whether
MHL
controlled
Riverbrand.
It
was
established
in
Duha
Printers
(Western)
Ltd.
v.
R.
(1998),
98
D.T.C.
6334
(S.C.C.)
that
control
of
a
corporation
refers
to
de
jure
control
rather
than
to
de
facto
control.
MHL
was
the
only
shareholder
of
Riverbrand.
Because
the
essential
condition
for
the
subscription
for
issuance
of
the
first
group
of
shares
to
WOHL,
namely
the
payment
of
the
lump
sum
of
$300,000
was
never
met,
those
shares
were
never
issued
and
the
second
group
of
shares
was
never
paid
for
or
issued.
The
unanimous
shareholder’s
agreement
was
never
executed
and,
on
the
evidence,
was
never
agreed
to,
so
its
conditions
were
not
binding
to
determine
de
jure
control.
As
the
sole
shareholder
of
Riverbrand,
MHL
elected
the
only
three
directors
so
that
it
had
de
jure
control
of
Riverbrand
and
therefore
was
also
related
to
Riverbrand.
It
follows
that,
pursuant
to
subsection
37(1.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Appellant
is
entitled
to
the
reimbursement
claimed.
The
appeal
is
allowed.
The
Appellant
is
awarded
party
and
party
costs.
Appeal
allowed.