Lamarre
Proulx
T
.
C.J.:
This
is
an
application
under
section
166.2
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(“the
Act’)
to
extend
the
time
for
serving
a
notice
of
objection
on
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(“the
Minister”).
The
taxation
years
involved
are
1993,
1994
and
1995.
The
time
limit
for
serving
a
notice
of
objection
for
1993
was
April
30,
1997.
For
the
other
two
years,
it
was
March
10,
1997.
The
appellant
explained
that
he
did
not
feel
well
psychologically
in
1996.
He
filed
a
letter
from
his
attending
psychologist
as
Exhibit
A-1.
Robert
Julien,
the
appellant’s
accountant
and
his
agent
at
the
hearing
of
this
application,
explained
in
his
testimony
that
he
began
looking
after
the
appellant’s
tax
affairs
in
early
January
1997.
He
began
negotiating
with
Revenue
Canada
and
Revenu
Québec
and
said
that
he
was
surprised
when
the
applicantAs
accounts
were
seized.
That
was
when
he
applied
to
the
Minister
for
an
extension
of
time
under
subsection
166.1(1)
of
the
Act.
The
application,
dated
July
9,
1997,
was
filed
as
Exhibit
I-1.
It
states
only
the
following:
[TRANSLATION]
“Application
to
extend
the
time
for
appealing
in
respect
of
the
1993,
1994
and
1995
taxation
years
because
new
facts
have
been
obtained”.
The
application
was
refused
by
the
Minister
in
a
letter
dated
October
17,
1997.
When
the
accountant
was
asked
by
the
Court
what
meetings
or
telephone
conversations
he
had
had
with
Revenue
Canada
concerning
the
application
for
an
extension,
he
replied
that
there
had
been
none
and
that
he
had
simply
received
Revenue
Canada’s
response
dated
October
17,
1997,
refusing
the
application.
However,
this
was
contradicted
by
the
testimony
of
Claude
Soulard,
the
Minister’s
officer
in
this
case.
He
referred
to
several
telephone
calls
asking
Mr.
Julien
why
he
was
applying
to
the
Minister
for
an
extension
of
time.
Mr.
Soulard
said
that
he
never
received
an
answer
and
finally
decided
against
the
application.
Mr.
Julien’s
answer
to
that
was
that
he
had
trouble
remembering
the
telephone
calls
and
that,
while
he
was
not
denying
them,
he
wondered
why
the
Minister’s
appeals
officer
did
not
send
him
a
letter
instead.
A
letter
makes
it
easier
to
prove
the
date
and
content
of
communications,
and
it
may
be
thought
that
the
various
exchanges
with
Mr.
Julien
should
have
included
one.
However,
the
appeals
officer
cannot
be
criticized
for
contacting
the
appellant’s
agent
by
telephone,
since
points
that
are
unclear
in
a
taxpayer’s
case
and
cannot
all
be
covered
by
a
form
letter
can
be
explained
in
a
telephone
conversation.
Analysis
and
conclusion
Mr.
Julien
began
looking
after
the
applicant’s
file
in
1997
and
admitted
that
he
was
aware
of
the
time
limits
for
serving
the
notices
of
objection.
It
is
therefore
difficult
to
understand
why
he
did
not
serve
the
notices
at
the
proper
time.
Moreover,
in
seeking
an
extension
of
time,
he
did
not
say
in
his
written
application
why
he
was
asking
for
an
extension
and
did
not
even
respond
to
the
many
requests
by
the
MinisterÀs
officer
for
that
information.
The
intention
under
the
Act
is
that
an
application
to
extend
the
time
for
serving
an
objection
be
discussed
initially
at
the
ministerial
level.
Subsection
166.2(5)
of
the
Act
reads
as
follows:
When
application
to
be
granted
—
No
application
shall
be
granted
under
this
section
unless
(a)
the
application
was
made
under
subsection
166.1(1)
within
one
year
after
the
expiration
of
the
time
otherwise
limited
by
this
Act
for
serving
a
notice
of
objection
or
making
a
request,
as
the
case
may
be;
and
(b)
the
taxpayer
demonstrates
that
(i)
within
the
time
otherwise
limited
by
this
Act
for
serving
such
a
notice
or
making
such
a
request,
as
the
case
may
be,
the
taxpayer
(A)
was
unable
to
act
or
to
instruct
another
to
act
in
the
taxpayer’s
name,
or
(B)
had
a
bona
fide
intention
to
object
to
the
assessment
or
make
the
request,
(11)
given
the
reasons
set
out
in
the
application
and
the
circumstances
of
the
case,
it
would
be
just
and
equitable
to
grant
the
application,
and
(iii)
the
application
was
made
under
subsection
166.1(1)
as
soon
as
circumstances
permitted.
It
is
my
opinion
that
due
diligence
in
the
exercise
of
the
applicant’s
rights
has
not
been
shown
in
this
case.
The
application
is
accordingly
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.