Bowie
T
.C.J.:
This
appeal
concerns
a
claim
for
a
medical
expense
credit
under
section
118.2
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act).
The
sole
issue
is
whether
the
bed
which
the
Appellant
purchased
because
of
his
wife’s
disability
is
a
“hospital
bed”
within
the
meaning
of
that
expression
in
paragraph
(h)
of
Regulation
5700.
For
the
purposes
of
paragraph
118.2(2)
(m)
of
the
Act,
a
device
or
equipment
is
prescribed
if
it
is
a
(h)
hospital
bed
including
such
attachments
thereto
as
may
have
been
included
in
a
prescription
therefor;
The
parties
filed
an
Agreed
Statement
of
Facts;
the
first
10
paragraphs
set
the
basic
facts.
I.
The
parties
to
this
matter
have
agreed
to
the
facts
set
out
in
this
statement.
2.
The
Appellant
is
an
individual
resident
in
Canada.
3.
The
Appellant’s
spouse
is
Heather
Crockart.
Mrs.
Crockart
is
afflicted
with
multiple
sclerosis,
a
degenerative
disease
of
the
central
nervous
system
that
can
cause
vision
problems,
numbness,
loss
of
balance,
extreme
fatigue,
tremors,
and
paralysis.
4.
Mrs.
Crockart’s
condition
is
progressive.
It
has
resulted
in
paralysis
of
her
left
arm
and
leg.
5.
Mrs.
Crockart’s
medical
condition,
specifically
the
paralysis
of
her
left
arm
and
leg,
prevented
her
from
getting
into
and
out
of
a
“normal”
bed
unassisted.
Mrs.
Crockart
has
difficulty
with
bladder
and
bowel
control,
and
must
often
leave
her
bed
several
times
per
night
to
use
the
bathroom.
The
Appellant
works
shifts
and
cannot
assist
her
when
at
work.
6.
In
1994
Mrs.
Crockart’s
physician
advised
her
to
purchase
an
adjustable
bed
to
assist
her
in
getting
into
and
out
of
bed.
This
advice
constituted
a
prescription
for
the
purposes
of
subparagraph
118.2(/n)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Ac/”).
7.
The
ability
use
an
electronic
control
to
raise
and
lower
the
adjustable
bed,
together
with
the
use
of
a
stationary
pole,
allows
Mrs.
Crockart
to
get
into
and
out
of
bed
unassisted.
8.
After
viewing
several
models,
the
Appellant
purchased
a
Slumberland
adjustable
bed.
Its
size
was
a
“double
bed”.
It
is
not
a
classic
“hospital”
bed
with
rails
and
wheels.
In
addition
to
its
adjustability
feature,
the
adjustable
bed
was
some
eight
inches
lower
than
her
former
bed.
This
assisted
Mrs.
Crockart
in
getting
into
and
out
of
bed.
9.
The
purchase
price
of
the
bed
was
$3,235.
The
Appellant
paid
that
amount
to
the
vendor
of
the
bed,
and
was
reimbursed
$1,500
by
his
extended
medical
plan,
leaving
him
with
an
out-of-pocket
outlay
of
$1,735.
The
Appellant
filed
the
receipt
with
his
1994
income
tax
return.
10.
In
his
1994
taxation
year
the
Appellant
deducted
a
medical
expense
tax
credit.
In
computing
the
amount
of
his
medical
expenses
tax
credit
the
Appellant
included
his
out-of-pocket
outlay
for
the
adjustable
bed.
No
part
of
the
cost
of
the
adjustable
bed
was
included
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
medical
expenses
for
a
prior
year.
The
only
witness
was
Dr.
John
Hooge,
a
physician
who
has
specialized
in
the
treatment
of
multiple
sclerosis
for
almost
twenty
years.
He
is
Mrs.
Crockart’s
physician.
He
advised
the
purchase
of
an
“adjustable
bed”.
The
benefit
of
it
to
Mrs.
Crockart
lies
in
the
ease
of
getting
in
and
out,
particularly
when
her
husband
is
not
there
to
help
her.
The
bed
Mr.
Crockart
bought
can
be
raised
at
both
the
head
and
foot
by
electric
motors,
which
are
operated
by
a
hand
control.
It
is
lower
than
the
beds
traditionally
found
in
hospitals,
which
is
beneficial
for
Mrs.
Crockart.
It
does
not
have
the
side
rails
found
on
a
“classic
hospital
bed”,
and
this
too
is
beneficial
to
her.
It
is
a
double
bed.
Dr.
Hooge
agreed
that
he
had
never
seen
a
double
bed
in
use
in
a
hospital.
I
have
no
doubt
that
it
is
beneficial
to
Mrs.
Crockart,
that
she
and
her
husband
can
continue
to
share
a
double
bed,
despite
her
need
for
an
adjustable
bed.
In
summary,
this
bed
is
one
that
is
not
specifically
designed
and
manufactured
with
medical
concerns
in
mind,
it
is
not
one
that
would
likely
be
found
in
a
hospital,
but
it
has
the
essential
feature
of
those
that
are
found
there
which
is
required
by
Mrs.
Crockart
-
it
is
adjustable.
Also,
it
is
more
beneficial
to
her
condition
than
a
“classic
hospital
bed”
would
be
in
several
respects.
Counsel
for
the
Minister
takes
the
position
that
since
you
would
not
find
it
in
a
hospital,
it
is
not
a
hospital
bed,
and
so
it
does
not
qualify
for
the
tax
credit.
He
referred
me
to
Williams
v.
R.
in
which
Rip
J.
held
that
a
chemical-free
mattress
is
not
a
hospital
bed.
He
also
referred
me
to
three
separate
passages
from
Hansard,
and
a
technical
note
published
by
the
Department
of
Finance,
from
all
of
which
I
conclude
that
the
Respondent
accepts
that
this
is
not
a
case
in
which
the
words
in
dispute
admit
of
only
one
meaning.
I
agree
that
there
is
ambiguity,
but
I
do
not
find
either
Hansard
or
the
government’s
technical
notes
to
be
useful
in
resolving
it.
In
Radage
v.
/?.
Bowman
J.
said
of
sections
118.3
and
118.4
of
the
Act:
The
court
must,
while
recognizing
the
narrowness
of
the
tests
enumerated
in
sections
118.3
and
118.4,
construe
the
provisions
liberally,
humanely
and
compassionately
and
not
narrowly
and
technically.
That
principle
has
since
been
approved
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
Section
118.2
of
the
Act,
and
Regulation
5700
have
the
same
purpose
as
sections
118.3
and
118.4;
they
should
be
construed
in
the
same
way.
That
purpose
would
be
thwarted,
not
fostered,
by
the
technical
construction
for
which
the
Respondent
contends
here.
I
do
not
believe
that
it
was
the
intention
of
either
Parliament,
when
enacting
section
118.2,
or
the
Governor-in-
Council,
when
enacting
Regulation
5700,
to
so
limit
the
availability
of
the
credit
as
to
deny
it
to
Mr.
Crockart
because
he
bought
a
bed
having
the
desirable
attributes
of
a
“classic
hospital
bed”,
but
one
more
beneficial
to
his
wife
than
such
a
“classic
hospital
bed”
would
be.
Nor,
I
am
sure
would
Parliament
or
the
Governor-in-Council
have
intended
the
provision
to
be
construed
in
such
a
way
as
to
preclude
its
application
to
a
bed
which
could
be
shared
by
husband
and
wife.
I
find
that
the
bed
in
question
here
has
sufficient
of
the
attributes
of
a
“classic
hospital
bed”
as
to
bring
it
with
the
Regulation.
The
appeal
is
allowed,
with
costs.
Appeal
allowed.