Blais
J.:
The
plaintiff
Claude
Côté
is
appealing
from
a
decision
by
Tremblay
J.T.C.,
which
affirmed
the
assessment
made
by
the
defendant.
At
the
very
start
of
the
hearing
the
plaintiff
Claude
Côté
admitted
that
the
only
point
at
issue
was
whether
the
plaintiff
was
en
employee
or
an
independent
contractor,
and
as
such
whether
the
expense
of
$12,815.19
could
be
regarded
as
an
expense
within
the
meaning
of
s.
18(
1
)(rz)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
which
reads
as
follows:
18.(1)
Dans
le
calcul
du
revenu
du
contribuable,
tiré
d’une
entreprise
ou
d’un
bien,
les
éléments
suivants
ne
sont
pas
déductibles:
(a)
débours
ou
une
dépense
sauf
dans
la
mesure
où
elle
a
été
faite
ou
engagée
par
le
contribuable
en
vue
de
tirer
un
revenu
des
biens
ou
de
l’entreprise
ou
de
faire
produire
un
revenu
aux
biens
ou
à
l’entreprise;
18.(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property;
The
plaintiff
admitted
at
once
that
if
he
cannot
be
regarded
as
a
contractor
the
expense
is
not
eligible
in
view
of
his
income
for
1985.
Facts
The
plaintiff
explained
that
following
his
doctoral
studies
in
the
U.S.
and
post-doctoral
studies
in
Europe,
he
had
submitted
a
research
project
to
several
Quebec
universities
and
had
indicated
his
interest
in
coming
to
work
in
Quebec.
After
various
discussions
the
Lady
Davis
Institute
for
Medical
Research
of
Sir
Mortimer
B.
Davis,
an
institution
attached
to
the
Jewish
General
Hospital
of
Montréal,
indicated
that
it
was
interested
and,
after
various
discussions
and
negotiations,
Dr.
Claude
Côté
agreed
to
join
the
research
team
at
the
Lady
Davis
Institute.
There
are
a
number
of
researchers
at
this
institute,
each
of
whom
has
a
research
program
for
which
they
each
receive
funds
from
various
Canadian
and
international
research
funds.
Each
researcher
is
responsible
for
his
research
program
and
for
administering
the
program,
once
he
has
been
accepted
by
the
grantor
organization.
For
1985
Dr.
Claude
Côté
had
filed
a
grant
application
with
the
Medical
Research
Council
of
Canada
on
October
31,
1983.
For
the
grant
application
to
be
admissible
it
must
be
made
in
accordance
with
the
Grants
and
Awards
Guide,
issued
by
the
Medical
Research
Council
of
Canada.
It
is
essential
for
a
researcher
filing
a
grant
application
to
show
that
he
is
associated
with
a
research
centre
which
can
provide
him
the
facilities
and
equipment
necessary
to
carry
out
the
research
program.
For
1985
Dr.
Claude
Côté
filed
his
grant
application
supported
by
Mr.
Arche
Deskin,
executive
director,
and
M.N.
Kalant,
M.D.,
both
associated
with
the
Lady
Davis
Institute
for
Medical
Research
of
Sir
Mortimer
B.
Davis
and
the
Jewish
General
Hospital.
According
to
Dr.
Côté’s
testimony
it
appears
that
the
institute
only
consists
of
researchers
who
meet
from
time
to
time
to
take
decisions
on
software
affecting
the
management
of
premises
used
by
the
institute.
The
institute
itself
receives
a
grant
of
some
$4-600,000
from
the
Quebec
Fonds
de
recherche
en
santé,
and
this
grant
is
used
to
pay
the
general
fees
of
the
institute
and
among
other
things
the
living
expenses
of
one
or
more
researchers
who
have
no
other
means
of
support.
Of
the
other
researchers
who
belong
to
the
institute,
some
are
professors
in
various
universities,
others
receive
grants
from
other
sources
to
do
their
research
and
still
others
are
paid
through
research
contracts.
Dr.
Côté
received
an
amount
which
initially,
in
early
1980,
was
around
$20,000
as
living
expenses,
and
this
amount
was
some
$40,000
for
1985.
For
administration
purposes,
the
grant
[was]
allocated
to
Dr.
Côté’s
research
program,
and
according
to
the
notice
of
grant
sent
to
Dr.
Claude
Côté
on
June
4,
1984,
[TRANSLATION]
“this
grant
will
be
paid
into
the
joint
grant
fund
of
the
Council
under
the
control
of
the
treasurer
of
the
institution
where
you
are
conducting
your
work,
to
cover
your
expenses
as
you
authorize
payments”.
Following
the
approval
of
each
annual
grant
the
expenses
were
authorized
by
Dr.
Côté
or
his
assistant
at
the
time,
Miss
Boulet,
who
sent
the
authorizations
to
the
Jewish
Hospital
purchasing
department,
and
the
latter
was
responsible
for
making
payments
in
accordance
with
the
authorizations
given
by
Dr.
Côté
or
his
assistant,
acting
as
such
as
trustee
for
the
amounts
paid
by
the
Medical
Research
Council
of
Canada.
Dr.
Côté
testified
that
the
research
program
he
had
supervised
since
1980
was
a
business
in
itself,
intended
to
produce
intellectual
property
which
could
result
in
a
capacity
to
market
the
biomedical
products
developed
or
generate
economic
spinoffs
from
the
reputation
of
the
project,
presentation
of
the
seminars
and
so
on.
Dr.
Côté
testified
clearly
that
he
could
not
receive
any
pay
as
part
of
the
grant
made
by
the
Medical
Research
Council
of
Canada
for
1985,
and
his
living
expenses
were
paid
for
from
the
general
funds
of
the
institute,
which
received
money
from
another
source,
namely
the
Quebec
Fonds
de
recherche
en
santé.
Dr.
Côté
further
testified
that
he
had
no
hierarchical
relationship
with
the
Jewish
Hospital
and
that
the
latter
acted
only
as
a
trustee
for
the
amounts
paid
by
the
Medical
Research
Council
of
Canada,
and
it
was
the
Jewish
Hospital
which
was
responsible
for
making
up
cheques
and
sending
them
to
suppliers
for
and
on
behalf
of
the
researcher
responsible
for
the
research
program.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
maintained
that
everything
in
the
evidence
tended
to
show
that
Dr.
Côté
was
an
employee
of
the
hospital,
that
he
was
paid
in
this
way,
that
s.
8(1)(b)
and
(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
apply,
and
that
the
expense
of
$12,815.19
constituting
the
legal
fees
incurred
by
the
plaintiff
in
an
action
for
an
injunction
in
the
Quebec
Superior
Court
to
preserve
his
contract
with
the
Lady
Davis
Institute
and
the
Jewish
General
Hospital
could
not
be
allowed
as
an
eligible
expenditure
within
the
meaning
of
s.
18(
1
)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Law
Sestions
8(1)0)
and
(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
state:
8(1)(b)
Les
sommes
payées
par
le
contribuable
dans
l’année
à
titre
de
frais
judiciaires
ou
extrajudiciaires
engagés
par
lui
en
recouvrement
du
traitement
ou
salaire
qui
lui
est
dû
par
son
employeur
ou
son
ancien
employeur;
8(2)
En
dehors
des
déductions
permises
par
le
présent
article,
aucune
autre
déduction
ne
doit
être
faite
lors
du
calcul
du
revenu
d’un
contribuable
tiré,
pour
une
année
d’imposition,
d’une
charge
ou
d’un
emploi.
8(
1
)(/?)
Amounts
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as
or
on
account
of
legal
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
collecting
salary
or
wages
owed
to
him
by
his
employer
or
former
employer;
8.(2)
Except
as
permitted
by
this
section,
no
deductions
shall
be
made
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment.
Section
18(
l)(n)
of
the
Act
for
its
part,
states:
18.(1)
Dans
le
calcul
du
revenu
du
contribuable,
tiré
d’une
entreprise
ou
d’un
bien,
les
éléments
suivants
ne
sont
pas
déductibles:
(a)
débours
ou
une
dépense
sauf
dans
la
mesure
où
elle
a
été
faite
ou
engagée
par
le
contribuable
en
vue
de
tirer
un
revenu
des
biens
ou
de
l’entreprise
ou
de
faire
produire
un
revenu
aux
biens
ou
à
l’entreprise;
18.(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property;
Dr.
Côté
maintained
that
the
expense
of
$12,815.19
incurred
in
the
action
for
an
injunction
against
the
Institute
and
the
Hospital,
an
action
which
was
in
fact
successfully
prosecuted,
is
an
eligible
expense
since
it
ultimately
enabled
him
to
go
ahead
with
his
research
program
and
proceed
efficiently
with
the
organization
of
his
business,
first
temporarily
at
the
Hôpital
Ste-Justice
and
then
at
the
University
of
Quebec
at
Montréal,
so
he
could
effectively
pursue
his
research
program
in
subsequent
years.
In
this
sense
the
$12,815.19
expense
is
an
eligible
expense
since
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property.
It
is
not
unusual
for
taxpayers
to
report
income
for
a
given
taxation
year
from
both
money
earned
as
salary
and
other
income
earned
as
business
income.
Dr.
Côté
testified
that
the
greater
part
of
his
time,
especially
in
1985
when
problems
arose
with
his
associates,
was
taken
up
with
developing
and
coordinating
his
research
program.
This
was
a
business
although
in
1985
the
business
produced
no
income
for
its
owner,
Dr.
Côté.
There
is
no
doubt
in
my
mind
that
when
Dr.
Côté
took
the
decision
to
institute
an
action
for
an
injunction
against
the
Jewish
Hospital
and
the
Lady
Davis
Institute,
he
did
so
in
all
good
faith
to
ensure
the
continuity
of
his
research
program,
namely
his
business.
As
such
his
expense,
which
he
incurred
and
which
he
also
put
to
good
use,
was
incurred
if
not
to
produce
income
from
a
business
then
surely
to
enable
the
business
to
earn
income
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
s.
18(
1
)(7z)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
expenses
incurred
in
a
business
for
the
purpose
of
producing
income
from
the
said
business
are
not
always
effective.
In
the
case
at
bar,
although
Dr.
Côté’s
business
did
not
produce
the
expected
income
in
1985,
it
is
clear
that
this
type
of
business
only
expects
to
produce
profits
in
the
long
term.
For
example,
if
we
look
at
large
businesses
in
the
pharmaceutical
sector,
research
programs
may
last
for
more
than
ten
years
before
a
pharmaceutical
product
can
be
marketed,
and
money
spent
for
research
purposes
throughout
those
ten
years
is
regarded
as
expenses
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
in
order
to
gain
or
produce
income
from
a
business
or
a
property.
For
these
Reasons:
•
I
allow
the
plaintiff’s
action;
•
I
declare
that
the
expense
of
$12,815.19
is
an
expense
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
Claude
Côté
in
order
to
produce
income
from
his
business;
•
I
direct
the
defendant
to
issue
a
reassessment
for
1985
taking
this
expense
into
account;
•
I
order
the
defendant
to
pay
the
plaintiff
costs
which
in
the
circumstances
are
set
at
the
amount
of
$3,000.
Appeal
allowed.