O’Connor
T.C.J.:
This
appeal
was
heard
at
Toronto,
Ontario
on
February
19,
1998
pursuant
to
the
Informal
Procedure
of
this
Court.
The
appeal
relates
to
the
Appellant’s
1995
taxation
year.
Issue
The
issue
is
whether
a
Canada
Pension
Plan
benefit
in
the
amount
of
$4,575
should
have
been
included
in
the
Appellant’s
taxable
income
in
that
year
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
he
did
not
actually
receive
it
because
the
said
amount
had
been
set
off
against
taxes
allegedly
owing
by
the
Appellant
in
previous
years.
Facts
On
March
30,
1993
and
on
March
6,
1995
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(“Minister”)
issued
to
the
Appellant
Notices
of
Retention
of
his
Canada
Pension
Plan
benefits
(“CPP”)
pursuant
to
section
224.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(“Act”)
for
taxes
owing
by
the
Appellant
from
the
1970’s.
In
assessing
the
Appellant
for
the
1995
taxation
year
the
Minister
included
in
his
taxable
income
amounts
that
were
payable
to
the
Appellant
under
the
CPP
which
were
set
off
against
the
Appellant’s
unpaid
taxes
owing.
The
Appellant
appeals
on
the
basis
that
the
CPP
benefits
were
not
“received”
by
him
in
the
taxation
year
and
therefore
should
not
be
included.
Law
The
basic
provisions
of
the
Act
are
the
following:
56(1)
Without
restricting
the
generality
of
section
3,
there
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
(a)
any
amount
received
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as,
on
account
or
in
lieu
of
payment
of,
or
in
satisfaction
of
(i)
a
superannuation
or
pension
benefit
including,
without
limiting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
(B)
the
amount
of
any
benefit
under
the
Canada
Pension
Plan.,.,
224.1
Where
a
person
is
indebted
to
Her
Majesty
under
this
Act
or
...
the
Minister
may
require
the
retention
by
way
of
deduction
or
set-off
of
such
amount
as
the
Minister
may
specify
out
of
any
amount
that
may
be
or
become
payable
to
the
person
by
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
Canada.
Analysis
and
Decision
Subsubparagraph
56(
1
)(a)(i)(B)
includes
in
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
the
year
the
amount
of
any
CPP
benefits
which
were
“received”
by
the
taxpayer
in
a
given
year.
The
Appellant
argued
that
because
this
amount,
namely
the
amount
in
question
was
set-off
against
his
alleged
tax
owing
from
previous
years,
it
was
never
received
by
him
in
the
year.
Certain
dictionary
definitions
of
“receive”
or
“receipt”
might
leave
one
with
the
impression
that
something
is
not
received
unless
it
is
actually
taken
into
one’s
hands
or
possession.
However
the
case
law
is
clear
that
an
amount
may
be
included
in
income
even
where
it
is
only
notionally
or
constructively
received.
In
Morin
v.
R.
(1975),
75
D.T.C.
5061
(Fed.
T.D.),
Lacroix
J.
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
stated
as
follows
at
page
5064:
In
the
case
at
bar
the
provincial
and
federal
statutes
state
that
income
tax
is
payable
on
the
salary,
wages
or
remuneration
that
an
employee
receives
during
a
taxation
year.
In
this
case
the
plaintiff
was
recorded
in
his
employer’s
books
as
being
entitled
to
a
salary
of
$16,268.84.
He
contends
that
since
the
government
deducted
the
amount
of
tax,
he
did
not
receive
his
full
salary,
given
the
fact
that
the
amount
of
the
tax
was
deducted
at
source.
In
other
words,
the
plaintiff
puts
forward
as
a
proposition
of
law
that
in
order
to
receive
his
salary
in
the
legal
sense,
he
must
actually
touch
or
feel
it,
or
have
it
in
his
bank
account.
We
regret
to
say
that
this
proposition
seems
to
us
absolutely
inadmissible,
because
the
word
“receive”
obviously
means
to
get
or
to
derive
benefit
from
some-
thing,
to
enjoy
its
advantages
without
necessarily
having
it
in
one’s
hands.
In
other
words,
the
plaintiff
can,
and
must,
say,
“what
is
left
of
my
salary
or
income,
after
taxes,
is
$14,639.85”;
it
is
not
correct
to
say
“My
income
is
only
$14,639.85”.
In
Hoffman
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1985),
85
D.T.C.
5508
(Fed.
T.D.),
Rouleau
J.
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
stated
as
follows
at
5510:
If
the
proposition
that
income
must
be
in
the
actual
possession
of
the
employee
before
it
can
be
taxed
is
correct,
then
I
would
have
to
conclude
that
an
employee’s
contributions
to
Canadian
or
provincial
pension
plans,
deducted
at
source
by
the
employer,
are
not
income
in
the
hands
of
the
employee.
Jurisprudence
does
not
support
this
proposition.
In
Lucien
Gingras
v.
M.N.R.
[unreported
decision
dated
March
26,
1973]
the
Tax
Review
Board
noted
(at
page
4):
The
expression
“touché”
(received)
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
the
full
amount
of
the
salary
must
be
physically
received
by
the
payee
or
be
deposited
in
full
in
his
bank
account.
According
to
the
interpretation
of
s.
5
it
is
sufficient
to
say
that
the
amount
of
the
salary
was
paid
by
the
employer
either
to
the
employee
himself
or
to
his
benefit,
or
that
it
was
handed
over
to
a
third
party
under
a
federal
or
provincial
statute.
The
fact
that
the
defendant’s
employer
deducted
at
source
employee’s
social
security
contributions
in
the
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
does
not
support
the
proposition
that
he
received
income
net
of
the
withheld
amounts.
The
amounts
deducted
and
forwarded
were
for
his
eventual
benefit.
Finally,
in
Fairey
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1991),
91
D.T.C.
5230
(Fed.
T.D.),
Muldoon
J.
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division
found
that
money
which
was
automatically
deducted
from
a
government
employee’s
salary
and
deposited
into
a
pension
fund
was
in
effect
received
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
sense
that
it
accrued
to
his
credit
and
his
entitlement
to
it
could
not
be
disputed.
The
Appellant
points
out
that
an
amendment
was
made
to
section
56(l)(a)
by
1980-81-82-83
Statutes
of
Canada,
Chap.
140,
Section
26(1)
by
adding
after
the
words
“received”
the
words
“by
the
taxpayer”
applicable
to
the
1982
and
subsequent
taxation
years.
He
argues
that
the
amendment
must
be
given
some
meaning,
namely
that
the
amount
must
be
actually
received
by
the
taxpayer.
I
do
not
believe
this
argument
can
succeed.
The
previous
version
of
the
section
in
question
which
did
not
contain
the
words
“by
the
taxpayer”
I
believe
can
only
be
interpreted
as
referring
to
amounts
received
by
the
taxpayer.
In
other
words,
the
words
“by
the
taxpayer”
were
added
for
clarification
rather
than
to
substantively
change
the
meaning
of
the
provision.
In
any
event,
the
decisions
in
Hoffman
and
Faireyreferred
to
above,
were
made
after
the
amendment
in
question
and
I
believe
those
decisions
accurately
reflect
the
state
of
the
law.
For
all
of
the
above
reasons
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.