Lamarre
Proulx
T
.
C.J.:
The
Appellant
is
appealing,
by
way
of
the
Informal
Procedure,
the
assessment
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
for
the
year
1991.
The
question
at
issue
is
whether
by
virtue
of
paragraph
118(
1
)(£>)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”)
the
Appellant
is
entitled
to
the
credit
known
as
the
equivalent
to
married
tax
credit
for
the
second
half
of
the
year
for
the
first
half
of
which
he
was
entitled
to
and
claimed,
under
paragraph
60(c)
of
the
Act,
a
deduction
for
an
alimony
payment.
The
facts
of
this
appeal
are
not
in
dispute
and
are
set
out
in
paragraph
9
of
the
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal
as
follows:
(a)
the
Appellant
was
divorced
from
his
ex-wife
on
May
26,
1989;
(b)
as
per
the
written
agreement
upon
divorce
the
Appellant’s
children,
Benjamin
Daniel
Youe
and
Emily
May
Youe,
were
to
live
with
the
ex-
wife
until
June
19,
1991
at
which
time
they
would
live
with
the
Appellant
until
September
1,
1993;
(c)
the
Appellant
made
child
support
payments
of
$5,815.88
in
the
taxation
year
1991
to
his
ex-wife
for
which
he
claimed
a
deduction
from
income
as
per
paragraph
60(c);
(d)
the
ex-wife
claimed
an
equivalent
to
married
tax
credit
of
$5,233.00
in
respect
of
Emily
May
Youe
in
the
1991
taxation
year;
(e)
the
Appellant
is
not
entitled
to
deduct
any
amount
from
tax
payable
for
an
equivalent
to
married
amount
in
the
1991
taxation
year.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
submitted
that
the
Appellant
was
not
entitled
under
paragraph
118(1)(b)
of
the
Act
to
the
equivalent
to
married
tax
credit
in
the
amount
of
$2,616.50
as
he
was
entitled
to
a
deduction
under
paragraph
60(c)
and
therefore
his
child
was
deemed
not
to
be
his
child
as
per
subsection
118(5)
of
the
Act.
The
Appellant
submitted
that
the
purpose
of
subsection
118(5)
of
the
Act
was
to
prevent
a
double
deduction.
He
tried
to
distinguish
the
decision
of
this
Court
in
Gifford
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1991),
91
D.T.C.
953
(T.C.C.)
—
which
stated
that
the
effect
of
former
subsection
109(4)
of
the
Act,
whose
wording
and
object
were
substantially
the
same
as
the
present
subsection
118(5),
was
to
negate
the
right
to
the
deduction
of
the
equivalent
to
married
amount
under
paragraph
109(1)(b)
of
the
Act
-
on
the
basis
that
in
that
case
the
taxpayer
had
paid
alimony
for
his
child
throughout
the
year,
whereas
in
the
present
case
the
Appellant
had
obtained
custody
of
his
children
on
June
9
of
the
taxation
year
in
question
and
had
therefore
stopped
paying
alimony
at
that
time.
He
therefore
argued
that
he
was
entitled
for
the
rest
of
the
year
to
half
of
the
credit
provided
for
in
paragraph
118(1
)(Z?)
of
the
Act.
Unfortunately,
this
is
not
how
the
pertinent
legislative
provisions
read.
Paragraph
118(5)
of
the
Act
reads
as
follows:
118(5)
Where
an
individual
in
computing
his
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
entitled
to
a
deduction
under
paragraph
60(b),
(c)
or
(cd)
in
respect
of
a
payment
for
the
maintenance
of
a
spouse
or
child,
the
spouse
or
child
shall,
for
the
purposes
of
this
section
(other
than
the
definition
“qualified
pension
income’’
in
subsection
(7))
be
deemed
not
to
be
the
spouse
or
child
of
the
individual.
This
deeming
provision
contemplates,
without
any
doubt
whatsoever,
the
whole
of
the
taxation
year.
It
contains
nothing
that
would
allow
of
a
partition
of
the
year
and
I
see
no
ambiguity
in
its
wording.
Consequently,
the
Appellant
is
not
entitled
to
claim
a
credit
pursuant
to
paragraph
118(1)(b)
of
the
Act
because
for
the
year
1991
his
child
was
deemed
not
to
be
his
child
for
the
purposes
of
section
118
of
the
Act.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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