Sarchuk
T.C.J.:
Motions
by
both
the
Respondent
and
the
Appellants
in
respect
of
the
appeals
of
Basil
Dick,
Kenneth
R.
Livermore,
K.
John
Woodcock
and
Anne
Goetz-Rapcewicz
were
argued
yesterday
and
I
indicated
that
I
would
rule
on
them
today.
The
first
is
a
motion
by
the
Respondent
for
an
Order
abridging
the
time
for
service
of
the
Notice
of
Motion,
which
I
grant;
and
for
an
Order
dismissing
the
appeals
with
costs,
or,
alternatively,
compelling
the
Appellants
to
re-attend
at
their
own
expense
to
answer
questions
undertaken
to
be
answered
and
any
proper
questions
arising
therefrom,
with
costs
of
the
motion
to
the
Respondent.
The
Appellants,
for
their
part,
sought
an
adjournment
of
the
trial
of
these
appeals.
The
grounds
advanced
by
the
Respondent
in
respect
of
each
individual
motion
are
identical
and
allege
that
each
Appellant
has
failed
to
satisfy
undertakings
given
on
oral
examination
contrary
to
the
Orders
of
this
Court
dated
January
22,
1997
and
April
9,
1997
which
undertakings
were
to
be
satisfied
by
July
30,
1997.
More
specifically,
it
is
asserted
that
each
Appellant
failed
to
answer
a
number
of
proper
questions
undertaken
to
be
answered
on
their
respective
examinations
for
discovery
conducted
in
the
case
of
Woodcock
on
July
3,
1997,
and
in
the
case
of
the
other
three
Appellants
on
June
17,
1997.
The
Respondent
relies
on
section
110
and
subsection
125(7)
of
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
Rules
(General
Procedure).
A
brief
summary
of
the
events
giving
rise
to
these
motions
is
warranted.
The
Notices
of
Appeal
were
filed
on
May
23,
1995
and
the
Replies
thereto
followed
on
July
26,
1995.
No
further
steps
were
taken
by
the
Appellants
as
a
result
of
which
a
status
hearing
was
held
on
November
12,
1996.
At
that
time,
Counsel
for
the
Appellants
was
unable
to
advise
the
Court
whether
he
had
served
copies
of
the
notices
on
his
clients
and
as
a
result,
the
status
hearing
was
adjourned
to
January
13,
1997.
On
that
date,
the
Court
ordered
that
the
appeals
be
heard
on
common
evidence
on
August
11,
1997.
The
Court
further
set
time
periods
for
the
completion
of
the
remaining
steps,
included
in
which
was
a
requirement
that
the
examinations
for
discovery
and
any
undertakings
arising
therefrom
be
completed
by
May
30,
1997.
On
April
2,
1997,
Counsel
for
the
Appellants
requested
an
amendment
of
the
Order
to
permit
discoveries
to
be
completed
not
later
than
June
30,
1997
and
undertakings
to
be
completed
by
July
30,
1997.
The
Order
was
granted.
The
Dick,
Livermore
and
Goetz-Rapcewicz
discoveries
were
held
on
June
17,
1997.
A
further
motion
was
made
by
the
Appellants
to
again
extend
the
time
for
completion
of
the
Woodcock
examination
to
July
15,
1997,
which
was
motion
granted.
In
all
instances,
the
Respondent
chose
not
to
object.
As
of
July
30,
1997
(the
last
date
for
the
completion
of
undertakings),
not
one
of
the
Appellants
had
complied.
On
August
1,
1997,
the
Respondent
filed
the
present
motions
to
dismiss.
On
August
6,
1997,
the
date
set
for
the
hearing
of
these
motions,
a
series
of
letters,
some
accompanied
by
documents,
were
faxed
by
Appellants’
Counsel
to
Respondent’s
Counsel.
At
the
commencement
of
the
hearing,
none
of
this
material
had
been
received
by
the
Court.
At
various
times
that
day,
both
the
Court
and
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
received
this
material
and
in
several
instances
examined
it
for
the
first
time
in
the
course
of
the
argument
on
the
motion.
The
material
so
submitted,
according
to
Appellants’
Counsel,
constituted
a
complete
and
full
answer
to
the
39
undertakings
vis-a-vis
the
Appellant,
Dick,
eight
for
Woodcock
and
25
for
Livermore.
Goetz-
Rapcewicz
did
not
respond
at
all,
and
none
of
the
undertakings
relating
to
her
appeal
have
been
produced.
She
has
thus
completely
failed
to
comply
with
the
Court
order.
Counsel
for
the
Appellants
advised
the
Court
that
he
has
not
been
able
to
speak
or
otherwise
communicate
with
her
and
has
no
idea
why
she
has
failed
to
comply
with
the
Order.
In
view
of
this,
the
Minister’s
motion
is
granted
with
respect
to
Goetz-Rapcewicz
and
her
appeal
is
dismissed.
With
respect
to
the
other
three
Appellants,
the
position
advanced
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
(it
would
appear
after
only
a
cursory
examination
of
the
material
submitted),
was
that
a
number
of
undertakings
were
not
answered
or
were
insufficiently
or
incompletely
answered.
With
particular
reference
to
Dick,
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
submitted
that
some
of
the
answers
did
not
address
the
issue
raised
by
the
questions
and
in
some
instances,
appeared
to
skirt
the
issue.
In
my
view,
upon
examination
of
the
material,
that
appeared
to
be
the
case,
but
whether
this
was
done
deliberately
or
inadvertently
was
difficult
to
tell.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
contended
that
the
faxed
documents
did
not
constitute
full
and
complete
answers
to
the
questions
they
related
to
as
required.
Quite
frankly,
the
explanations
for
the
delay
advanced
by
their
Counsel,
particularly
with
respect
to
Dick
and
Livermore,
do
not
bear
close
scrutiny.
Counsel
for
the
Appellants
argued
that
his
clients
had
until
July
30,
1997
to
complete
the
undertakings
and
that
the
production
of
the
undertakings
on
the
day
of
this
hearing
was
in
essence
only
three
working
days
late.
That
may
be
so,
but
the
examinations
for
discovery
of
Dick
and
Livermore
were
completed
on
June
17,
1997
which
left
six
weeks
to
comply
with
the
Court’s
directions.
With
respect
to
Woodcock,
his
discovery
was
completed
on
July
3,
1997,
again
leaving
virtually
a
full
month
within
which
the
undertakings
could
have
been
completed.
The
fact
that
within
five
days
of
the
filing
of
the
motion
by
the
Respondent,
the
Appellants,
Dick,
Woodcock
and
Livermore,
produced
answers
to
undertakings
(in
one
form
or
another)
clearly
indicates
that
they
could
readily
have
been
provided
well
before
the
Court-mandated
deadline.
The
Appellants’
counsel
also
submitted
that
given
the
circumstances,
dismissal
of
the
appeals
was
too
severe
a
sanction.
Let
me
say
that
both
the
Respondent
and
the
Appellants
are
obliged
to
obey
the
lawful
orders
of
this
Court
as
long
as
they
are
outstanding.
If
a
party
disagrees
with
an
order,
it
can
appeal
but
it
may
not
ignore
the
order.
The
conduct
of
the
Appellants
in
this
case
clearly
had
the
potential
to
prejudice
the
Respondent’s
position,
particularly
given
that
fact
that
the
trial
was
scheduled
to
be
heard
on
August
11,
1997,
a
fact
known
to
the
Appellants
for
over
six
months.
Quite
simply,
an
Appellant
has
the
responsibility
to
prosecute
an
appeal
with
due
dispatch
and
within
the
prescribed
rules.
As
was
noted
by
Hamlyn
J.
in
D’Abbondanza
v.
R.,
(1993),
93
D.T.C.
1042
(T.C.C.),
an
Appellant
must
be
proactive
not
reactive.
The
history
of
this
file
is
that
the
Appellants
have
consistently
been
dilatory
in
their
prosecution
of
the
appeals.
Their
recent
actions
demonstrate
that
only
too
well.
In
this
context,
I
note
that
on
July
25,
1997,
the
Appellants
sought
an
adjournment
of
the
trial
date
set
for
these
appeals.
The
grounds
set
out
by
their
Counsel
in
his
letter
to
the
Court
were
in
part
as
follows:
These
appeals,
while
being
made
by
only
four
Appellants,
are
actually
on
behalf
of
some
100
other
taxpayers
who
are
also
involved
in
this
business
investment.
The
proper
presentation
of
these
appeals
will
involve
the
use
of
professional
accountants,
lawyers
etc.,
as
witnesses
aside
from
the
parties
themselves.
The
use
of
these
professionals
will
be
expensive.
I
had
asked
my
clients
to
organize
a
solicitation
of
funds
from
the
other
investors
in
order
to
be
able
to
pay
these
professionals.
They
had
advised
me
that
a
third
party
was
involved
in
this
and
was
soliciting
these
funds.
They
have
recently
learned
that
this
was
not
the
case
and
that
no
other
taxpayers
had
been,
in
fact,
solicited.
At
that
time,
Counsel’s
submission
to
the
Court
was
that
“my
clients
have
now
organized
themselves
and
a
letter
has
been
sent,
to
be
followed
up
with
a
telephone
solicitation,
to
seek
the
funds
necessary
for
the
proper
presentation
of
theses
(sic)
cases
before
the
Court.
However,
sufficient
funds
have
not
been
received
as
of
yet
and
the
preparation,
meeting,
etc.
with
necessary
professionals
has
not
yet
started”.
This
motion
for
an
adjournment
was
denied
by
the
Chief
Judge
of
the
Tax
Court
on
July
28,
1997.
It
was
renewed
before
me
on
August
6,
1997,
at
which
time
I
indicated
that
an
adjournment
on
the
grounds
advanced
was
not
warranted.
I
have
not
been
persuaded
by
the
submissions
of
Counsel
for
the
Appellants
that
there
was
a
genuine
attempt
by
his
clients
to
comply
with
the
Orders
of
this
Court.
The
Respondent’s
motion
is
granted,
with
costs,
and
the
appeals
are
dismissed,
with
costs.
Given
my
decision
in
respect
of
the
Respondent’s
motion,
I
need
not
address
the
Appellants’
request
for
an
adjournment.
Motion
granted.