Gibson
J.:
By
notice
of
motion
filed
the
3rd
of
December,
1997,
the
plaintiff
seeks
an
order
under
Rule
2100
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules^
and
section
50
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
staying
execution
of
the
Certificate
related
to
a
Requirement
To
Pay
dated
the
4th
of
December,
1996,
or
alternative
relief.
The
motion
is
filed
in
an
action
based
upon
an
alleged
failure
of
the
defendant:
..to
honour
the
agreement
between
[the
then
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue]
and
the
plaintiff
for
mutually
acceptable
terms
of
payment
of
taxes,....
The
“Requirement
to
Pay”
dated
the
4th
of
December,
1996,
was
directed
by
the
defendant
to
the
plaintiffs
employer.
In
effect,
it
amounted
to
a
garnishee
of
the
plaintiff’s
wages
at
a
rate
in
excess
of
the
payment
schedule
proposed
by
the
plaintiff
and
alleged
by
her
to
be
provided
for
in
the
“agreement”.
Subsection
50(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
provides
as
follows:
50(1)
The
Court
may,
in
its
discretion,
stay
proceedings
in
any
cause
or
matter,
(a)
on
the
ground
that
the
claim
is
being
proceeded
with
in
another
court
or
jurisdiction:
or
(b)
where
for
any
other
reason
it
is
in
the
interest
of
justice
that
the
proceedings
be
stayed.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
urged
that
the
Court
lacked
jurisdiction
under
section
50
to
stay
recovery
under
the
Requirement
To
Pay
because,
whether
or
not
a
stay
might
be
in
the
interest
of
justice,
such
action
by
the
Court
would
not
amount
to
a
stay
of
proceedings
“in
any
cause
or
matter...”.
The
defendant
stated
the
issue
in
the
following
terms:
Can
this
Court,
acting
under
authority
of
Federal
Court
Rule
2100
and
section
50
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
stay
the
continuing
application
of
a
non-judicial
collection
device
that
has
been
validly
implemented
under
section
224(1.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act?
For
the
purposes
of
these
reasons,
I
find
it
unnecessary
to
recite
the
words
of
Federal
Court
Rule
2100.
In
Yri-York
Ltd.
v.
Canada
(Attorney
General)Mr.
Justice
Heald
wrote:
Since
I
think,
for
the
reasons
expressed,
supra,
that
the
s.
17
procedure
herein
constitutes
a
proceeding,
it
seems
to
me
that
the
dicta
articulated
by
Stone
J.
in
the
case
of
New
Brunswick
Electric
Power
Com
'n
v.
Maritime
Electric
Co.
Ltd.,
[1985]
2
F.C.
13,
...
would
apply
to
the
situation
at
bar.
At
p.
24
of
the
reasons,
Mr.
Justice
Stone
said:
Subsection
50(1)
of
the
Act
is
not
on
its
face
limited
to
proceedings
“before
the
Court’’.
The
inclusion
of
those
words
or
words
of
like
effect
would,
I
think
have
removed
any
doubt
as
to
the
intention
of
Parliament.
Omission
of
them
from
subsection
50(1)
lends
some
support
to
an
argument
that
by
“proceedings”
Parliament
intended
to
confer
power,
in
appropriate
circumstances,
to
stay
proceedings
in
addition
to
those
pending
in
the
Court
itself.
I
find
that
view
of
the
matter
to
be
persuasive
indeed.
[italics
added
by
me
for
emphasis]
On
the
material
before,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
“non-judicial
collection
device”
of
a
Requirement
To
Pay,
authorized
as
it
is
by
subsection
224(1.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
is
a
proceeding
in
a
cause
or
matter
notwithstanding
that
it
is
not
a
cause
or
matter
before
this
Court.
Thus,
I
find
that
it
is
within
the
jurisdiction
of
this
Court
under
subsection
50(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
to
stay
such
a
proceeding.
The
issue
then
arises,
are
the
circumstances
that
were
before
me
“appropriate
circumstances”
in
which
to
exercise
this
Court’s
discretionary
jurisdiction
to
stay.
I
conclude
that
the
answer
to
that
question
must
be
no.
The
“Requirement
To
Pay”
was
first
issued
by
the
defendant
in
December,
1996,
just
over
a
year
ago.
The
action
in
which
this
motion
was
filed,
relating
to
the
Requirement
To
Pay
was
commenced
the
22nd
of
January,
1997.
Now,
almost
a
year
later,
the
plaintiff
seeks
this
stay.
Whatever
the
hardship
she
alleges,
and
I
make
no
finding
in
that
regard,
I
am
satisfied
that
to
be
entitled
to
a
stay,
the
plaintiff/applicant
must
move
at
an
early
date
following
the
day
on
which
the
right
to
seek
the
stay
arises.
Where
there
is
failure,
as
here,
to
do
so,
I
am
satisfied
that
it
is
open
to
the
Court
to
conclude
that
the
plaintiff/applicant
simply
has
failed
to
demonstrate
“appropriate
circumstances”
as
referred
to
in
the
quotation
from
New
Brunswick
Electric
Power
Com’n,
above.
In
the
result,
this
application
for
a
stay
should
be
dismissed.
The
alternative
remedy
sought
by
the
plaintiff
was
not
seriously
pursued
before
me.
Accordingly,
the
plaintiffs
application
in
its
entirety
was
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.
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