Muldoon
J.:
This
application
arises
in
the
context
of
an
action
in
which
the
applicant
is
plaintiff,
and
the
sovereign
is
defendant.
It
is
a
tax
case
under
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
Chap.
E-15.
The
plaintiff,
as
applicant,
moves
for
leave
to
be
represented
in
this
action
by
an
officer
of
the
corporation,
Mr.
Sieg
Deleu.
The
defendant,
here
the
respondent,
takes
no
position
on
the
matter
in
issue.
The
hearing
took
place
in
Halifax
on
January
13,
1998.
This
being
a
matter
of
public
law-the
operation
of
this
Court’s
rules
made
pursuant
to
sec.
46
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
Chap
F-7-
the
respondent’s
neutrality
is
of
little
concern.
The
pertinent
current
rule
is
300(2),
thus:
300(2)
A
corporation
shall
be
represented
by
a
solicitor
in
all
proceedings
in
the
Court,
unless
the
Court,
in
special
circumstances,
grants
leave
to
the
corporation
to
be
represented
by
an
officer
of
the
corporation.
So,
the
applicant
must
demonstrate
special
circumstances.
The
jurisprudence
helps
to
define
such
special
circumstances.
Under
the
previous,
more
inflexible
rule
300(2)
Mr.
Justice
Teitelbaum
declined
to
grant
leave
in
IAM-Institute
of
Applied
Methodology
v.
R.
(1991),
44
F.T.R.
8
(Fed.
T.D.).
This
case
was
cited
by
Mr.
Justice
Richard
in
NsC
Diesel
Power
Inc.
v.
Canada
(Superintendent
of
Bankruptcy)
(May
24,
1995),
Doc.
T-724-95
(Fed.
T.D.).
Although
Richard,
J.
acknowledged
the
correct
rule,
he
relied
on
the
decision
of
Teitelbaum,
J.
who
was
construing
the
previous
rule.
The
most
recent
case
on
rule
300(2)
is
Sharpe
’s
Tropical
Shell
Co.
v.
R.
(1996),
100
F.T.R.
59
(Fed.
T.D.),
in
which
Prothonotary
Hargrave
granted
leave
for
the
corporation
to
be
represented
by
a
director
in
lieu
of
a
solicitor.
In
that
case,
the
plaintiff
was
a
family
corporation
which
was
unable
to
pay
for
legal
representation.
Denying
the
motion
would
have
resulted
in
the
corporation’s
inability
to
proceed
with
the
action.
At
page
61,
Prothonotary
Hargrave
stated:
Where
there
is
a
director
who
seems
reasonably
capable
of
representing
a
company,
an
impecunious
company
ought
not
to
be
denied
its
day
in
court.
On
the
issue
of
a
non-lawyer
representing
the
company
in
an
expeditious
manner
he
added
at
page
61:
There
is,
however,
the
issue
of
whether
the
action,
being
conducted
by
a
lay
person,
will
proceed
in
an
expeditious
and
manageable
fashion.
While
the
material
filed
so
far
by
the
plaintiffs
may
be
a
little
wordy,
it
is
coherent
and,
on
its
face,
presents
a
claim
which
appears
reasonable.
I
see
no
reason
why
Richard
Sharpe,
by
applying
himself
to
the
Rules
and
seeking
procedural
assistance
from
the
registry
staff,
ought
not
to
be
able
to
conduct
the
action
in
a
businesslike
manner,
having
due
regard
to
moving
the
action
to
a
conclusion
within
a
reasonable
time.
From
these
cases
the
following
factors
appear
to
be
relevant
to
the
determination
of
whether
special
circumstances
exist:
whether
the
corporation
can
pay
for
a
lawyer;
whether
the
proposed
representative
will
be
required
to
appear
as
advocate
and
as
witness;
the
complexity
of
the
legal
issues
to
be
determined
(and
therefore
whether
it
appears
that
the
representative
will
be
able
to
handle
the
legal
issues)
and
whether
the
action
can
proceed
in
an
expeditious
manner.
In
the
present
case
Mr.
Deleu
appeared
and
stated
“I
should
be
able
to
do
it”,
in
essence
what
he
stated
in
his
affidavit
herein,
sworn
November
7,
1997.
Already
the
roles
of
witness
and
advocate
have
become
difficult
to
distinguish!
However,
this
is
the
sole
ground
advanced.
That
Mr.
Deleu
considers
himself
capable
of
representing
the
plaintiff
corporation,
is
not
one
of
the
“special
circumstances”
contemplated
by
rule
300(2).
The
motion
is
dismissed
without
costs.
The
action
is
stayed
until
March
13,
1998,
by
which
date
it
shall
be
dismissed
with
costs,
if
no
plaintiffs
solicitor
come
forward
on
the
record.
Time
for
the
filing
of
a
statement
of
defence
shall
run
only
form
the
date
of
the
plaintiffs
solicitor
notifying
the
defendant’s
solicitor
of
the
plaintiffs
solicitor’s
entry
onto
the
record
herein
Application
dismissed.