Richard
Morneau,
Esq.,
Prothonotary:
These
are
two
motions
the
subject
of
both
of
which
is
certain
documents
included
by
the
applicants
in
their
record
under
Rule
1606
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
(the
“Rules”)
which
was
filed
in
an
application
for
judicial
review
brought
by
the
applicants
on
November
22,
1996,
against
a
requirement
to
provide
documents
which
the
respondent
served
on
the
applicants’
accountant
on
October
25,
1996,
under
section
231.2
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1985
(5th
Supp.),
c.
1,
as
amended.
In
chronological
order,
the
first
of
these
motions
was
filed
by
the
respondent,
seeking
to
have
documents
struck
from
the
applicant’s
record
on
the
ground,
first,
that
the
documents
were
placed
in
the
record
without
affidavits
in
support,
and
second,
that
the
applicants
had
not
to
date
submitted
any
allegation
in
evidence
that
could
demonstrate
the
relevance
or
usefulness
of
the
documents
to
the
argument
that
will
take
place
on
the
merits
of
the
applicants’
application
for
review.
The
second
motion
before
me
was
made
by
the
applicants
and
seeks
to
introduce
into
their
record,
by
filing
two
affidavits,
the
same
two
documents
that
the
respondent
is
seeking
to
have
struck
out.
It
seems
to
me
that
the
applicants’
motion
is
a
reaction
to
the
respondent’s
motion
and
there
is
nothing
in
the
Court’s
record
to
indicate
that
they
would
have
tried
to
correct
their
error
had
it
not
been
for
the
respondent’s
motion.
The
documents
which
are
the
subject
of
the
dispute
are
described
by
the
respondent
as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
•
at
pages
68
to
85
of
the
Applicants’
Record,
a
passage
from
the
Operations
Manual
of
the
special
investigations
division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue;
•
at
pages
86
to
135,
an
undated
memorandum
of
fact
and
law,
apparently
filed
in
the
Ontario
Court
of
Justice
(General
Division),
Region
of
Peel,
in
the
case
entitled
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
v.
Javed
Ahmad
and
Naheed
Ahmad;
•
at
pages
136
and
137,
a
summons
addressed
to
Javed
Ahmad
in
his
capacity
as
director
of
the
company
Importations
Madni
Inc.;
°
at
pages
138
to
157,
passages
from
testimony
apparently
given
in
the
Ontario
Court
(General
Division)
on
November
16,
1995,
in
Brampton,
Ontario,
in
the
case
entitled
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
v.
Javed
Ahmad
and
Naheed
Ahmad;
Analysis
It
seems
to
me
that
both
of
the
motions
before
me
must
be
dismissed.
Even
though
the
respondent’s
motion
was
not
made
under
the
inherent
jurisdiction
of
this
Court,
it
seems
to
me
that
it
must
be
addressed
under
that
jurisdiction,
as
applied
by
Strayer
J.A.
in
Pharmacia
Inc.
v.
Canada
(Minister
of
National
Health
&
Welfare)
(1994),
176
N.R.
48
(Fed.
C.A.),
at
pages
54-5
(“Pharmacia").
I
believe
that
the
principles
stated
therein
apply
to
this
case,
even
though
here
the
respondent
is
seeking
to
have
the
applicants’
record
struck
out
only
in
part,
and
not
to
have
the
entire
application
for
review
struck
out.
I
would
even
say
that
Pharmacia
applies
here
particularly,
and
therefore
a
fortiori,
since
the
motion
seeks
to
strike
out
only
a
few
documents.
In
Pharmacia,
Strayer
J.A.
allowed
a
motion
to
strike
out
to
be
made
in
a
judicial
review
proceeding
only
in
exceptional
cases.
At
pages
54-5,
the
Court
said:
This
is
not
to
say
that
there
is
no
jurisdiction
in
this
court
inherent
or
through
rule
5
by
analogy
to
other
rules,
to
dismiss
in
summary
manner
a
notice
of
motion
which
is
so
clearly
improper
as
to
be
bereft
of
any
possibility
of
success.
(See
e.g.
Cyanamid
Agricultural
de
Puerto
Rico
Inc.
v.
Commissioner
of
Patents
(1983),
74
C.P.R.
(2d)
133
(F.C.T.D.);
and
the
discussion
in
Vancouver
Island
Peace
Society
et
al.
v.
Canada
(Minister
of
National
Defence)
et
al.,
[1994]
1
F.C.
102;
64
F.T.R.
127,
at
120-121
F.C.
(T.D.)).
Such
cases
must
be
very
exceptional
and
cannot
include
cases
such
as
the
present
where
there
is
simply
a
debatable
issue
as
to
the
adequacy
of
the
allegation
in
the
notice
of
motion.
[Emphasis
added]
The
same
reasoning
was
followed
by
Nadon
J.
of
this
Court
in
a
decision
dated
August
13,
1996
(Tom
Pac
Inc.
v.
Kem-A-Trix
(Lubricants)
Inc.,
file
no.
T-1238-96,
at
page
5
[reported
(1996),
118
F.T.R.
109
(Fed.
T.D.)]).
In
the
instant
case,
the
aspects
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
is
seeking
to
have
corrected
by
making
this
motion
are
not,
in
the
circumstances,
aspects
that,
even
in
the
event
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
might
be
correct,
may
be
seen
as
so
incorrect
or
unacceptable
that
we
should
intervene
in
the
process
of
an
application
for
judicial
review
(see
the
comments
of
Strayer
J.A.
in
Pharmacia,
supra,
at
pages
54-5).
Any
motion
to
strike
out
that
is
made
in
the
course
of
an
application
for
judicial
review
must
be
an
exception,
so
that
one
of
the
primary
objectives
of
such
an
appli
cation,
which
is
to
hear
the
application
on
the
merits
as
quickly
as
possible,
may
be
met.
As
Strayer
J.A.
stated
in
Pharmacia'.
...[
T]he
focus
in
judicial
review
is
on
moving
the
application
along
to
the
hearing
stage
as
quickly
as
possible.
This
ensures
that
objections
to
the
originating
notice
can
be
dealt
with
promptly
in
the
context
of
consideration
of
the
merits
of
the
case.
(See
also
the
decisions
in
Merck
Frosst
Canada
Inc.
v.
Canada
(Minister
of
National
Health
&
Welfare).
(1994),
58
C.P.R.
(3d)
245
(Fed.
T.D.),
at
page
248,
and
Glaxo
Wellcome
Inc.
c.
Canada
(Minister
of
National
Health
&
Welfare),
unreported
decision
of
this
Court,
September
6,
1996,
file
no.
T-793-96
[reported
(1996),
119
F.T.R.
36
(Fed.
T.D.)].)
The
respondent
filed
his
record
under
Rule
1607
on
February
18,
1977.
I
believe
that
the
respondent
should
have
simply
raised
the
points
identified
in
his
motion
in
his
memorandum
in
that
record.
He
did
not
do
so
and
I
believe
that
this
is
a
plain
sign
that
the
merits
of
the
case
may
be
argued
without
stopping
along
the
way
to
eliminate
certain
documents.
With
respect
to
the
applicants’
motion,
certainly
when
they
filed
their
application
for
judicial
review
they
were
aware
of
the
existence
of
the
documents
they
are
now
seeking
to
submit
by
affidavit.
Their
present
counsel
argued
that
the
fact
that
those
documents
were
not
submitted
by
affidavit
when
the
application
for
review
was
filed,
as
required
by
Rule
1603,
should
be
attributed
to
a
mere
oversight
on
the
part
of
the
applicants’
former
counsel.
The
applicants’
delay
in
acting
now
forces
them
to
make
their
motion
under
Rule
303,
which
allows
the
Court
to
grant
leave
for
the
amendment
sought
if
it
is
of
the
view
that
the
amendment
is,
in
short,
relevant
or
useful
for
the
purpose
of
determining
the
real
questions
in
controversy.
In
this
case,
I
do
not
believe
that
the
documents
whose
presence
the
applicants
are
seeking
to
legitimize
are
so
useful
that
unless
their
presence
in
the
record
is
secure
and
recognized
the
Court
that
hears
the
matter
on
the
merits
will
be
limited
in
analyzing
the
substantive
questions
raised
by
the
applicants.
The
applicants
are
primarily
seeking,
on
the
merits,
to
have
the
Court
declare
that
the
requirement
to
provide
documents
served
by
the
respondent
is,
because
of
parallel
criminal
proceedings
in
which
some
of
the
applicants
are
currently
involved,
a
violation
of
their
right
to
silence
as
guaranteed
by
the
Charter.
That
right
to
silence
allegedly
also
applies
in
the
future.
Coun-
sel
for
the
applicants
argued
on
this
point
that
the
applicants
could
be
liable
to
criminal
prosecutions
even
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
supra.
On
the
question
of
the
parallel
criminal
proceedings,
the
affidavit
submitted
by
the
applicants
in
support
of
their
application
for
review
already
makes
ample
reference
to
that
situation
(see
paragraphs
3,
4
and
21
of
the
affidavit
of
Sydney
Feldhammer
filed
on
November
22,
1996),
and
the
respondent
has
made
no
attempt
to
disprove
that
situation.
Any
additional
document
on
that
point
is,
in
my
view,
superfluous.
On
the
question
of
the
possibility
of
prosecutions
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
evidence
in
the
record
at
present,
in
my
view,
makes
this
possibility
merely
hypothetical.
In
any
event,
the
documents
that
the
applicants
have
in
mind
on
this
point,
a
summons
and
one
of
the
respondent’s
internal
manuals,
do
nothing
to
assist
in
determining
the
real
questions
in
controversy.
Lastly,
we
must
distinguish
the
situation
here
from
the
one
that
arose
in
Tyler
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1990),
91
D.T.C.
5022
(Fed.
C.A.),
in
which
it
was
established,
based
on
the
recent
past,
that
the
police
and
the
tax
authorities
were
likely
to
exchange
information
obtained
from
the
taxpayer.
There
was
no
such
evidence
in
this
case.
Motions
dismissed.