Bowie
T.C.J.:
The
application
before
me
is
for
an
Order
pursuant
to
section
166.2
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act)
to
extend
the
time
within
which
the
Applicant
may
serve
on
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
Minister)
a
Notice
of
Objection
in
respect
of
the
Notice
of
Reassessment
for
the
1994
taxation
year
which
was
mailed
to
her
on
August
17,
1995.
The
Applicant
is
an
employee
of
Petro
Canada
who
was
required
to
move
her
residence
by
reason
of
a
corporate
reorganisation.
As
a
consequence
she
was
paid
a
mortgage
interest
subsidy
of
the
kind
considered
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Hoefele
v.
R,
(1995),
95
D.T.C.
5602
(Fed.
C.A.).
At
the
time
she
filed
her
return
for
the
1994
taxation
year
such
subsidy
payments
were
thought
to
be
taxable,
and
she
declared
it
accordingly.
With
the
release
of
the
judgment
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
on
October
11,
1995,
and
the
subsequent
dismissal
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
of
an
application
for
leave
to
appeal,
it
became
apparent
that
the
payment
was
not
taxable.
Unfortunately,
she
had
not
taken
the
precautionary
step
of
fil-
ing
a
Notice
of
Objection
to
the
reassessment
issued
to
her
by
the
Minister
on
August
17,
1995.
On
August
28,
1996,
following
the
dismissal
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
of
the
leave
application
in
Hoefele,
she
filed
a
Notice
of
Objection
which
made
reference
to
the
decision
in
Hoefele
and
ended
by
requesting
an
extension
of
time
to
file
a
Notice
of
Objection.
On
October
4,
1996,
she
was
advised
by
the
Revenue
Canada
office
at
Winnipeg
that
her
application
for
an
extension
of
time
was
refused,
following
which
she
made
the
present
application
to
this
Court
on
October
22,
1996.
There
does
not
appear
to
be
any
real
doubt
that
the
Applicant’s
appeal
would
succeed
if
she
were
able
to
bring
it
before
the
Court.
I
understand
the
facts
of
her
case
to
be
identical
to
those
considered
by
the
Court
of
Appeal
in
Hoefele.
It
is
equally
clear
that
her
application
does
not
meet
the
criteria
laid
down
by
Parliament
in
subsection
166.2(5)
of
the
Act.
The
material
before
me
indicates
that
the
Applicant
formed
the
intention
to
object
to
the
assessment
only
after
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
was
rendered
in
August
1996,
some
12
months
following
the
date
of
Notice
of
Reassessment.
There
is
no
suggestion
that
she
was
unable
to
act,
or
to
instruct
another
to
act
for
her,
during
the
period
between
the
August
1995
reassessment
and
the
time
of
her
application
to
the
Minister
for
an
extension
of
time.
On
the
hearing
of
this
application
I
suggested
to
counsel
for
the
Minister
that
in
this
case
the
Minister
could,
by
appropriate
administrative
action,
have
brought
about
the
appropriate
result,
and
that
she
still
could
do
so.
It
is
open
to
the
Minister
to
reassess
the
Applicant
for
the
1994
taxation
year
to
exclude
the
mortgage
subsidy
payment
from
her
income.
I
reserved
judgment
on
this
application
to
permit
the
Minister
to
reconsider
her
position.
I
have
since
been
advised
that
the
Respondent
continues
to
oppose
this
application.
It
is
clear
that
the
Applicant
does
not
meet
the
statutory
criteria,
and
that
I
therefore
have
no
alternative
but
to
dismiss
the
application.
However,
in
doing
so
I
would
strongly
urge
the
Minister
to
reassess
the
Applicant
to
remove
the
mortgage
subsidy
from
her
income
for
the
1994
taxation
year.
I
cannot
leave
the
matter
without
pointing
out
that
if
the
Revenue
Canada’s
staff
had
applied
the
spirit
of
subsection
152(4.2)
of
the
Act
and
the
Minister’s
Information
Circular
92-3
when
the
matter
was
first
brought
to
their
attention
by
the
filing
of
a
Notice
of
Objection,
albeit
an
untimely
one,
then
a
simple
reassessment
pursuant
to
subsection
152(4)
would
have
ensured
that
this
taxpayer
was
treated
equitably
and
in
a
manner
consistent
with
the
other
Petro
Canada
employees
in
the
same
situation,
while
saving
time
and
expense
to
the
taxpayer,
Revenue
Canada
and
the
Court.
It
is
now
too
late
to
save
time
and
expense,
but
it
is
not
too
late
to
see
that
the
Applicant
is
treated
equitably.
Application
dismissed.
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