D
E
Taylor:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
the
City
of
Toronto,
Ontario,
on
April
16,
1980
against
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
year
1975
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
taxed
a
gain
of
$33,941.25
from
a
sale
of
land
as
on
income
rather
than
on
capital
account.
In
assessing,
the
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
sections
3,
4,
9
and
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended.
History
Klausen
Holdings
Limited
(the
“Company”)
was
originally
incorporated
in
January
1973
under
the
name
of
Klausen-Madden
Holdings
Limited,
with
two
equal
shareholders,
a
Mr
Madden
and
a
Mr
Henning
Klausen.
The
land
in
question,
part
of
Lot
1
Concession
1
Parcel
B
of
the
then
Township
of
Albion
in
the
Province
of
Ontario,
was
acquired
by
the
appellant
under
an
agreement
dated
May
21,
1973,
at
a
cost
of
$64,500.
It
was
sold
for
an
amount
of
$105,000
by
virtue
of
an
agreement
dated
December
12,
1973,
with
the
sale
to
be
completed
by
February
28,
1974.
Contentions
For
the
appellant:
—The
property
was
purchased
solely
for
the
purpose
of
establishing
a
Chrysler
dealership
on
it
and
the
company
had
no
use
for
it
after
its
failure
to
obtain
such
a
dealership.
—
There
was
no
intention
of
purchasing
or
retaining
the
said
property
for
any
other
purpose
than
a
Chrysler
dealership.
For
the
respondent:
—At
the
time
of
the
acquisition
of
the
lands
the
respondent
submits
that
the
lands
were
purchased
speculatively,
with
the
intention
of
trading
and
turning
the
same
to
account
at
a
profit
whenever
a
favourable
opportunity
to
do
so
would
present
itself.
—The
gain
was
income
from
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
or
a
business,
within
the
meaning
of
sections
3,
4,
9
and
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Evidence
Mr
Henning
Klausen,
President
of
the
appellant
company,
gave
evidence
that
Madden
had
approached
him
in
1972
with
regard
to
establishment
of
an
automobile
dealership.
Both
Klausen
and
Madden
had
a
lengthy
history
of
association
with
each
other
as
salesmen
in
the
automobile
industry,
and
were
both
employed
at
that
time
in
such
endeavours.
Klausen’s
responsibilities
were
of
a
more
senior
nature
than
those
of
Madden,
and
Madden
was
still
employed
by
a
Chrysler
dealer
in
the
eastern
area
of
Metropolitan
Toronto,
while
Klausen
had
changed
from
Chrysler
to
General
Motors
but
not
until
March
of
1972.
According
to
Klausen,
basic
contact
was
made
with
Chrysler
and
quiet
efforts
proceeded
during
the
early
months
of
1973
to
locate
a
suitable
site—not
only
from
a
physical
viewpoint,
but
also
such
that
it
would
not
encroach
on
the
territory
of
other
Chrysler
dealers.
During
this
time
Klausen
lived
in
the
western
area
of
Metro
Toronto,
and
one
criterion
was
that
the
location
be
near
his
home.
Madden
was
to
relocate
to
that
area
once
the
project
was
under
way.
A
contact
was
made
with
the
Township
Council
on
March
5,
1973
(Exhibit
A-2)
regarding
rezoning
of
the
subject
property
from
agricultural
to
commercial,
and
the
reaction
was
generally
favourable.
The
purchase
then
took
place.
Limited
evidence
and
documentation
(Exhibits
A-3,
A-4,
A-5
and
A-6)
were
introduced
by
Klausen
to
show
that
efforts
had
proceeded
toward
arranging
financing,
securing
the
dealership
and
determining
construction
plans.
The
estimated
costs
increased
beyond
those
which
could
be
borne
by
Madden
as
a
50%
participant,
and
he
requested
that
Klausen
buy
him
out.
Klausen
did
so
in
July
of
1973,
paying
Madden
$19,000
for
his
original
investment
of
$20,000
in
the
company.
Klausen
had
no
further
plans
for
the
property
and
did
not
wish
to
continue
the
dealership
program
on
his
own
or
with
any
other
partner.
Between
March
1973
and
July
1973,
Madden
had
in
fact
sold
his
home
on
the
eastern
edge
of
Toronto,
and
moved
to
the
general
western
area
near
where
the
subject
property
was
located.
After
July,
he
moved
back
again
to
his
original
residential
area.
Klausen
listedthe
property
for
sale,
and
accepted
the
first
offer
which
came
along
for
it,
the
gain
at
issue
arising.
He
had
never
before
or
since
purchased
and
sold
real
property
with
profits
as
the
result,
and
to
his
personal
knowledge,
neither
had
Madden.
At
the
outset
of
the
project
he
had
been
confident
that
Mad
den
would
be
able
to
provide
his
50%
share
of
necessary
capital,
and
he
could
not
foresee
any
difficulty
from
that
viewpoint.
The
idea
seemed
good—a
dealership
in
the
area
was
needed—Madden
was
a
young
energetic
man
with
practical
experience
and
he
himself
(Klausen)
had
broad
management
experience
in
the
industry
in
addition
to
the
business
of
already
selling
cars.
As
of
now
(1980),
there
are
several
operating
automobile
dealerships
around
the
general
area
of
the
subject
property.
Argument
Counsel
for
the
appellant
pointed
out
that
the
only
physical
evidence
available
to
the
Board
(the
exhibits
filed)
supported
the
testimony
of
Klausen
that
the
only
possible
purpose
for
the
purchase
was
to
establish
an
automobile
dealership.
Madden’s
move
from
one
side
of
Toronto
to
the
opposite
side
to
further
the
project,
and
then
his
move
back
again
once
he
decided
not
to
continue
it,
should
be
accepted
as
support
for
the
assertion
of
the
appellant.
Reference
was
made
to
S
&
S
Properties
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1977]
CTC
2267;
77
DTC
190,
and
Ronald
Francis
Theres
Maclsaac
v
MNR,
[1974]
CTC
576;
74
DTC
6380.
The
position
of
counsel
for
the
respondent
was
that
while
the
appellant
might
have
entertained
the
hope
of
establishing
a
dealership,
nothing
concrete
had
developed,
nor
had
specific
action
been
taken
such
as
soil
tests,
rezoning,
financing,
etc,
which
could
have
translated
this
hope
into
an
intention
or
a
reasonable
expectation.
The
gain
had
been
made
on
vacant
land
and
as
such,
the
onus
upon
the
appellant
to
refute
the
assumptions
of
the
Minister
was
substantial.
Further,
there
could
be
no
claim
of
“frustration”
because
nothing
had
proceeded
far
enough
that
anything
could
be
frustrated.
The
appellant
could
not
have
had
an
exclusive
investment
intention
because
the
subsequent
action
did
not
support
this
view.
Findings
I
would
make
reference
to
the
following
decisions
which
portray
the
difficulties
which
must
be
overcome
by
an
appellant
to
sustain
a
position
that
a
gain
is
on
capital
rather
than
on
income
account:
Elmer
D
Bassani
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2311;
77
DTC
208;
Sam
Grossman
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2132;
79
DTC
141;
Regin
Properties
Limited
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2149;
79
DTC
156.
Reference
is
also
made
to
certain
decisions
in
which
it
has
been
made
clear
that
the
conditions
referred
to
above
are
not
insurmountable
when
the
facts
of
the
matter
are
portrayed
in
perspective:
Harold
Brown
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2259;
80
DTC
1235;
Mary
Wladyka
and
William
Wladyka
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2408;
80
DTC
1374.
In
the
instant
case,
the
Minister
has
asserted
that
the
appellant
had
no
investment
intention
and,
by
deduction
therefore,
must
have
had
a
trading
intention.
The
facts,
however,
all
support
the
conclusion
that,
at
a
minimum,
the
prospect
of
establishing
an
automobile
dealership
existed
in
the
minds
of
Klausen
and
Madden,
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
any
prospect
other
than
use
in
a
business
way
was
ever
considered
by
the
two
shareholders.
As
I
would
read
the
information
available
to
the
Board,
Madden
was
the
initiating
force
and
his
withdrawal,
for
whatever
reason,
left
Klausen
with
neither
interest
nor
prospects
of
continuing
the
project.
It
was
simply
a
venture
too
great
for
him
to
entertain
without
the
direct
participation
of
some
partner
with
whom
he
was
completely
compatible
and
familiar.
This
is
a
specific
situation
in
which
the
oral
testimony
provided
by
Klausen
is
corroborated
by
the
physical
evidence
made
available
to
the
Board,
and
the
Minister
has
provided
no
evidence
to
support
his
own
assertions.
The
conditions
whereby
the
Board
may
accept
such
oral
testimony
are
fully
met
in
this
case
and
are
consistent
with
the
following
cases:
P
Litvinchuk
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
3141;
79
DTC
899;
John
J
Neder
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2031;
80
DTC
1040;
J
Vincent
Toolsie
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2239;
80
DTC
1209.
There
is
not
the
slightest
indication
of
anything
but
a
business
reason
that
could
have
included
the
participants
Klausen
and
Madden
into
the
venture.
The
Minister’s
effort
to
discern
evidence
of
a
secondary
intention
was
not
effective
in
my
opinion.
Decision
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed.