D
E
Taylor:—These
appeals
were
heard
on
common
evidence
in
the
City
of
Toronto,
Ontario,
on
February
19,
1980,
and
the
issue
in
each
case
is
identical,
although
there
is
a
slight
difference
in
the
amounts
involved.
The
appeals
are
against
income
tax
assessments
for
the
year
1975
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
provided
the
following
information
in
making
changes:
Kathryn
E
Baker
Your
interest
income
had
been
reduced
by
$1,121.92.
Your
carrying
charges
have
been
reduced
by
$1,172.92.
Your
interest
and
dividend
income
deduction
has
been
reduced
by
$998.41,
as
there
was
no
bona
fide
acquisition
or
disposition
of
the
bonds.
Gordon
R
Baker
Your
interest
income
has
been
reduced
by
$1,121.92.
Your
carrying
charges
have
been
reduced
by
$1,172.92.
Your
interest
and
dividend
income
deduction
has
been
reduced
by
$954.67,
as
there
was
no
bona
fide
acquisition
or
disposition
of
the
bonds.
In
assessing
the
appellants,
the
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
section
3,
subsection
9(1),
paragraph
12(1
)(c),
subsection
20(14)
and
section
110.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
This
decision
is
to
be
read
in
conjunction
with
the
decision
in
Frederick
Tim
Smye
v
MNR.
Background
Gordon
R
Baker
is
a
solicitor
by
profession,
Kathryn
E
Baker
is
an
employee
of
the
Board
of
Education,
North
York,
Ontario.
Each
claimed
the
full
$1,000
interest
and
dividend
deduction
(section
110.1),
but
in
reassessing
the
Minister
allowed
only
an
amount
of
$1.59
for
Kathryn
Baker
as
deduction
under
that
section,
which
amount
was
received
as
interest
separately
from
the
amounts
at
issue
in
this
appeal,
and
in
a
similar
way,
allowed
the
amount
of
$45.33
for
Gordon
Baker.
On
December
29,
1975,
each
appellant
placed
an
order
with
Yorkton
Securities
Incorporated
(“Yorkton”)
to
purchase
$30,000
of
Government
of
Canada
bonds
at
7.5%,
maturing
July
1,
1978
(the
“bonds”).
On
December
29,
1975,
each
appellant
ordered
Yorkton
to
sell
the
bonds.
Contentions
For
the
appellants:
There
was
a
bona
fide
acquisition
of
Government
of
Canada
Bonds
by
the
taxpayers
through
their
agent,
Yorkton
Securities
Inc,
and
a
bona
fide
disposition
thereof.
The
taxpayers
were
at
a
risk
and
obligated
to
pay
the
amount
of
the
purchase
price
on
the
purchase
and
were
entitled
to
the
proceeds
of
disposition
on
the
disposition.
For
the
respondent:
—The
Bonds
were
not
assigned
or
transferred
to
the
appellants
within
the
meaning
of
section
20(14)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
—
Even
if
there
was
a
transfer
or
assignment
of
the
said
bonds,
the
appellants
earned
no
interest
from
the
ownership
of
the
said
bonds,
but
in
fact
all
interest
that
accrued
prior
to
the
date
of
the
assignment
or
transfer
of
the
bonds
to
the
appellants
was
capital
in
the
hands
of
the
appellants,
and
not
interest
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
12(1)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
—
No
interest
from
the
said
bonds
was
receivable
by
the
appellants
in
1975
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
12(1)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
therefore
the
appellants
are
not
entitled
to
a
deduction
pursuant
to
section
110.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Evidence
The
“buy”
and
“sell”
slips
from
Yorkton
for
Gordon
Baker
showed
the
following:
12/29/75—bought—$30,000
GC
bonds—amount
$29,430—interest
$1,121.92—net
amount
$30,551.92—settlement
date
12/30/(75).
12/29/75—sold—$30,000
GC
bonds—amount
$29,430—interest
$1,121.92—net
amount
$30,500.92—settlement
date
12/30/(75).
The
same
slips
from
Kathryn
Baker
were
identical
in
all
aspects
material
to
this
decision.
Argument
Essentially,
the
position
of
the
appellants
was
that
Yorkton
had
acted
as
“trustee”
or
“agent”
in
three
different
roles—the
purchase
of
the
securities,
holding
them
for
the
appellants,
and
selling
them
when
ordered
to
do
so.
The
fact
that
these
three
roles
may
have
been
conducted
simultaneously
was
of
no
import
in
the
view
of
the
appellants.
It
was
agreed
by
the
appellants
that
they
could
not
demonstrate
delivery,
but
that
this
was
their
choice,
not
that
of
Yorkton.
Findings
Reference
is
made
to
the
recent
decisions
of
Vernon
G
M
Fitzgerald
v
MNR,
John
R
White
v
MNR,
and
W
Thomas
R
Wilson
v
MNR.
In
the
instant
matters,
there
is
no
evidence
of
payment
or
of
arrangements
for
payment
to
Yorkton
which
demonstrate
that
Yorkton
would
or
could
deliver
the
bonds
to
the
appellants.
The
argument
was
competently
advanced
by
Gordon
Baker
that
the
Board
should
view
the
“buy”
transactions
as
if
“beneficial
ownership”
had
passed
at
that
moment
to
the
appellants.
I
am
far
from
convinced
that
such
an
argument
is
tenable,
but
the
more
important
point
is
that
the
evidence
required
subsection
20(14)
for
any
such
assertion
is
transfer—
Physical
delivery
in
this
case.
On
the
information
available,
in
my
view
it
is
not
open
to
the
Board
to
conclude
that
such
physical
delivery
was
possible,
without
some
further
action
(presumably
payment)
on
the
part
of
the
appellants.
Accordingly,
the
Board
does
not
agree
that
the
appellants
have
demonstrated
that
there
was
an
“agency”
relationship
of
any
kind
between
themselves
and
Yorkton
as
“holding
agent”
in
which
the
“transfer”
of
even
a
beneficial
interest
in
the
securities,
let
alone
the
securities
themselves,
had
passed
to
the
appellants.
The
evidence
more
appropriately
supports
a
conclusion
that
Yorkton
was
holding
the
securities
and
retaining
the
beneficial
ownership
therein
pending
completion
by
the
appellants
of
their
part
of
the
transactions—payment—which
would
then
remove
that
impediment
to
transfer
and
delivery.
Without
the
right
to
take
delivery
in
their
own
names,
it
has
not
been
demonstrated
to
me
that
the
appellants
could
have
accorded
such
a
right
to
another
party
as
“agent”,
notwithstanding
any
other
rights
they
may
have
acquired
by
virtue
of
the
“buy”
orders.
Decision
The
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.