D
E
Taylor:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
Halifax,
Nova
Scotia,
on
July
28,
1981
against
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
year
1978
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
did
not
apply
the
averaging
provisions
of
subsection
118(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
so
assessing,
the
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
subsections
2(1),
2(3),
section
114,
subsection
115(2),
sections
118
and
250
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
Both
the
notice
of
appeal
and
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
set
out
appropriately
the
basis
of
the
dispute
between
the
parties
and
their
contentions
as
to
the
facts
and
the
application
of
the
law.
For
the
appellant:
Until
December
1974
I
had
been
a
resident
in
Canada
since
birth.
I
departed
from
Vancouver
in
December,
1974
and
travelled
to
Australia
where
I
arrived
December
22,
1974.
I
applied
for
and
was
granted
permanent
resident
status
at
that
time.
I
enrolled
in
the
Master
of
Laws
programme
at
the
University
of
Sydney
in
1975
and
graduated
in
March,
1977.
After
completing
the
programme
I
returned
to
Canada
June
30,
1977,
arriving
in
Vancouver
on
that
date.
I
then
travelled
to
Toronto
which
is
where
my
parents
reside
before
returning
to
Halifax
which
is
where
I
attended
law
school
and
now
practise
law.
When
I
originally
left
for
Australia
I
sold
nearly
all
my
belongings
to
help
finance
the
trip.
I
did
not
own
any
real
property
or
keep
any
residence
while
I
was
away
as
I
did
not
then
know
when
or
if
I
was
ever
going
to
return.
Nor
did
I
carry
on
any
business
here
while
I
was
in
Australia.
In
September
1977
I
commenced
a
nine
month
articling
period
with
a
law
firm
in
Halifax
and
after
filing
an
income
tax
return
for
the
September
to
December
period
received
a
Notice
of
Assessment,
in
relation
to
those
earnings.
In
June
1978
I
commenced
full
time
employment
and
again
filed
an
income
tax
return
for
the
1978
taxation
year.
A
Notice
of
Assessment
was
received
indicating
an
overpayment
of
$120.83.
Prior
to
filing
my
1978
return
I
had
made
inquiries
at
the
District
Tax
Office
in
relation
to
the
provisions
contained
in
section
118
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
was
told
that
the
general
averaging
provisions
would
be
applied
but
subsequently
have
discovered
that
they
were
not
applied
as
indicated
by
the
amount
of
overpayment
in
the
Notice
of
Assessment.
My
argument
in
relation
to
the
application
of
Section
118
to
my
1978
income
is
as
follows:
I
returned
to
Canada
June
30th,
1977
between
that
date
and
the
end
of
the
1977
taxation
year,
I
was
physically
present
in
Canada
for
a
total
of
185
days.
Prior
to
June
30th,
1977,
I
had
been
a
permanent
resident
of
Australia
since
December
22,
1974.
Section
250(1)
states:
For
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
a
person
shall,
subject
to
subsection
(2),
be
deemed
to
have
been
a
resident
in
Canada
throughout
a
taxation
year
if,
(a)
he
sojourned
in
Canada
in
the
year
for
a
period,
or
periods
the
aggregate
of
which
is,
183
days
or
more.
This
particular
section
is
in
very
plain
language.
A
person
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
a
resident
in
Canada
throughout
a
taxation
year
if
he
sojourns
183
days
or
more.
In
1977
I
in
fact
sojourned
for
185
days
and
by
virtue
of
s.
250(1)(a)
should
have
been
deemed
a
resident
throughout
the
1977
taxation
year.
It
would
appear
to
me
that
in
1977
the
section
was
applied
otherwise
I
would
not
have
been
liable
to
pay
any
income
tax
in
Canada
for
that
taxation
year
and
would
not
have
received
a
Notice
of
Assessment
for
my
1977
income
because
I
was
not
a
resident
and
residency
is
required
before
liability
for
income
tax
attaches.Section
2(1)
of
the
Act
states:
An
income
tax
shall
be
paid
as
hereafter
required
upon
the
taxable
income
for
each
taxation
year
of
every
person
resident
in
Canada
at
any
time
in
the
year.
I
realize
that
the
term
“resident”
is
not
defined
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
apart
from
the
extending
meaning
of
resident
in
s.
250(1
)(a)
and
s.
250(3)
which
states
that
a
reference
to
a
person
resident
in
Canada
includes
a
person
who
at
the
relevant
time
was
ordinarily
resident
in
Canada.
As
I
had
been
absent
from
Canada
from
December
1974
to
June
1977
I
do
not
think
I
could
be
said
to
be
ordinarily
resident
in
Canada
at
the
end
of
the
1977
taxation
year.
The
determination
of
whether
a
person
is
a
resident
or
not
is
essentially
a
question
of
fact
and
is
quite
different
from
both
domicile
and
citizenship.
When
I
filed
my
1978
income
tax
return
the
general
averaging
provisions
should
have
been
applied
using
1977
as
the
base
year.
Section
118
states
that
“where,
in
the
case
of
an
individual
who
was
resident
in
Canada
throughout
the
taxation
year
immediately
preceding
a
particular
taxation
year.
.
.”
Before
the
general
averaging
provisions
are
applied
you
must
meet
certain
criteria,
namely:
1.
you
must
be
an
individual
2.
resident
in
Canada.
.
.
throughout
the
taxation
year
immediately
preceding
a
taxation
year.
.
.
The
first
requirement
is
certainly
fulfilled.
Regarding
the
second
part
I
submit
that
I
qualify
here
as
well.
According
to
s.
250(1)(a),
because
I
in
fact
sojourned
in
Canada
in
1977
for
185
days,
I
am
deemed
to
have
been
a
resident
throughout
the
taxation
year.
It
appears
that
the
Minister
is
saying
that
I
cannot
use
1977
as
my
base
year
because
I
returned
part
way
through
it
and
was
not
therefore
resident
in
Canada
throughout
the
taxation
year
immediately
preceding
1978.
I
was
not,
in
fact,
“resident
or
ordinarily
resident”
in
Canada
in
1977
but
was
by
virtue
of
s.
250(1)(a)
“deemed
to
have
been
resident”
in
Canada
throughout
the
1977
taxation
year.
That
being
so,
section
118
should
have
been
applied
to
my
1978
income
return
as
I
was
a
deemed
resident
throughout
the
year
immediately
preceding;
namely,
1977.
For
the
respondent:
(a)
the
appellant
left
Canada
in
the
1974
taxation
year
without
any
specific
intention
to
return;
(b)
From
the
time
of
his
departure
from
Canada
the
appellant
did
not
maintain
any
property,
business
or
bank
account
anywhere
in
Canada;
(c)
The
appellant
returned
to
Canada
to
take
up
permanent
residence
in
1977;
(d)
The
appellant
at
no
time
in
his
1977
taxation
year
sojourned
in
Canada;
(e)
The
appellant
was
not
resident
in
Canada
throughout
the
1977
taxation
year.
The
point
at
issue
is
whether
during
the
period
June
30,
1977
to
December
31,
1977,
the
appellant
can
claim
to
have
sojourned
in
Canada.
The
argument
of
the
appellant
is
that
he
was
only
looking
over
prospects
in
Canada
until
the
time
in
1978
when
he
accepted
employment
as
a
lawyer.
The
argument
of
the
respondent
is
that
even
if
the
appellant
“sojourned”
for
a
while
after
June
30,
1977,
that
date
of
suspension
came
to
an
end
at
some
time
before
December
31,
1977,
either
when
he
agreed
to
article
as
a
law
clerk,
or
when
he
had
his
belongings
shipped
back
from
Australia
to
Halifax.
As
I
see
it,
the
crux
of
the
matter
rests
in
the
admission
of
the
appellant
that
his
“sojourn”
in
Canada
came
to
an
end
in
June
1978
when
he
accepted
employment
in
the
office
of
the
Crown
Attorney.
I
see
no
difference,
for
purposes
of
the
word
“sojourn”
between
the
significance
of
that
employment
as
a
lawyer,
and
the
employment
he
accepted
for
the
purpose
of
articling
in
law
which
commenced
in
September
1977.
His
professional
standing
may
have
been
different
after
June
1978
than
it
was
in
September
1977,
and
he
was
continuing
his
education
in
a
sense.
Nevertheless,
his
taxable
status
as
an
employee
was
no
different.
The
Board
is
not
required
to
make
a
determination
that
even
the
acceptance
by
Mr
Zimmer
of
employment
in
June
of
1978
would
necessarily
characterize
him
as
a
resident
of
Canada.
The
Board
only
points
up
that
if
such
an
acceptance
brought
to
an
end
any
“sojourn”
that
obtained
(and
that
was
accepted
by
the
appellant),
then
the
“sojourn”
had
already
been
brought
to
such
an
end
in
September
1977.
The
appeal
is
therefore
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.