The
contentions
of
the
parties
are
well
spelled
out
at
paragraphs
1
to
9
inclusive
of
the
notice
of
appeal
and
paragraph
12
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
which
read
as
follows:
Notice
of
Appeal:
1.
The
Taxpayer,
a
blacksmith,
conditionally
offered
to
purchase
approximately
130
acres
of
partially
cleared
land
in
the
Township
of
Whitney
(the
“Property”)
on
or
about
November,
1973
from
Mrs
Hebert
(‘‘Hebert’’)
for
$25,000.000
(sic)
(the
“Offer
to
Purchase”).
The
Offer
to
Purchase
was
understood
to
be
conditional
upon
the
Taxpayer
selling
his
own
principal
residence,
143
Front
Street,
in
South
Porcupine
(a
few
miles
away),
which
later
sale
was
completed
on
December
21,
1973.
2.
The
Offer
to
Purchase
on
the
Property
was
completed
on
December
22,
1973,
after
the
original
offer
had
been
revised
to
include
a
vendor
take
back
mortgage
rather
than
cash
to
the
first
mortgage
as
originally
proposed.
3.
The
Offer
to
Purchase
provided
as
well
that
the
offer
“is
conditional
on
the
vendor
obtaining
sole
ownership
of
the
above
lands
held
in
joint
tenancy
by
William
Hebert
and
Patricia
Hebert
...
In
the
event
that
ownership
is
not
obtained
the
deposit
shall
be
returned
without
interest”.
Another
version
of
the
offer
provides
that
“cost
of
installed
furnace
to
be
discharged
by
the
vendor”.
4.
The
Taxpayer
offered
to
purchase
the
property
after
Hebert
had
mentioned
on
more
than
one
occasion
to
him
that
she
was
considering
selling
since
without
her
husband
around
it
was
difficult
to
keep
the
place
up.
As
well,
it
was
difficult
for
the
children
getting
to
and
from
school
from
the
property
due
to
the
busing
route
and
winter
weather
problems.
The
Taxpayer
frequented
the
Property
often
since
he
was
the
“Big
Brother”
to
Hebert’s
9
year
old
son,
Douglas.
5.
The
Taxpayer
acquired
the
Property
for
the
purposes
of
making
it
his
principal
residence
which
is
evidenced
by
his
and
his
family’s
(wife,
sister,
and
brother-in-
law)
actual
occupation
of
the
home,
including
the
making
of
necessary
improvements
to
the
home.
In
addition,
a
prime
consideration
in
the
purchase
of
the
Property
by
the
Taxpayer
was
the
time
saving
and
convenience
of
boarding
his
horses
on
the
Property,
rather
than
continuing
to
commute
60
miles
round
trip
daily
to
attend
to
the
horses
which
were
boarded
at
Connaught.
6.
As
a
result
of
an
unsolicited
offer,
the
Taxpayer
sold
the
Property
on
February
28,
1975
for
$234,000
to
an
undisclosed
purchaser
(Texas
Gulf)
who
was
attempting
to
parcel
land
for
development.
Farm
properties
nearer
to
Porcupine
and
contiguous
to
the
Property
were
also
purchased
by
Texas
Gulf.
7.
Shortly
after
the
sale
of
the
Property,
March,
1975,
the
Taxpayer
and
his
spouse
moved
to
Havelock
where
they
purchased
another
farm
on
which
they
still
reside.
They
continued
to
live
on
the
farm
and
maintain
the
horses
just
as
was
done
with
the
Property,
and
the
Taxpayer
continued
his
blacksmith
business.
8.
In
1978,
Hebert
commenced
a
civil
suit
against
the
Taxpayer,
his
spouse,
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Ltd,
the
local
real
estate
firm
and
its
principals
and
salesmen
et
al,
attempting
to
allege
a
conspiracy
on
the
original
sale
of
the
Property
in
1973
and
be
compensated
for
damages
to
the
extent
of
the
“windfall
gain”
realized
by
the
Taxpayer
on
his
sale
to
the
developer,
Texas
Gulf.
The
civil
action
was
published
in
the
local
newspapers
and
the
Minister
assessed
the
gain
as
income
pursuant
to
section
9(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
‘‘Act’’).
9.
The
nuisance
suit
promoted
by
Hebert’s
lawyer
was
settled
for
$20,000
in
October,
1979.
The
Taxpayer
settled
the
nuisance
suit
for
less
than
his
estimated
costs
of
trial,
$5,000.
The
local
real
estate
company
and
its
principals
settled
for
$15,000.
The
“Minutes
of
Settlement”
and
the
“Full
and
Final
Release”
is
attached
as
Exhibit
“A”
hereto.
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal:
12.
In
reassessing
the
Appellant
for
his
1975
taxation
year,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
relied,
inter
alia,
on
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
prior
to
moving
to
Havelock,
the
Appellant
lived
with
his
family
(mother
and
grandmother)
at
123
Moore
Street,
South
Porcupine;
(b)
on
April
20,
1972,
Karolina
Wastuck
(the
Appellant’s
grandmother)
transferred
a
property
on
142
Front
Street,
South
Porcupine
to
the
Appellant;
(c)
the
Appellant
derived
rental
income
from
the
property
on
142
Front
Street
until
it
was
sold
on
December
21,
1973;
(d)
in
1973,
J
W
Spooner
and
Son
Ltd,
a
real
estate
firm,
agreed
with
Ecstall
Mining
Ltd
(now
known
as
TexasGulf
Ltd)
to
attempt
to
assemble
land
for
Ecstall
in
Mountjoy
township
in
the
west
side
of
Timmins.
Spooner’s
attempt
was
unsuccessful;
(e)
in
the
latter
part
of
1973,
J
W
Spooner
and
Son
Ltd
offered
to
assemble
land
for
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Limited
in
the
Bob’s
Lake
area
(where
the
Hebert
farm
was
situated);
(f)
at
all
relevant
times,
the
Appellant
was
a
shareholder
of
TexasGulf
Canada
Limited;
(g)
Mr
George
Groom
was
a
real
estate
agent
for
J
W
Spooner
and
Son
Ltd
in
1973
(he
continued
working
for
Spooner
until
1976)
and
knew
of
Spooner’s
agreement
with
TexasGulf
Canada
Limited;
(h)
the
Appellant
married
Groom’s
daughter,
Marcia,
in
July
1974;
(i)
because
of
his
relationship
with
Groom,
the
Appellant
knew
that
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Limited
was
interested
in
a
land
assembly
in
the
Hebert
farm
area
when
he
offered
to
purchase
the
Property
in
November,
1973;
(j)
the
motivating
reason
for
the
Appellant’s
purchase
of
the
Property
was
the
prospect
of
reselling
it
to
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Limited
at
a
profit;
(k)
in
order
to
finance
the
purchase
of
the
Property,
the
Appellant
sold
the
property
at
142
Front
Street.
The
sale
was
completed
on
December
21,
1973
through
J
W
Spooner
and
Son
Ltd
as
agent
for
the
Appellant;
(l)
the
house
located
on
the
property
was
not
habitable
without
extensive
major
repairs
being
completed
and
the
Appellant
and
his
wife
were
never
ordinarily
resident
there
in
1974
or
1975;
(m)
the
farm
land
was
made
up
of
mainly
bush
land
with
only
a
small
amount
of
clear
acreage;
(n)
in
March
1974,
the
Appellant
listed
the
Property
for
sale
with
J
W
Spooner
and
Son
Ltd;
(0)
on
November
30,
1974,
the
Appellant
accepted
an
offer
of
purchase
for
the
Property
from
a
Mr
Cousineau,
acting
as
trustee
for
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Limited,
in
the
amount
of
$234,000;
(p)
of
the
$234,000
sale
price
to
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Limited,
the
Minister
attributed
$8,000
to
the
value
of
the
farm
house
and
its
site;
(a)
on
or
about
November
30,
1974,
many
other
owners
in
the
Bob’s
Lake
area
also
entered
into
agreements
of
purchase
and
sale
with
Texas
Gulf
Canada
Limited;
(r)
in
1976,
Mrs
Hebert
filed
a
writ
against,
inter
alia,
the
Appellant,
Groom
and
Texas
Gulf,
alleging
that
the
Appellant
and
Groom
failed
to
disclose
to
her
their
speculative
interest
in
the
Property
but
represented
instead
that
the
Appellant
wanted
the
land
for
farming.
The
suit
was
eventually
settled
out
of
court.
The
appellant
testified
that
he
purchased
the
farm
as
a
hobby
for
the
purpose
of
living
and
having
horses
thereon,
but
it
took
a
year
to
do
it
and
the
horses
were
never
moved
thereon.
What
struck
me
the
most
upon
cross-examination
was
when
the
appellant
was
interrogated
about
the
negotiations
of
the
selling
price,
he
said:
“When
she
mentioned
the
price,
I
thought
I
should
buy.”
This
answer
gives
me
the
impression
that
he
saw
a
good
bargain
and,
from
that
moment,
his
intention
was
to
buy
the
farm
and
dispose
of
it
at
the
best
opportunity.
Futhermore,
what
reinforces
my
thinking
is
the
fact
that
the
appellant’s
father-in-law
seems
to
have
been
the
guiding
light
in
all
these
transactions.
He
always
seemed
to
be
present
when
a
decision
had
to
be
taken.
As
to
the
testimony
of
the
witnesses,
there
is
ample
jurisprudence
to
say
that
it
is
much
more
important
before
rendering
a
decision
to
look
at
all
the
facts
as
a
whole
than
to
give
weight
to
the
testimonies,
especially
when
there
are
too
many
unanswered
questions.
One
of
the
most
important
witnesses
who
should
have
testified
was
the
father-in-law
but
he
did
not
come
to
corroborate
the
appellant’s
testimonies
or
to
explain
his
own
conduct.
Futhermore,
the
allegation
in
the
notice
of
appeal
that
the
offer
to
purchase
was
conditional
was
refuted
by
the
respondent
whereas
the
respondent
substantiated
all
of
the
allegations
of
paragraph
12
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal.
The
onus
was
on
the
appellant
to
prove
that
the
Minister’s
assessment
was
wrong
in
facts
and
in
law
but
he
failed
to
do
it.
Therefore,
I
decide
that
this
transaction
was
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
and
the
parties
agreed
that
in
such
event,
the
net
gain
would
be
$172,671.55.
The
appeal
is
allowed
in
part
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
and
reconsideration
accordingly.