John
B
Goetz:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
appellant
with
respect
to
his
1976
taxation
year
wherein
he
sold
certain
farm
land
acquired
by
him
in
the
year
1972,
the
profit
from
which
sale
he
declared
as
a
capital
gain
as
opposed
to
income.
In
assessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
sections
2,
3,9
and
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant
was
in
the
business
of
selling
real
estate;
that
his
main
source
of
income
was
from
the
sale
of
land;
that
he
had
little
or
no
knowledge
of
farming
and
experience
in
raising
animals
other
than
the
raising
of
some
race
horses;
and
that
he,
at
least,
had
a
secondary
intention
of
purchasing
the
property
in
question
on
a
speculative
basis
for
the
purpose
of
turning
same
to
account
at
a
profit.
Issue
Was
the
profit
from
the
sale
of
land
a
capital
gain
or
income?
Facts
I
must
first
commend
the
appellant
on
the
thorough
and
complete
presentation
of
his
evidence
in
support
of
his
appeal
and,
in
particular,
I
refer
to
the
three
exhibits
filed
by
him,
being
A-1,
A-2,
and
A-3.
Exhibit
A-1
is
a
book
of
photographs
showing
pictures
of
the
property
in
question
in
a
thoroughly
dilapidated
state,
which
pictures
included
his
children
assisting
him
in
the
erection
of
fences
and
destruction
and
burning
of
totally
obsolete
farm
buildings.
The
appellant
purchased
the
land
in
Carberry
Hills
in
1972,
which
purchase
was
composed
of
1,700
acres
of
bush
and
pasture
land
with
a
minimal
amount
of
arable
area.
Exhibit
A-3
shows
this
portion
of
land
purchased
by
him
at
that
time
(outlined
in
read
pencil)
which
land
is
composed,
in
the
main,
of
50%
bush
and
a
mixture
of
bush
and
pasture.
Very
little
of
the
land
was
arable.
Exhibit
A-2
shows
a
statutory
declaration
dated
June
30,
1972,
wherein
the
appellant
leased
from
the
Crown
certain
Crown
bush
and
pasture
area
and
within
the
declaration
are
the
following
words:
I
would
start
with
approx
30
head
in
the
spring
of
1973,
and
expand
to
a
larger
herd
of
up
to
200
head
over
a
period
of
four
to
five
years
to
an
economic
viable
operation.
In
fairness
to
the
appellant,
he
also
indicated
that
part
of
his
intention
of
leasing
the
Crown
property
was
to
study
the
ecology
of
the
area
and
develop
an
agrarian
style
of
life
for
his
family.
He
was
married
and
had
three
boys
of
the
ages
of
21,18
and
14
years
respectively.
The
photographs
were
taken
between
the
years
1972
to
1976,
and
I
must
say
that
they
showed
a
graphic
improvement
in
the
appearance
of
the
property
as
purchased
in
1972.
Up
to
this
point
in
time
the
appellant
had
lived
30
years
in
North
Dakota
where
he
worked
in
Dycks
Containers
&
Forest
Products
and
he
was
with
that
business
for
20
years.
He
ended
up
as
a
manager
of
the
business
and
sold
out
his
interest
therein
in
1970
for
$70,000.
Considering
the
comparative
worth
of
the
dollar
in
1970
to
that
of
1980,
$70,000
was
a
fair
amount
of
working
capital.
Quite
obviously
the
appellant
must
have
acquired
and
saved
a
certain
amount
of
money
in
that
he
owned
a
home,
which
he
ultimately
sold
for
$100,000
in
the
late
1970’s.
With
respect
to
the
farm
purchase,
he
totally
disavowed
any
speculative
intention
as
indicated
by
his
statutory
declaration
and
indicated
that
he
was
only
interested
in
establishing
a
viable
farming
operation.
To
this
end,
during
the
period
of
1972
to
1976,
he
constructed
ten
miles
of
wire
fence
at
the
cost
of
$6,000;
built
a
feed
lot
at
a
cost
of
$1,500;
improved
the
dam
on
the
creek
at
a
cost
of
$500;
repaired
and
rewired
a
barn.
The
Crown
lease
involved
two
3/4
sections
which
the
appellant
held
from
1972
to
1977.
In
1976
he
sold
80
acres
of
land
to
a
Mr
Buller
and
in
the
same
year
he
sold
160
acres
of
his
land
to
a
Mr
Gumpf.
In
1977
80
acres
of
land
were
sold
to
a
Mr
Bock.
The
land
sold
was
50%
wooded
and
open
sandy
area,
only
usable
for
the
raising
of
cattle
but
certainly
not
for
growing
crops.
He
sold
the
northwest
quarter
of
his
land
to
J
Pool
in
1977.
He
admits
that
there
were
fences
in
the
area
but
he
had
to
do
a
certain
amount
of
repairing.
The
whole
of
the
land
in
question,
namely
the
Carberry
farm,
cost
him
$33,000.
Prior
to
the
sales
in
question
in
1976,
the
appellant
admitted
under
cross-
examination
that
in
his
1972
tax
return
he
had
stated
that
his
occupation
was
“real
estate’’
and
he
suggested
that
this
was
a
gross
error.
Nevertheless,
in
his
1973
tax
return,
he
states
his
occupation
as
“farming
and
real
estate’’.
During
this
period
he
had
purchased
one
parcel
of
land
composed
of
40
acres
of
$12,000,
cleaned
it
up
and
sold
it
in
two
20-acre
parts
for
$30,000.
These
were
cash
sales
which
he
declared
in
income.
At
this
point
in
time,
although
he
had
no
actual
farming
experience
whatsoever,
he
showed
that
he
had
developed
an
expertise
in
the
upgrading
of
what
would
appear
to
be
originally
dilapidated
and
non-productive
farm
property
to
a
point
where
he
could
sell
it
at
a
substantial
profit.
He
admits
that
he
would
clean
up
such
areas,
removes
refuse,
till
the
soil,
make
driveways
and
do
all
necessary
improvements
to
make
the
property
attractive.
Again
in
his
1974
and
1975
tax
returns,
he
states
that
his
occupation
was
that
of
“farming
and
real
estate”.
It
was
not
until
1976
that
he
shows
his
occupation
as
being
merely
“farming”.
Findings
Although
the
appellant
strongly
expressed
a
sole
intention
of
using
the
land
in
question
for
the
purpose
of
establishing
a
large
herd
of
cattle,
when
he
made
his
statutory
declaration
to
that
effect,
he
had
not
purchased
one
head
of
cattle,
but
spent
money
on
equipment
and
exercised
all
his
efforts
solely
in
the
direction
of
upgrading
the
land
in
appearance.
The
onus
is
on
the
appellant
to
discharge
that
which
is
established
in
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
that
he
was
not
motivated
in
making
the
purchase
by
an
intention
to
use
the
property
in
an
adventure
or
operation
in
the
nature
of
trade.
This
onus
is
established
by
MNR
v
Pillsbury
Holdings
Limited,
[1965]
Ex
CR
676;
[1964]
CTC
294;
64
DTC
5184.
See
also
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
In
short,
it
is
incumbent
upon
the
appellant
to
satisfy
this
Board
that
his
Original
and
only
intention,
from
the
outset
of
the
purchase
of
the
property
in
1972
and
the
acquisition
of
the
Crown
lease
in
June
1972,
was
for
the
purpose
of
establishing
a
viable
farming
operation
for
the
purpose
of
raising
cattle.
From
1972
to
1976,
he
owned
no
cattle
and
his
neighbour
used
his
land.
He
admits
that
he
made
no
profit
from
his
“farming”
operation
on
the
Carberry
farm
and
he
states
that
his
income
since
1972
arose
from
the
sale
of
fence
posts
and
the
sale
of
land.
The
appellant
admits
that
he
actually
did
no
farming
whatsoever
but
merely
was
involved
in
the
work
related
to
the
improvement
of
his
land
by
upgrading
the
fencing,
etc.
He
worked
on
a
crop-sharing
basis
with
J
Pool
and
sometimes
‘‘allowed
free
grazing”.
He
states
that
when
Mr
Buller
who
was
a
friend
of
his
saw
the
land,
he
wanted
it
and
consequently
he
sold
to
Buller.
In
1976
the
appellant
published
two
advertisements
for
sale
of
the
land
in
the
Brandon
Sun,
offering
same
for
“Horseback
riding,
cross-country
skiing,
hiking
and
a
place
to
breathe”,
at
the
rate
of
$150
per
acre
in
one
advertisement,
and
in
the
other
advertisement
describing
the
land
as
“Picturesque
rolling
parkland
country.
Excellent
horseback
riding—Hiking—Camping
Carberry
Hills
area
80—160
acre
parcels
available”.
The
appellant
says
he
did
this
because
of
the
pressure
of
finances
and
the
cattle
market
had
dropped
in
activity.
In
fairness
to
the
appellant
I
must
acknowledge
that
he
admits
that
he
lived
on
a
family
farm
in
North
Dakota,
where
they
were
involved
with
mixed
farming,
but
he
only
lived
there
until
he
was
14
years
of
age
and
for
the
next
20
years
he
worked
in
family
businesses
in
the
manufacturing
of
wood
products,
boxes,
cartons,
etc.
The
appellant
never,
at
any
time,
did
any
actual
farming
and
his
tractor
was
used
solely
for
the
purpose
of
repairing
and
improving
the
fencing,
while
a
neighbour
did
the
farming
on
a
crop-sharing
basis.
He
admits
that
after
improving
the
farm,
he
abandoned
it
for
a
period
of
four
years,
although
his
intention
was
to
raise
grass-fed
cattle
from
forage
crop
and
that
he
is
now
actively
searching
for
farm
property
and
cannot
consider
farming
land
near
his
residence
as
it
is
too
expensive.
His
stated
intention
of
now
acquiring
200
cows
which
would
produce
150
calves
seems
rather
empty
in
the
face
of
the
fact
that
he
never
purchased
one
head
of
cattle
during
the
whole
period
from
1972
to
1976,
when
he
sold
the
first
parcel
of
land.
All
of
the
equipment
that
he
used
seem
to
relate
solely
to
the
upgrading
of
the
land.
The
following
was
the
equipment
used
for
what
he
calls
“putting
the
farm
in
shape”:
a
Massey-Ferguson
tractor,
a
fence
post
auger,
a
rotary
brush
cutter,
a
low-bed
20-foot
trailer
and
a
Ford
truck.
He
sold
his
home
for
$100,000
in
June
1980.
In
reaching
my
conclusion
as
to
whether
the
appeal
should
be
successful
or
otherwise,
I
must
not
only
consider
what
the
appellant
stated
in
his
correspondence
with
the
taxation
department
but
also
his
conduct
throughout.
It
was
in
1973
that
he
put
his
home
near
Oakbank
up
for
sale
but
the
sale
was
not
effected
until
1980.
He
says
that
he
brought
new
materials
on
to
the
land
for
a
proposed
new
home,
which
materials
he
ultimately
removed.
He
states
that
a
serious
financial
situation
developed
in
1975
and
the
80-acre
parcel
sold
to
his
friend
Herb
Buller
netted
him
$12,000,
with
a
subsequent
sale
of
another
160
acres
of
Mr
Carl
Gumpf
for
$24,000.
He
says
in
his
letter
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue:
With
the
sale
of
these
two
parcels
of
non-agricultural
land,
I
realized
the
potential
in
recreational
value
of
the
farm
in
spite
of
the
fact
that
Winnipeg
was
120
miles
away.
(Italic
mine).
His
assertion
of
the
value
of
recreation
land
lends
very
little
weight
to
his
argument,
having
consideration
to
the
proximity
of
the
Lake
of
the
Woods
area
not
much
further
than
120
miles
from
Winnipeg.
Considering
the
facts
that:
(1)
the
appellant
did
not
purchase
one
head
of
cattle,
and
(2)
his
sole
efforts
were
related
to
the
upgrading
in
the
appearance
and
saleability
of
the
land,
I
therefore
must
take
cognizance
of
these
facts
in
face
of
what
he
states
as
attempting
to
establish
a
viable
farming
operation.
His
actions
speak
far
louder
than
his
words
under
oath
and
I
deduce
that
his
true
intention
from
the
outset,
considering
all
of
the
circumstances
of
the
case,
was
to
turn
the
property
over
to
account
for
profit.
I
could
give
him
the
benefit
of
the
doubt
that
he
may
have
had
a
secondary
intention
to
sell
the
land
if
it
did
not
prove
a
viable
operation
as
a
farm,
but
no
attempt
was
ever
made
by
him
to
acquire
farm
income
from
the
land
purchased
and
leased
by
him.
It
would
appear
that
two
of
the
sales
about
as
a
result
of
his
advertisements
in
the
Brandon
Sun.
I
am
fully
aware
of
the
findings
in
Hiwako
Investments
Limited
v
Her
Majesty
The
Queen,
[1978]
CTC
378;
78
DTC
6281,
wherein
it
was
stated
as
follows:
Held
...
An
intention
at
the
time
of
acquisition
of
an
investment
to
sell
it
in
the
event
that
it
does
not
prove
profitable
does
not
make
the
subsequent
sale
the
completion
of
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
(per
Jackett,
CJ
and
Pratte,
J).
Quite
obviously,
from
the
facts
of
this
case,
the
decision
in
Hiwako
(supra)
does
not
apply.
Rather,
I
think
the
decision
in
Gairdner
Securities
Limited
v
MNR,
[1954]
CTC
24;
54
DTC
1015,
is
more
relevant
in
that
this
case
con-
siders
the
whole
course
of
conduct
of
the
appellant,
which
in
the
present
appeal
indicates
to
me
quite
firmly
that
the
appellant
made
no
attempt
to
farm
the
land
and
that
his
intention
in
the
acquisition
of
the
land
and
the
Sale
as
it
relates
to
the
1976
assessment
was
totally
speculative.
To
say
the
least,
he
had
a
secondary
intention
that
if
the
land
did
not
prove
suitable
for
farming
and
the
grazing
of
cattle,
he
would
sell
it
at
a
profit.
I
have
considered
the
following
cases
in
particular,
as
well
as
others
in
this
appeal:
Michael
Starko
v
MNR,
[1965]
CTC
246;
65
DTC
5151;
Regal
Heights
Limited
v
MNR,
[1960]
CTC
384;
60
DTC
1270;
Robert
D
Tate
and
John
Retzlaff
v
Her
Majesty
The
Queen,
[1974]
CTC
731;
74
DTC
6559;
Demeter
Equity
Limited
v
Her
Majesty
The
Queen,
[1979]
CTC
311;
79
DTC
5230;
Raymond
Schumph
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2850;
79
DTC
723.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.