The
Chairman:—The
appeal
of
Dutch-More
Corporation
is
from
an
assessment
in
respect
of
the
1977
taxation
year
by
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
a
deduction
of
$65,000
claimed
by
the
appellant
as
a
bad
debt
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
20(1
)(p)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended
or
alternatively
as
a
capital
loss
in
1977
from
the
disposition
of
property
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
paragraph
39(1)(b)
fo
the
Act.
Summary
of
Facts
The
appellant
corporation
was
formed
on
December
31,
1979
by
the
amalgamation
of
four
related
companies:
More-Wood
Homes
Ltd,
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
Company
Limited,
357196
Ontario
Limited
and
Amavic
Holdings
Inc.
This
appeal
is
more
particularly
concerned
with
More-Wood
Homes
Ltd
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“More-Wood”),
and
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
Company
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“Dutch
Sash
and
Door”)
which
were
owned
by
Mr
Adrian
Heuff
as
indeed
were
the
other
two
related
companies.
Owing
to
the
death
of
Mr
Heuff
in
October
of
1977,
the
appellant’s
principal
witness
was
Mr
Glen
Droppo
who
had
been
the
bookkeeper
of
Mr
Heuff’s
companies
for
21
years
and
was
the
Secretary-Treasurer
of
More-
Wood
and
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
since
1962.
More-Wood
is
engaged
in
the
construction
and
assembling
of
prefabricated
homes.
Dutch
Sash
and
Door’s
activities
were
limited
to
the
building
of
doors
and
sashes
which
it
supplied
to
More-Wood
as
well
as
to
other
building
contractors.
Among
the
clients
of
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
was
a
contracting
firm
operating
under
the
name
Montenegrino
Holdings
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“Montenegrino”)
with
whom
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
had
done
business
for
several
years.
In
the
Autumn
of
1976,
Montenegrino
had
an
outstanding
account
of
$65,000
for
material
purchased
from
Dutch
Sash
and
Door.
Mr
Droppo
testified
that
More-Wood
incorporated
in
December
of
1971
(Exhibit
A-1)
and
had
by
1975
a
surplus
working
capital
which
was
generally
invested
in
a
true
savings
account
(Exhibits
A-2
and
A-3).
Late
in
1976,
while
More-Wood
had
a
surplus
of
some
$800,000
to
$900,000,
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
had
an
overdraft
in
excess
of
$100,000.
In
order
to
reduce
Dutch
Sash
and
Door’s
overdraft,
More-Wood
advanced
$65,000
to
Montenegrino
on
November
1,
1976,
at
12%
interest,
with
which
the
latter
would
pay
its
$65,000
outstanding
account
to
Dutch
Sash
and
Door.
The
fact
that
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
received
payment
of
$65,000
from
Montenegrino
is
not
in
dispute.
In
his
evidence,
Mr
Droppo
stated
that
it
amounted
to
an
exchange
of
cheques
between
More-Wood
and
Dutch
Sash
and
Door.
Montenegrino
guaranteed
the
loan
by
way
of
mortgage
held
in
trust
for
More-Wood
by
Mr
Arnell
Saul
Goldberg,
Mr
Heuff’s
attorney.
The
loan
was
to
be
repaid
on
a
monthly
basis
with
the
balance
becoming
due
on
November
1,
1977
(Exhibit
A-4).
Montenegrino
was
unable
to
meet
its
first
monthly
payment
on
December
1,
1977.
On
December
22,
1976,
the
Clarkson
Company
Limited
wrote
to
the
creditors,
advising
them
that
the
formal
proposal
previously
comtemplated
by
Montenegrino
would
not
be
proceeded
with
since
Montenegrino
felt
that
sufficient
cash
flow
to
satisfy
all
the
creditors
could
be
obtained
from
financial
organizations
(Exhibit
A-5).
Mr
Droppo
interpreted
the
Clarkson
Company
Limited
letter
as
being
the
end
of
any
chance
of
recovering
the
$65,000
and
testified
that
the
debt
was
considered
by
himself
as
being
bad
as
of
that
time.
However,
early
in
1978,
More-Wood
served
Montenegrino
with
a
writ
of
execution
in
order
to
force
the
issue
and
salvage
something
of
the
guaranteed
loan.
The
mortgaged
land,
however,
was
incumbered
with
three
prior
mortgages
and
the
first
mortgagee,
acting
under
power
of
sale,
disposed
of
the
land.
More-Wood
did
not
receive
any
monies
from
the
disposition
of
the
land
and
sustained
a
loss
of
$65,000.
The
appellant
appealed
to
the
Tax
Review
Board
and
I
quote:
13.
THEREFORE
the
appellant
hereby
appeals
to
the
Tax
Review
Board:
(a)
to
have
the
Minister’s
assessment
vacated
on
the
ground
that
the
$65,000
deduction
claimed
by
More-Wood
as
properly
made
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
in
particular,
paragraph
20(1)(p)
thereof;
(b)
in
the
alternative,
to
have
the
Minister’s
assessment
varied
to
permit
a
capital
loss
of
$65,000
to
be
taken
by
More-Wood
for
the
1977
taxation
year
from
the
disposition
of
property
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
39(1)(b)
of
The
Income
Tax
Act.
In
his
reply,
the
respondent
submitted,
and
I
quote:
5.
He
submits
that
the
appellant
only
realized
a
loss
on
the
mortgage
to
Montenegrino
Holdings
Limited
in
its
1978
taxation
year.
6.
He
further
submits
that
the
loss
on
the
said
mortgage
was
a
capital
loss
with
the
meaning
of
paragraph
39(1)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
not
a
bad
debt
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
20(1)(p)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Paragraph
20(1)(p)
reads
as
follows:
Bad
Debts.—the
aggregate
of
debts
owing
to
the
taxpayer
(i)
that
are
established
by
him
to
have
become
bad
debts
in
the
year,
and
(ii)
that
have
(except
in
the
case
of
debts
arising
from
loans
made
in
the
ordinary
course
of
business
by
a
taxpayer
part
of
whose
ordinary
business
was
the
lending
of
money)
been
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year
or
a
previous
year;
The
fact
that
$65,000
was^advanced
by
More-Wood
to
Montenegrino,
which
in
turn
paid
that
amount
to
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
in
settlement
of
its
account,
is
not
disputed;
nor
is
the
fact
that
the
advance
was
not
repaid
and
that
More-Wood
sustained
a
loss
of
$65,000
contested.
As
I
see
it,
the
basic
question
in
determining
the
issue
is
whether
a
loss
arising
from
a
loan
was
sustained
by
More-Wood,
part
of
whose
ordinary
business
was
the
lending
of
money.
If
the
answer
to
that
question
is
in
the
affirmative,
the
secondary
question
to
when
the
debt
became
bad
debts
becomes
pertinent.
If
the
answer
is
in
the
negative,
then
we
are
not
dealing
with
a
bad
debt
and
paragraph
20(1)(p)
is
not
applicable.
I
agree
with
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
no
limits
have
been
set
as
to
the
number
of
loans
required
to
be
made
before
the
taxpayer
can
qualify
under
paragraph
20(1
)(p).
However,
the
loans
must
clearly
be
part
of
the
taxpayer’s
ordinary
business
before
that
section
can
apply.
The
only
loan
in
issue
in
this
appeal
is
a
$65,000
loan
made
by
More-wood
in
1976.
In
his
evidence,
Mr
Droppo
stated
clearly
the
reasons
why
Mr
Heuff
had
More-Wood
advance
some
of
its
surplus
funds
to
Montenegrino
viz,
to
cover
part
of
Dutch
Sash
and
Door’s
overdraft
while,
at
the
same
time,
acquiring
from
Montenegrino
a
mortgage
guarantee
rather
than
relying
on
the
mechanics’
lien
which
is
all
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
could
have
had
otherwise
obtained.
Montenegrino
was
an
old
customer
of
Dutch
Sash
and
Door,
according
to
Mr
Dropp’s
evidence,
and
the
latter
must
have
had
considerable
knowledge
of
the
financial
situation
of
Montenegrino
to
state
categorically
that
the
$65,000
loan
was
a
bad
debt
in
December
of
1976,
notwithstanding
the
Clarkson
letter
of
December
22,
1976
(Exhibit
A-5)
in
which
Montenegrino
is
reported
as
believing
it
could
pay
off
the
creditors
without
making
a
formal
proposal
under
the
Bankruptcy
Act.
Because
of
Mr
Droppo’s
knowledge
of
Montenegrino’s
financial
problems,
it
is
not
unreasonable
to
surmise
that
a
guaranteed
loan
made
by
More-Wood
was
considered
to
have
had
a
better
chance
of
receiving
the
monies
owed
by
Montenegrino
to
Dutch
Sash
and
Door
than
by
the
mechanics’
lien.
A
second
loan
of
$100,000
was
made
by
More-Wood
in
1976
to
a
company
known
as
315285
Ontario
Ltd
(Exhibit
A-3).
Mr
Droppo’s
evidence,
though
somewhat
sketchy,
was
sufficient
to
establish
that
Mr
Lightfoot,
Mr
Heuff’s
son-in-law,
had
interest
in
315285
Ontario
Ltd
which,
as
I
understand
it,
purchased,
serviced
and
sold
land
on
which
More-Wood
was
assembled.
That
loan,
for
some
unexplained
reason,
subsequently
became
a
non-interest
bearing
loan.
An
important
part
of
Mr
Droppo’s
evidence
which,
because
of
Mr
Heuff’s
death,
was
alleged
to
have
been
the
best
available
evidence,
had
to
do
with
possible
discussions
Mr
Droppo
may
have
had
with
Mr
Heuff
in
1975-1976
when
More-Wood’s
surpluses
were
buoyant.
Mr
Heuff
is
alleged
to
have
told
Mr
Droppo
to
keep
an
eye
out
for
possible
loans
to
private
individuals.
I
cannot
accept
the
inference
made
that,
at
that
time,
Mr
Heuff
or
anyone
else
had
decided
that
part
of
More-Wood’s
ordinary
business
could
henceforth
be
the
lending
money.
The
reason
for
my
conclusion
is
not
so
much
that
the
lending
of
money
is
not
included
in
More-Wood’s
articles
of
incorporation
(Exhibit
A-1)
but
because
the
facts
do
not
support
the
proposition
that
part
of
More-Wood’s
ordinary
business
in
1976
or
indeed
in
1977,
the
pertinent
year,
was
the
lending
of
money.
Mr
Droppo
testified
that
in
1977
all
of
More-Wood’s
surplus
funds
were
invested
in
term
deposits
as
they
had
been
since
November
of
1975.
No
loans
were
made
in
1977.
In
1976
the
Montenegrino
loan
was
made
in
attempt
to
recover
monies
owed
to
one
of
Mr
Heuff’s
companies.
The
non-interest
bearing
loan
of
$100,000
to
315285
Ontario
Ltd
was
not
clearly
explained
but
it
appears
from
Mr
Droppo’s
testimony
that
it
was
made
to
finance
another
of
Mr
Heuff’s
companies
in
which
his
son-in-law
had
an
interest.
It
is
the
nature
and
the
purpose
of
these
two
loans,
and
not
necessarily
their
number,
which
bring
me
to
conclude
that
they
were
not
loans
made
in
the
ordinary
course
of
More-Wood’s
business,
part
of
which
was
the
lending
of
money.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
objected
to
the
production
of
evidence
that
several
loans
were
made
by
More-Wood
as
of
May
1978
as
being
irrelevant
when
the
appeal
is
for
the
1977
taxation
year.
The
objection
was
noted
on
the
basis
that
the
Board
would,
under
the
circumstances,
determine
for
itself
the
probative
value
of
the
evidence.
In
this
instance,
the
loans
made
by
More-Wood
in
1978
to
its
employees
or
other
individuals
to
help
finance
their
purchase
of
More-Wood
homes
(Exhibit
A-3)
served
as
a
useful
basis
of
comparison
with
the
two
loans
made
in
1976
and
more
particularly
with
the
loan
made
to
Montenegrino.
I
have
no
difficulty
whatever
in
accepting
that
the
loans
made
by
More-
Wood
in
1978
were
loans
made
in
the
ordinary
course
of
its
business,
part
of
which
was
the
lending
of
money.
I
cannot
however,
on
the
basis
of
the
evidence,
reach
that
conclusion
for
the
loan
of
$65,000
made
to
Montenegrino
in
1976.
In
my
opinion,
we
are
not
dealing
here
with
a
bad
trade
debt
of
More-Wood
and
the
provisions
of
paragraph
20(1)(p)
are
not
applicable
to
the
facts
of
this
appeal.
Because
of
its
nature
and
the
purpose
for
which
the
Montenegrino
loan
was
made,
the
subsequent
loss
arising
from
the
non-repayment
of
the
loan
was,
In
my
opinion,
capital
in
nature.
The
year
in
which
that
loss
was
sustained
can
only
have
been
after
Montenegrino
became
insolvent
and
after
its
default
under
the
mortgage,
became
a
fact.
Notwithstanding
that
Mr
Droppo,
in
retrospect,
considered
the
dept
to
have
become
bad
in
December
1976
and
felt
that
More-Wood
would
not
receive
a
penny
on
the
loan,
Montenegrino,
according
to
the
evidence,
had
some
assets
in
1977
and
even
in
1978.
Instructions
were
given
to
the
More-Wood
solicitors
in
1978
to
commence
action
against
Montenegrino
in
order
to
put
pressure
on
the
company
and
realize
on
its
current
assets
or
on
its
securities.
The
evidence
is
not
clear
whether
the
existence
of
a
prior
mortgage
was
known
to
Mr
Droppo
or
Mr
Heuff
at
the
time
the
loan
was
made
and
guaranteed
by
the
mortgage,
but
the
fact
that
a
prior
mortgagee
disposed
of
the
mortgaged
property
under
power
of
sale
seems
to
have
come
as
somewhat
of
a
surprise
to
Mr
Droppo.
It
is
now
alleged
that
the
action
was
taken
with
no
expectation
that
the
loan
would
be
repaid
but
was
merely
an
attempt
to
realize
on
some
security.
It
is
difficult
to
understand
why
the
cost
of
instituting
action
would
be
incurred
if
there
was
no
possibility
whatsoever
of
obtaining
at
least
partial
repayment.
No
loss
would
have
been
sustained
by
More-Wood
to
the
extent
that
the
loan
(or
part
of
it)
had
been
repaid
either
from
assets
Montenegrino
had
in
1978
or
from
realization
on
More-Wood’s
security
on
the
mortgaged
land.
I
conclude
therefore
that
the
$65,000
loss
sustained
by
More-Wood
on
the
non-repayment
of
a
loan
was
capital
in
nature
and
was
incurred
in
the
1978
taxation
year.
The
appeal
must
therefore
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.