John
B
Goetz:—These
are
appeals
by
Donald
J
Bubnick
with
respect
to
his
1977
and
1978
taxation
years.
These
appeals
involve
particularly
subparagraph
(i)
of
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
The
whole
issue
revolves
around
the
words
in
that
section,
namely,
travelling
expenses
are
allowed
where
a
taxpayer
was
“ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places’’.
This,
apparently,
is
the
portion
of
the
section
which
the
respondent
has
found
and
has
assessed
the
appellant,
disallowing
travelling
expenses
on
the
basis
of
his
interpretation
of
this
section.
The
appellant
is
a
principal
of
a
very
large
school
with
700
pupils.
He
has
a
vice-principal.
There
is
obviously,
considering
the
teacher-pupil
ratio
that
the
teachers
wish
to
have,
a
large
number
of
teachers
must
undergo
surveillance
by
either
Mr
Bubnick
or
his
vice-principal.
The
duties
of
running
such
a
school
are
very
heavy.
That
has
been
recognized
by
the
salary
which
he
receives
from
the
school
division
and
he
is
receiving
that
salary
because
of
his
professional
ability
which
sets
him
over
and
above
the
professional
level
of
other
teachers
within
that
school
for
which
he
is
responsible.
Naturally,
as
principal,
he
is
responsible
for
whatever
happens
in
that
school
and
for
no
place
else.
The
appellant
has
cited
a
number
of
instances
of
things
that
he
does
relating
to
pick
up.
It
sounds
like
a
pick-up
and
delivery
service
that
he
is
basically
talking
about,
and
the
odd
emergency
case
would
not
necessarily
have
to
be
handled
by
the
principal
of
the
school.
The
vice-principal
or
the
teacher
immediately
involved
with
the
pupil
would
seem
to
be
a
better
person
to
do
this.
The
question
of
recruitment
and
orientation
of
teachers
has
no
bearing
whatsoever
on
the
necessity
of
the
appellant
to
travel
or
to
use
his
second
car.
He
had
obtained
a
letter
from
the
school
district
saying
it
is
“desirable”
that
he
use
his
car
to
carry
out
his
duties.
In
cross-examination
the
appellant
indicated
to
Mr
Taylor
(counsel
for
the
respondent)
that
if
anyone
else
did
these
things,
they
would
probably
ask
for
payment
and,
secondly,
he
said
that
if
he
refused
he
would
probably
lose
his
position
as
principal.
Now,
I
find
that
very,
very
hard
to
accept.
If
the
Potash
Hills
School
Division
No.
80
has
any
true
understanding
of
the
concept
of
the
functions
of
a
school
that
large,
it
certainly
does
involve
a
pick-up
and
delivery
boy;
and
that
is
what
the
school
division
is
asking,
that
he
be
allowed
to
deduct
these
expenses
as
opposed
to
their
responsibility
to
Mr
Bubnick
and
if
indeed
he
must
do
this,
that
he
be
allowed
the
compensation
for
it.
In
my
view,
this
is
the
way
it
should
be
done
and
there
is
no
validity
to
the
claim
for
expenses
here
in
dealing
specifically
with
the
interpretation
relating
to
“ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
employment”.
“Ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
employment”
obviously
involves
very
heavy
responsibility
to
the
appellant’s
personal
presence
within
that
school,
because
it
is
a
large
school
and
requires
a
competent
head
person—which
he
is.
Now,
these
little
things
that
he
does,
he
seems
to
enjoy
that,
but
I
would
say,
in
my
view,
either
he
is
irresponsible
or
the
school
district
is
irresponsible
in
letting
a
man
of
that
professional
calibre
perform
a
pick-up
and
delivery
service.
I
don’t
think
by
any
stretch
of
the
imagination
could
one
say
that
the
functions
of
a
principal
of
a
school
of
this
size
would
ordinarily
require
him
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
employment
away
from
the
school
for
which
he
is
fully
responsible
to
the
school
district.
For
those
reasons,
I
dismiss
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.