Gibson,
J:—The
evidence
in
this
appeal
consisted
of
an
Agreed
Statement
of
Facts,
Exhibit
29,
and
documentary
evidence,
Exhibits
1-28
and
30-
34,
and
the
oral
evidence
of
Mr
Morry
Wingold,
which
evidence
was
substantially
different
than
the
evidence
adduced
before
the
Tax
Review
Board.
The
sole
issue
is
whether
or
not
Valider
Limited
was
associated
with
Speedway
Realty
Corporation
Limited
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
39(4)(a)
or
(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
force
in
the
relevant
taxation
years
of
Speedway,
namely
1962-3-6-7.
Said
paragraphs
39(4)(a)
and
(b)
read:
(4)
For
the
purpose
of
this
section,
one
corporation
is
associated
with
another
in
a
taxation
year
if,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
(a)
one
of
the
corporations
controlled
the
other,
(b)
both
of
the
corporations
were
controlled
by
the
same
person
or
group
of
persons,
All
the
common
shares
of
Validor
were
owned
by
the
Wingolds;
and
Validor
owned
50%
of
the
common
shares
of
Speedway.
The
Gasners
owned
40%
of
the
common
shares
of
Speedway
plus
voting
preference
shares,
which
gave
the
Gasners
50%
voting
rights
of
Speedway.
The
submission
of
the
defendant
is
that
even
though
50%
voting
control
or
votes
which
can
be
cast
at
a
meeting
of
shareholders
were
held
equally
by
Validor
and
the
Gasners,
nevertheless
Validor
held
control
of
Speedway
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
39(4)
of
the
Act
because
the
preferred
shares
held
by
the
Gasners
did
not
have
the
same
de
jure
rights
as
the
common
shares;
and
for
this
proposition
the
defendant
relied
on
Oakfield
Developments
(Toronto)
Limited
v
MNR
(SCC)
[1971]
SCR
1032;
[1971]
CTC
283;
71
DTC
5175.
In
my
view
the
principle
in
the
Oakfield
case
is
not
applicable
to
the
facts
of
this
case.
Instead
the
principle
that
should
be
applied
is
exemplified
in
Buckerfield’s
Limited
et
al
v
MNR,
[1965]
1
Ex
CR
299;
[1964]
CTC
504;
64
DTC
5301;
MNR
v
Dworkin
Furs
(Pembroke)
Limited
et
al
[1966]
Ex
CR
228;
[1965]
CTC
465;
65
DTC
5277;
(SCC)
[1967]
SCR
223,
[1967]
CTC
50;
67
DTC
5035;
and
Him
ley
Estates
Ltd
and
Humble
Investments,
Ltd
v
The
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
(1932),
17
TC
367
at
379.
Accordingly,
the
appeal
is
allowed
with
costs,
and
the
matter
referred
back
for
further
reassessment
not
inconsistent
with
these
reasons.