John
B
Goetz:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
appellant
with
respect
of
his
1975,
1976
and
1977
taxation
years.
It
was
agreed
at
the
outset
of
the
hearing
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
that
the
only
relevant
years,
as
far
as
the
appeal
was
concerned,
were
1976
and
1977
and
the
parties
agreed
that
the
appellant,
in
the
1976
taxation
year,
had
deducted
as
legal
expenses
against
rental
income
the
sum
of
$4,380.52.
Likewise,
in
his
1977
taxation
year
he
claimed
legal
expenses
in
the
amount
of
$6,718.01
as
a
deduction
against
rental
income.
Issue
Were
the
legal
expenses
incurred
by
the
appellant
in
the
1976
and
1977
taxation
years
deductible
against
income
or
were
they
incurred
on
account
of
capital?
Facts
On
May
20,
1971,
the
appellant
was
the
registered
owner
of
a
residential
property
in
Calgary,
Alberta.
On
March
31,
1972,
he
entered
into
a
lease
option
purchase
agreement
which
was
exercisable
on
or
before
April
1,
1973,
by
Allan
Joseph
Pageot
and
Sandra
Pageot.
This
option
was
exercised
on
April
1,
1973,
but
a
dispute
arose
as
to
the
manner
in
which
it
was
exercised.
Quite
clearly,
the
appellant
was
greatly
distressed
at
the
arrears
of
payments
on
account
of
rent
at
the
time
of
exercising
the
option
in
1973.
The
appellant
filed
a
very
full
notice
of
appeal
to
which
were
attached
a
number
of
documents
including
two
orders
which
he
says
are
unlawful.
The
first
was
that
of
A
D
Bessemer,
QC,
Master
In
Chambers,
dated
October
23,
1973,
ordering
the
respondents
(Allan
J
Pageot
and
Sandra
Pageot)
to
pay
for
use
and
occupancy
pending
the
result
of
litigation
relating
to
the
determination
of
the
issues
as
to
whether
the
option
was
properly
exercised.
On
October
4,
1977,
Mr
Justice
D
H
Bowen
made
a
vesting
order
of
the
property
in
question
in
favour
of
the
optionees
(the
Pageots)
and
directed
that
a
new
title
issue
in
the
name
of
Mr
and
Mrs
Pageot,
extinguishing
all
rights
of
the
appellant.
The
appellant
was
given
leave
to
apply
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
to
appeal
these
decisions
and
such
leave
was
refused
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
The
Pageots
had
to
commence
an
action
for
a
specific
performance
that
the
exercise
of
their
option
on
the
property
be
honoured
by
the
appellant.
The
appellant
fought
this
vigorously
because
he
claimed
they
owed
him
money
as
rent.
The
appellant
appealed
the
order
of
Mr
Justice
Bowen
to
the
Alberta
Court
of
Appeal
which
upheld
Mr
Justice
Bowen’s
decision
and
that
is
what
prompted
an
attempt
to
obtain
leave
to
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
which
was
refused
on
October
18,
1976
and
the
matter
was
finally
determined.
I
can
only
comment
that
the
appellant
felt
that
the
Pageots
owed
him
money
and
sought
to
stay,
in
any
way
he
could,
the
orders
of
Master
Bessemer
and
of
Mr
Justice
Bowen
pending
the
outcome
of
his
appeals.
The
respondent
filed
three
Exhibits
showing
lawyers’
billings
and
these
were
his
billings
for
1976
and
1977
and
the
items
listed
in
these
billings
relate
to
the
appellant’s
effort
to
reassert
his
right
to
title
and
to
turn
over
the
vesting
orders.
The
whole
unfortunate
legal
process
began
when
the
Pageots
attempted
to
exercise
the
option
and
continues
to
this
day
in
that
the
appellant
has
admitted
he
has
two
actions
involving
the
Pageots
and
relating
to
the
subject
property
which
are
extant.
Unfortunately,
the
appellant
fails
to
understand
the
operation
of
the
due
process
in
law
and
it
is
not
within
my
jurisdiction
to
in
any
way
interfere
with
orders
made
by
the
Master
and
the
various
levels
of
court
where
the
appellant
sought
relief
to
the
effect
that
title
would
be
returned
to
him.
It
is
clear
to
me
that
all
of
the
legal
expenses
during
the
years
1976
and
1977
were
incurred
to
preserve
an
existing
capital
asset
and
were
therefore
payments
on
account
of
capital.
The
legal
expenses
were
incurred
to
attempt
to
preserve
his
title.
See
British
Columbia
Power
Corporation
Limited
v
MNR,
[1967]
CTC
406;
67
DTC
5258,
a
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada;
see
also
Farmers
Mutual
Petroleums
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1967]
CTC
396;
67
DTC
5277,
and
Leslie
Reitman
and
Clara
Reitman
v
MNR,
[1969]
Tax
ABC
988;
69
DTC
695.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.