M
J
Bonner
[ORALLY]:—I
am
of
the
view
that
the
appeal
must
be
allowed.
The
issue
is
one
of
the
V-Day
value
of
the
appellant’s
farm
located
near
the
City
of
Calgary.
There
were
two
real
estate
experts
called
to
give
evidence.
The
conclusion
of
the
appellant’s
expert
was
that
the
total
value
of
the
land
and
buildings
was
$330,900.
I
accept
that
conclusion.
The
evidence
given
by
that
witness
was
not
shaken
on
cross-examination
in
any
material
degree.
The
evidence
given
by
the
respondent’s
expert
is
unacceptable.
The
last
witness,
Mr
Jenkins,
relied
on
the
municipal
appraisals
as
the
basis
for
determining
whether
other
land
which
was
sold
was
comparable.
For
example,
when
he
was
asked
in
cross-examination
if
he
had
any
notes
with
respect
to
comparables
5,
6
and
7,
and
asked
further
if
that
land
was
poor
land,
he
pointed
out
that
that
is
what
makes
that
land
valuable
—
that
being
poor
land
makes
it
valuable
for
speculators.
The
inference
from
that
evidence
is
that
he
was
relying
on
municipal
appraisals
and
treating
land
that
had
the
same
appraised
value
for
municipal
taxation
purposes
as
being
comparable
no
matter
what
its
use
was.
He
would
treat
as
comparable
land
that
had
value
as
speculative
land
and
land
such
as
the
appellant’s
that
had
value
as
farm
land.
He
admitted
further,
and
my
note
of
his
evidence
was,
“I
rely
on
the
assessment
.
.
.,”
that
is
to
say,
the
municipal
assessment,
.
.
more
than
anything
else.”
In
such
circumstances,
I
find
that
in
essence
the
respondent’s
appraiser
has
failed
utterly
to
exercise
his
own
judgment
in
determining
whether
the
comparables
on
which
he
relied,
and
on
which
his
conclusion
rested
were
in
fact
comparable.
That
is
utterly
unacceptable
in
principle.
I
can
therefore
give
no
weight
to
his
report
and
thus,
on
the
balance
of
probabilities
on
the
evidence
that
I
can
give
weight
to,
I
find
that
the
V-Day
value
of
the
property
in
question
here
was
$330,900
The
appeals
will
therefore
be
allowed
and
the
assessments
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessments
on
the
basis
that
the
figure
mentioned
of
$330,900
was
the
V-Day
value
of
the
appellant’s
property.
Appeal
allowed.