Boland,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
pursuant
to
subsection
20(1)
of
The
Retail
Sales
Tax
Act,
RRO
1970,
chapter
415,
to
vary
an
assessment
of
retail
sales
tax
confirmed
by
the
Minister
of
Revenue.
The
facts
are
agreed
upon.
The
appellant
Syroco
Canada,
a
division
of
Dart
Products
National
Limited,
carries
on
business
in
Ontario
principally
as
a
manufacturer
and
wholesaler
of
goods.
Coppercraft
Guild
of
Canada,
another
division
of
Dart
Products,
whose
offices
abut
those
of
Syroco,
carries
on
business
as
a
retailer
of
consumer
copper
and
plastic
giftware.
It
was
agreed
by
Dart
Products
and
the
Minister
that
the
appellant
Syroco
would
be
responsible
for
remitting
to
the
Treasurer
of
Ontario,
the
retail
sales
tax
due
under
The
Retail
Sales
Tax
Act
from
the
operation
of
its
division,
Coppercraft,
as
Syroco
holds
the
Ontario
retail
sales
tax
vendor’s
permit.
Coppercraft
products
are
sold
through
a
“party
plan”.
A
counsellor
representing
Coppercraft,
arranges
for
a
hostess
to
invite
friends
to
her
home
and
the
counsellor
demonstrates
and
sells
products
to
the
assembled
group.
The
hostess
and
her
guests
select
the
items
they
wish
to
purchase
from
the
Coppercraft
catalogue
and
list
them
on
an
order
form
called
a
guest
selection
slip.
This
form
contains
a
description
of
the
products
ordered,
the
price
of
each
product
as
indicated
in
the
sales
catalogue
and
the
total
purchase
price.
Ontario
retail
sales
tax
is
calculated
on
the
catalogue
price
and
en-
tered
as
a
charge
on
the
order
form.
In
addition
to
these
charges,
a
handling
charge
is
shown
as
a
separate
charge
on
the
order
form
with
no
provision
for
tax.
At
the
time
in
question,
the
handling
charge
was
75¢
per
customer
order
and
was
arrived
at
by
aggregating
the
postal
shipping
charges
over
a
certain
period
and
dividing
those
charges
by
the
number
of
order
forms
covered
by
those
charges
and
rounding
the
result
to
the
nearest
5$.
As
a
result,
the
charge
closely
approximates
the
postal
shipping
charges.
Total
charges
are
then
aggregated
on
the
order
form
and
the
balance
due
is
then
entered
in
the
column
marked
“balance
to
pay
hostess’’.
Printed
on
the
order
form
are
the
words
“Shipment
Arrives
COD’’.
The
guests
deliver
their
completed
forms,
together
with
the
purchase
price
or
deposit,
to
the
counsellor
who
forwards
them
with
a
summary
information
sheet
to
Coppercraft.
Arrangements
are
made
by
Coppercraft
for
the
post
office
to
send
the
orders
from
the
warehouse
in
Kitchener,
to
the
home
of
the
hostess.
Most
shipments
are
sent
COD.
The
catalogue
has
a
uniform
retail
price
for
all
parts
of
Canada
and
does
not
refer
to
handling
charges.
It
also
contains
a
guarantee
that
if
an
item
is
damaged
it
will
be
replaced
for
one-half
of
the
current
retail
price.
However
in
practice,
Coppercraft
waives
the
half
price
payment
for
damage
incurred
during
transportation
and
applies
it
in
all
other
cases
to
promote
good
relations
with
consumers
in
the
direct
sales
market.
In
the
event
merchandise
is
damaged,
no
claim
is
made
for
a
refund
of
sales
tax.
Coppercraft
calculates
its
Ontario
corporations
tax
by
calculating
its
income
on
the
basis
that
a
sale
is
made
at
the
time
merchandise
is
delivered
to
a
post
office
truck
at
its
warehouse
and
its
inventory
is
reduced
by
the
cost
of
the
merchandise
delivered
at
that
time.
The
price
of
the
product
purchased,
upon
which
Coppercraft
calculated
the
amount
of
retail
tax
due
on
each
retail
sale,
did
not
include
the
amount
of
the
handling
charge
paid
by
the
guest.
Consequently,
no
retail
sales
taxes
were
charged,
collected
or
remitted
to
the
Treasurer
of
Ontario
by
the
appellant.
On
September
2,
1975,
the
Minister
of
Revenue,
after
an
audit
of
the
appellant’s
records,
made
an
assessment
under
subsection
15(3)
of
The
Retail
Sales
Tax
Act
for
the
period
running
from
October
1,
1972
to
May
31,1975.
By
notice
dated
November
28,
1975,
Dart
Products
objected
to
the
assessment
for
retail
sales
tax
in
the
amount
of
$27,296.46
as
“tax
on
handling
charges
on
Ontario
retail
sales
by
Coppercraft
Guild
of
Canada
erroneously
not
collected’’.
The
Minister
of
Revenue
confirmed
the
assessment
issued
against
the
appellant
by
letter
dated
June
8,
1976
and
this
appeal
was
launched.
The
issues
raised
on
this
appeal
are
whether
the
handling
charge
set
at
/5€
per
customer
was
taxable
under
The
Retail
Sales
Tax
Act
and
if
so,
whether
the
appellant
as
vendor
is
responsible
for
paying
the
assessment
of
$27,296.46.
In
determining
liability
for
tax,
one
must
look
at
the
legislation,
the
nature
of
the
transaction
and
the
surrounding
circumstances.
Pursuant
to
subsection
2(1)
of
the
Act,
guests
purchasing
items
from
the
hostess
according
to
the
catalogue
price
are
liable
to
pay
tax
“computed
at
the
rate
of
7
per
cent
of
the
fair
value
thereof”
(italics
added).
Fair
value
as
defined
in
subsection
1(4)
of
the
Act,
includes
the
price
for
which
the
goods
were
purchased
and
the
cost
of
or
charges
for
transportation
whether
or
not
such
are
shown
separately
on
an
invoice.
It
is
agreed
that
the
handling
charges
paid
by
the
guests
as
purchasers,
were
to
recover
the
postal
expenses
incurred
in
moving
the
goods
from
the
appellant’s
warehouse
to
the
homes
of
the
various
hostesses
where
the
purchasers
received
possession
of
the
goods.
Thus
the
75€
handling
charge
covered
transportation
from
the
warehouse
to
the
home
of
the
hostess.
Pursuant
to
subsection
2(5)
of
the
Act,
“a
purchaser
shall
pay
the
tax
imposed
by
this
Act
at
the
time
of
the
sale”.
Section
1
(13)
stipulates
that
sale
means
any
transfer
of
title
or
possession.
Section
8
dictates
that
every
vendor
as
agent
of
the
Minister,
must
levy
and
collect
the
taxes
imposed
by
the
Act
upon
the
purchaser
or
consumer.
The
appellant
contends
that
the
handling
charges
were
not
included
in
fair
value
and
are
therefore
not
taxable
as
they
occurred
subsequent
to
title
passing.
The
appellant
further
contends
that
title
passed
either
at
the
time
the
contract
was
made
and
the
order
form
was
signed
by
the
purchaser
or
when
the
goods
left
the
warehouse
in
the
post
office
truck.
To
support
this
argument,
the
appellant
pointed
out
that
it
is
common
ground
that
Copper-
craft
calculates
its
Ontario
corporations
tax
by
calculating
its
income
on
the
basis
sales
are
made
when
the
merchandise
is
picked
up
by
a
post
office
truck
at
the
warehouse
and
its
inventory
is
reduced
by
the
cost
of
the
merchandise
at
that
time.
It
was
also
argued
that
it
is
the
policy
of
the
Ministry
that
transportation
expenses
incurred
in
an
FOB
supply
point
contract
do
not
form
part
of
the
fair
value
of
the
goods.
On
the
other
hand,
the
respondent
argues
that
title
passed
when
the
goods
were
delivered
COD
to
the
home
of
the
hostess
subject
to
inspection
by
the
guest.
In
an
FOB
contract,
it
is
stipulated
at
what
point
the
vendor’s
liability
ceases
and
the
property
and
risk
in
the
goods
passes
to
the
purchaser
and
the
purchaser
thereupon
becomes
responsible
for
the
transportation
charges.
The
determination
of
the
FOB
supply
point
or
delivery
point
by
the
vendor
is
irrelevant
in
these
circumstances
as
this
was
neither
discussed
nor
agreed
upon
by
the
parties
to
the
contract.
The
intent
of
the
parties
is
clearly
set
out
in
their
contract
for
the
purchase
of
goods
as
the
order
form
specifically
states
that
the
goods
are
to
be
sent
to
the
home
of
the
hostess
COD.
Furthermore,
the
contract
with
the
post
office
for
COD
services,
indicates
the
post
office
is
the
agent
of
the
appellant
to
collect
the
purchase
price
before
completing
delivery.
In
these
circumstances,
I
am
satisfied
that
title
passed
when
the
purchase
price
was
paid
and
the
guest
had
inspected
the
goods.
On
the
facts
of
this
case,
fair
value
was
catalogue
price
plus
transportation
costs.
It
follows
that
a
guest
purchasing
items
at
the
Coppercraft
party
was
responsible
for
paying
retail
tax
on
the
75¢
handling
charge,
which
in
fact
covered
postal
shipping
charges,
as
this
was
included
in
the
fair
value
of
the
goods.
It
also
follows
that
the
appellant
as
vendor
and
agent
of
the
Minister,
was
responsible
for
levying
and
collecting
these
transportation
costs
imposed
by
the
Act
upon
the
purchaser.
Having
determined
that
the
handling
charges
of
75$
per
customer
are
taxable
under
the
Act
as
transportation
costs,
the
next
issue
to
be
determined
is
whether
the
appellant,
standing
in
the
shoes
of
the
vendor,
is
responsible
as
agent
for
paying
the
assessment
arising
under
subsection
15(3)
of
the
Act,
by
way
of
damages.
Section
8
clearly
instructs
every
vendor
as
agent
of
the
Minister,
to
levy
and
collect
taxes
imposed
by
the
Act
upon
the
purchaser
or
consumer.
According
to
our
law,
an
agent
who
fails
to
carry
out
the
terms
of
his
instructions,
is
liable
for
the
resulting
damages
to
his
principal.
The
vendor
as
agent
of
the
Ministry
was
responsible
for
collecting
tax
on
the
fair
value
which
includes
transportation
costs.
It
is
common
ground
that
no
such
tax
was
either
collected
by
the
vendor
or
paid
by
the
purchaser
on
the
75¢
transportation
cost
as
the
vendor
neglected
to
position
the
handling
charge
above
the
sales
tax
on
the
Guest
Selection
Slip
in
order
to
arrive
at
fair
value.
The
individual
purchasers
are
still
liable
to
pay
the
tax
on
the
handling
charges
as
prescribed
by
the
Act
at
the
rate
of
7
per
cent
of
75€.
However,
it
is
impossible
as
well
as
totally
impractical
for
the
Minister
to
assess
each
purchaser
and
collect
the
5¢
tax
directly
at
this
point
in
time.
It
is
also
impossible
for
the
appellant
to
collect
these
taxes
totalling
$27,296.46.
Thus
the
failure
of
Coppercraft
to
carry
out
its
statutory
instruction
to
collect
the
appropriate
tax
from
its
purchaser,
resulted
in
damages
to
the
Minister
in
the
sum
of
$27,296.46.
Surely
the
intent
of
the
legislature
when
making
the
appellant
an
agent
to
collect
the
tax,
was
to
avoid
this
very
type
of
situation.
section
15
of
the
Act
provides
enforcement
machinery
to
cover
situations
where
the
vendor
has
not
kept
records
and
accounts,
remitted
tax
collected
or
collected
tax
in
compliance
with
the
Act.
On
September
2,
1975,
the
Minister
under
subsection
15(3)
of
the
Act,
assessed
the
appellant
$27,296.46
for
transportation
costs
erroneously
not
collected
from
October
1,
1972
to
May
31,
1975.
The
assessment
was
made
within
the
three
years
required
by
the
Act
and
is
the
subject
of
this
appeal.
Pursuant
to
subsection
15(3)
of
The
Retail
Sales
Tax
Act
as
amended
in
1975,
the
Minister
may
assess
any
tax
collectable
by
a
vendor
under
the
Act.
Subsection
15(3)
as
amended,
provides:
The
Minister
may
assess
or
reassess
any
tax
collectable
by
a
vendor
or
any
tax
payable
by
a
purchaser
under
this
Act
within
three
years
from
the
day
such
tax
became
collectable
or
payable,
as
the
case
may
be,
except
that,
where
the
Minister
establishes
that
any
vendor
or
purchaser
has
made
any
misrepresentation
that
is
attributable
to
neglect,
carelessness
or
wilful
default,
or
has
committed
any
fraud,
in
making
a
return
or
in
supplying
any
information
under
this
Act
or
in
omitting
to
disclose
any
information,
then
the
Minister
may
assess
or
reassess
tax
imposed
by
this
Act
at
any
time
he
considers
reasonable.
The
Minister
and
the
Attorney
General
for
Ontario
argue,
that
the
charge
imposed
upon
the
appellant
under
the
assessment,
is
not
a
tax
but
rather
a
penalty.
On
the
other
hand,
the
appellant
strongly
contends
that
the
only
statutory
authority
for
such
a
penalty
is
contained
in
section
38
of
the
Act
and
the
assessment
is
in
fact
an
indirect
tax
contrary
to
subsection
92(2)
of
the
British
North
America
Act,
which
enables
the
provinces
of
Canada
to
levy
and
collect
direct
taxes
only.
Subsection
15(3)
is
analogous
to
the
right
of
a
principal
to
sue
an
agent
for
damages
for
breach
of
the
agent’s
duty
to
the
principal.
“Tax
collectable”,
according
to
the
Oxford
Shorter
English
Dictionary,
means
“tax
that
may
be
gathered
in’.
The
use
of
the
word
“collectable”
provides
the
vehicle
for
the
Minister
to
make
an
assessment
against
a
vendor-agent
for
damages
arising
out
of
the
agent’s
breach
of
duty
to
collect
retail
tax
payable
at
the
time
the
fair
value
is
received
by
the
vendor-agent.
On
the
other
hand,
section
38
of
the
Act
provides
for
criminal
procedures
and
is
not
applicable
to
the
facts
before
me.
I
can
discern
no
conflict
between
subsection
15(3)
and
section
38
and
find
no
merit
in
the
argument
that
they
cannot
co-exist.
In
my
view,
the
assessment
of
uncollected
tax
from
a
vendor
is
in
the
nature
of
a
penalty
for
failure
to
collect
tax
prescribed
by
the
Act.
It
is
not
a
tax.
The
authority
of
the
Province
to
impose
penalties
to
enforce
its
legislation
is
found
in
section
92:15
of
the
British
North
America
Act
which
authorizes
legislation
to
be
enacted
in
relation
to:
The
Imposition
of
Punishment
by
Fine,
Penalty,
or
Imprisonment
for
enforcing
any
Law
of
the
Province
.
.
.
The
purpose
of
subsection
15(3)
is
to
put
teeth
into
the
statutory
requirement
that
the
vendor
collect
tax
from
the
purchaser,
to
penalize
a
vendor
who
is
in
breach
of
his
duty
to
collect
tax
under
the
statute
by
making
him
personally
liable
for
that
amount
of
money
and
to
impose
a
deterrent
on
the
business
community.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
has
pointed
out
that
section
15
of
the
Act
has
undergone
substantial
change
subsequent
to
this
assessment;
however
it
is
my
view
that
subsection
15(3)
as
amended
in
1975,
was
a
clear
and
unambiguous
authority
for
the
Minister
to
assess
a
vendor
for
taxes
collectable
but
not
collected.
I
have
reviewed
at
great
length
the
authorities
presented
by
counsel,
including
F
W
Woolworth
Ltd
v
The
Queen
(1957),
10
DWR
(2d)
225;
W
H
Violette
Ltd
v
Provincial
Secretary
of
New
Brunswick
(1978),
23
NBR
(2d)
384
and
The
Becker
Milk
Company
Limited
v
Minister
of
Revenue,
an
unreported
decision
of
Estey,
CJHC,
October
8,
1977.
However,
I
found
none
of
them
directly
related
to
the
issues
before
me.
Accordingly
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
As
the
point
is
novel,
there
will
be
no
costs.