Taylor,
TCJ:—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
Toronto,
Ontario
on
December
8,
1983,
against
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1978
and
1979,
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
had
disallowed
certain
expenses
claimed
by
the
taxpayer
as
deductions
from
rental
income.
In
so
doing,
the
respondent
relied
inter
alia,
upon
paragraphs
18(l)(a),
18(l)((b),
18(l)(h)
and
20(l)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
and
upon
section
1100
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations.
The
position
of
the
appellant
and
his
agent
was
“‘all
expenditures
claimed
for
rental
expenses
are
vouchered,
supportable
and
deductible
as
claimed’’.
Because
of
the
rather
novel
posture
taken
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
in
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
and
at
the
trial,
certain
particularly
significant
portions
of
the
reply
are
quoted
as
follows:
4.
The
Respondent
by
Notices
of
Reassessment
dated
June
15,
1981
reduced
the
rental
loss
deductible
from
other
income
to
$1,234.99
for
1978
and
$1,253.98
for
1979
by
disallowing
a
portion
of
the
expense
deductions
claimed
by
the
Appellant
on
the
basis
that
the
expenses
disallowed
consisted
of
amounts
not
expended
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
and
amounts
that
were
outlays
on
account
of
capital.
The
expenses
allowed
by
the
Respondent
are
indicated
in
Table
I
for
1978
and
Table
II
for
1979.
|
TABLE
I
|
|
|
1978
Taxation
Year
|
|
|
Claimed
by
|
|
Allowed
by
|
|
Appellant
|
|
Respondent
|
|
Revenue
|
$1,980.00
|
|
$1,980.00
|
|
Maintenance
&
Repairs
|
$1,745.35
|
|
$
245.35
|
|
Other
Expenses
|
6,095.03
|
|
6,095.03
|
|
Total
Expenses
|
7,840.38
|
|
6,340.38
|
|
Less
Personal
Use
(25%)
|
1,960.09
|
(50%)
|
3,170.19
|
|
Net
Total
Expenses
|
5,880.29
|
|
3,170.19
|
|
C.C.A.
|
80.90
|
|
44.80
|
|
Total
Deductions
|
5,961.19
|
|
3,214.99
|
|
Loss
|
$3,981.19
|
|
$1,234.99
|
|
TABLE
II
|
|
|
1979
Taxation
Year
|
|
|
Claimed
by
|
|
Allowed
by
|
|
Appellant
|
|
Respondent
|
|
Revenue
|
$1,980.00
|
|
$1,980.00
|
|
Maintenance
&
Repairs
|
$
4,254.80
|
|
$
500.00
|
|
Other
Expenses
|
5,896.28
|
|
5,896.28
|
|
Total
|
10,151.08
|
|
6,396.28
|
|
Less
Personal
Use
(25%)
|
2,537.77
|
(50%)
|
3,198.14
|
|
Net
Expenses
|
7,613.13
|
|
3,198.14
|
|
C.C.A.
|
70.13
|
|
35.85
|
|
Loss
|
$5,563.18
|
|
$1,253.98
|
5.
In
assessing
tax
as
aforesaid,
the
Respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
the
following
findings
or
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
The
Appellant
during
the
period
under
appeal
owned
and
lived
with
his
wife
and
two
children
at
the
residence
located
at
66
Empress
Avenue,
Hamilton,
Ontario;
(b)
the
Appellant
during
the
period
under
appeal
rented
out
less
than
50%
of
the
living
space
of
the
abovementioned
residence;
(c)
the
Appellant,
in
calculating
his
income
for
the
1978
and
1979
taxation
years
deducted
75%
of
the
expenses
of
operating
and
maintaining
his
residence
as
rental
expenses;
(d)
the
difference
between
the
75%
of
residence
expenses
claimed
by
the
Appellant
and
the
50%
of
residence
expenses
allowed
by
the
Respondent
were
not
amounts
incurred
by
the
Appellant
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
business
or
property
but
were
personal
or
living
expenses
of
the
Appellant;
(e)
of
the
sum
of
$1,745.35
claimed
by
the
Appellant
as
maintenance
and
repair
expenses
in
1978,
$1,500.00
represented
payments
and
outlays
on
account
of
capital
for
aluminum
siding,
eaves
troughs,
carpeting,
electrical
equipment
and
wall
paper;
(f)
of
the
sum
of
$4,250.80
claimed
by
the
Appellant
as
maintenance
and
repair
expenses
in
1979,
$3,754.80
represented
payments
or
outlays
on
account
of
capital
for
a
fire
escape,
humidifier,
furnace,
lumber,
carpeting
and
sod;
(g)
the
amount
of
capital
cost
allowance
claimed
by
the
Appellant
and
disallowed
by
the
Respondent
for
the
1978
($36.10)
and
1979
($34.29)
taxation
years
did
not
relate
to
property
of
the
Appellant
with
a
capital
cost
greater
than
nil
and
used
to
earn
income
from
business
or
property.
In
testimony,
it
was
asserted
by
the
appellant
that
the
amounts
classified
as
“capital”
by
the
respondent
were
really
current
expenses
and
that
his
estimate
of
50
per
cent
for
“rental”
purposes
of
the
total
house
was
more
appropriate
than
the
Minister’s
25
per
cent.
It
was
also
alleged
by
him,
and
vigorously
argued
by
his
agent,
that
it
was
the
appellant’s
firm
belief
on
purchase
of
the
house
that
he
could
make
a
profit.
Mr
Cecato
did
agree
with
counsel
for
the
Minister
that
certain
of
the
fixed
expenses,
interest
on
the
mortgage,
taxes,
and
light,
heat
and
water,
should
have
made
it
plain
to
him
that
at
the
fixed
rent
of
$165
per
month
(at
acquisition)
there
was
no
possibility
of
making
a
profit.
Mr
Cecato
countered
that
perhaps
he
had
been
a
bit
naive
and
gullible
when
deciding
to
buy
the
property
on
the
basis
of
any
expectation
of
profit.
Considerable
detail
regarding
a
fire
escape,
carpeting,
aluminum
siding,
etc
was
provided
by
the
agent
and
the
appellant
at
the
hearing.
However,
I
should
leave
these
distinctions
relatively
untouched,
since,
in
my
view,
the
major
thrust
of
the
respondent’s
argument
went
to
the
heart
of
this
matter,
that
since
there
was
no
“reasonable
expectation
of
profit”
in
the
rental
operation,
losses
incurred
were
not
deductible
from
other
income.
In
short,
for
there
to
be
a
“source
of
income”,
there
must
be
a
“reasonable
expectation
of
profit”,
and
a
rental
loss
can
be
viewed
from
the
perspective
set
out
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
William
Moldowan
v
The
Queen,
[1977]
CTC
310;
77
DTC
5213.
In
this
matter,
the
Court
notes
the
contradiction
between
that
position
taken
by
the
Minister
at
the
trial
of
the
issue
and
the
results
arrived
at
in
the
assessment
by
the
Minister.
Had
the
rationale
proposed
at
the
trial
been
used
as
the
basis
for
the
assessment,
the
entire
loss
claim
might
have
been
disallowed.
Nevertheless,
I
am
not
aware
of
any
jurisprudence
which
would
prohibit
the
Minister
at
the
hearing
of
an
appeal
from
relying
on
just
such
a
fundamental
argument.
In
my
opinion,
Moldowan,
(supra),
does
provide
a
sufficient
basis
for
comparing
“rental
loss”
to
“farm
loss”
as
indicated
by
the
Minister.
An
earlier
case
Coleman
E
Hall
v
MNR,
[1970]
CTC
510;
70
DTC
6333,
laid
down
essentially
the
same
line
of
reasoning,
and
cases
subsequent
to
Moldowan,
(supra),
such
as
Barry
S
Arbus
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2872;
80
DTC
1744;
Wesley
H
Warden
v
MNR,
[1981]
CTC
2379;
81
DTC
322;
Donald
Arthur
Porter
v
MNR,
[1981]
CTC
2445;
81
DTC
385,
emphasize
the
same
point
although
perhaps
in
different
language.
Conversely,
in
this
matter,
the
agent
for
the
appellant
did
not
refer
the
court
to
any
jurisprudence
which
would
support
a
proposition
that
the
shortfall
between
income
and
expenses
has
some
inherent
claim
to
deductibility
from
other
income,
simply
by
attributing
to
it
the
term
‘‘rental
loss”.
Section
18
of
the
Act
does
not
provide
for
deductions;
it
is
a
section
that
specifically
prohibits
deductions
except
under
certain
circumstances,
the
basic
one
of
which
is
that
the
“outlay
or
expense”
must
be
made
“for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property”.
There
was
no
evidence
that
this
was
met
or
could
have
been
met
in
this
matter
and
I
accept
the
Minister’s
proposition
in
this
appeal.
So-called
“rental
losses”
are
not
deductible
from
other
income
when
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
has
not
been
demonstrated.
It
would
appear
to
me
a
misrepresentation
of
the
Act
to
unreservedly
attribute
“tax
shelter”
characteristics
to
all
rental
operations.
Whether
some
other
income
tax
treatment,
such
as
an
accumulation
of
the
losses,
and
use
of
the
“carry
back/carry
forward”
provision
of
the
Act;
or
increasing
the
capital
cost
of
the
property
by
the
amount
of
the
losses,
or
anything
else,
is
appropriate,
is
not
a
subject
for
determination
in
this
particular
appeal.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
the
appellant
in
this
matter
has
failed
to
show
that
the
expenses
claimed
fulfill
the
requirements
of
paragraph
18(l)(a)
of
the
Act,
and
his
claim
for
relief
in
addition
to
that
already
accorded
by
the
Minister
must
be
denied.
As
already
noted,
the
Court
makes
no
specific
comment
on
the
losses
which
have
been
allowed
to
him
by
the
Minister
and
deducted
from
other
income.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.