Taylor,
TCJ:—These
are
appeals
heard
on
common
evidence,
in
Toronto,
Ontario
on
February
20,
1985.
The
parts
of
the
appeal
of
Gail
van
Oldenbarneveld
for
the
years
1980
and
1981
were
withdrawn
and
are
to
be
dismissed.
There
was
only
one
point
in
dispute,
common
to
both
appeals
and
to
all
years
remaining
in
dispute
—
1979,
1980
and
1981
for
Rudolf
van
Oldenbarneveld
and
1979
for
Gail
van
Oldenbarneveld.
For
the
respondent
in
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
for
Gail
van
Oldenbarneveld
the
issue
was:
the
appellant’s
expenses
exceeded
revenues
prior
to
any
deduction
in
respect
of
capital
cost
allowance
on
the
rental
and
leasing
properties
owned
by
her,
the
deduction
of
capital
cost
allowance
in
the
1979
taxation
year
is
specifically
prohibited
by
paragraph
20(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
Regulations
1100(11)
and
1100(15)
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations.
The
issue
is
identical
for
Rudolf
van
Oldenbarneveld.
Prior
to
1979
the
taxpayers
owned
separately
certain
parcels
of
real
estate
which
were
rented.
The
capital
cost
allowance
schedules
included
with
the
returns
show
capital
cost
allowance
taken,
in
connection
with
the
“real
property”
assets
on
certain
Class
8
and
Class
10
assets
—
which
apparently
represented
furniture
and
equipment
of
some
kind
(Class
8)
and
an
automobile
(Class
10).
There
was
no
depreciation
(cca)
charge
for
any
asset
class
which
could
represent
a
“building”.
Precisely
what
that
situation
should
be
interpreted
to
mean,
I
do
not
know,
and
it
was
not
explained,
—
perhaps
the
“building”
class
assets
had
been
exhausted
in
prior
years
with
regard
to
available
depreciation
deductions.
Very
little
evidence
was
brought
forward
by
either
the
appellants
or
the
respond
ent
to
show
the
“profit”
or
“loss”
record
of
properties
up
to
the
year
1979,
and
in
these
appeals
the
Minister
was
not
alleging
that
there
was
no
“reasonable
expectation
of
profit”
in
the
years
under
review.
The
available
record
was
of
continuing
losses
for
years
before
1979
and
that
might
leave
the
“reasonable
expectation
of
profit”
concession
by
the
Minister
in
question,
but
that
is
not
before
the
Court.
The
Minister
did
not
agree
that
there
had
been
a
“business”,
merely
that
there
had
been
a
“source
of
income’’.
In
1979
the
appellants
acquired,
on
a
joint
basis,
a
motor
home
which
they
then
leased
—
as
they
claimed
—
in
somewhat
the
same
manner
as
the
other
real
property
and
with
the
same
intention
—
to
make
a
profit.
It
was
further
their
contention
that
the
rental
and
leasing
operations
constituted
a
“business”,
and
therefore
was
not
subject
to
the
restriction
noted
by
the
Minister
with
respect
to
‘‘rental
of
property”.
They
added
that
view
was
in
accord
with
the
professional
advice
they
had
received
when
the
motor
home
was
purchased,
and
they
understood
that
the
only
reason
their
rental
operation
was
not
treated
as
a
“business”
by
the
Minister
was
because
they
only
had
one
motor
home.
The
appellants
stated
that
in
leasing
the
motor
home
they
did
provide
towels
and
linen
as
well
as
drapery
etc,
keeping
these
in
good
condition
and
repair
themselves.
As
I
see
it,
the
only
question
is
whether
the
appellants
are
entitled
to
deduct,
as
an
expense,
the
capital
cost
allowance
claimed
on
either,
or
both,
of
the
rental
properties
—
the
regular
“real
property”
and/or
the
“motor
home”.
Nothing
was
presented
by
the
appellants
which
would
identify
the
“‘real
property”
rentals
as
“business”
rather
than
“income
from
property”
—
even
assuming
that
the
identification
of
“business”
would
accomplish
their
objective.
Further,
the
“real
property
rentals”
do
not
constitute
“rental
business”
merely
because
there
is
also
the
leasing
of
the
motor
home
to
take
into
account,
as
far
as
I
am
aware
(whether
one
or
more
than
one
motor
home).
Accordingly
any
portion
of
these
appeals
which
is
founded
on
a
claim
for
capital
cost
allowance
related
to
the
“real
property”
rentals
has
not
been
supported
and
must
be
dismissed.
Turning
to
the
matter
of
capital
cost
allowance
on
the
motor
home
separately,
it
appeared
to
me
that
the
appellants
were
under
the
impression
that
the
leasing
of
the
motor
home
(presumably
because
of
its
particular
characteristics)
was
distinctly
different
than
the
rental
or
leasing
of
the
real
property.
I
have
been
unable
to
find
support
for
that
view
within
the
provisions
of
Regulation
1100,
and
in
fact
the
Minister’s
treatment
of
the
asset,
as
falling
under
the
provisions
of
Regulation
1100(15)
of
the
Act
would
seem
appropriate.
I
confess
to
the
normal
consternation
when
reading
through
the
wording
of
Regulation
1100,
but
if
indeed
that
Regulation
provides
for
the
relief
sought
by
these
taxpayers,
the
manner
in
which
that
could
be
interpreted
and
achieved
was
not
made
clear
to
me.
The
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.
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