Rip,
TCJ:—The
facts
in
Mr
Steven
Adam's
appeal
from
an
income
tax
assessment
for
1982
are
not
in
question.
The
issue
is
whether
a
salary,
once
paid
as
salary,
can
be
made
retroactively
into
a
dividend.
During
1982
Mr.
Adam
owned
60
per
cent
of
the
issued
and
outstanding
shares
of
Adamin
Industries
Ltd
(“Adamin”),
a
Canadian
controlled
private
corporation.
Mr
Adam’s
son
owned
the
other
40
per
cent
of
the
shares
of
the
corporation.
At
the
time
Mr
Adam
and
his
son
were
employees
of
Adamin.
According
to
Adamin’s
payroll
sheet
for
Mr
Adam,
each
week
during
1982
Mr
Adam
was
paid
a
salary
of
$702.77;
Adamin
issued
weekly
to
him
for
a
net
amount,
cheques
after
deductions
at
source
for
Quebec
Pension
Plan,
federal
income
tax
and
provincial
income
tax.
The
amounts
withheld
were
remitted
to
the
federal
and
Quebec
governments.
Mr
Adam’s
son
also
received
salary.
Adamin’s
1982
fiscal
year
ended
on
December
31.
On
December
28,
1982
the
following
resolution
was
passed
by
all
the
directors
of
Adamin:
RESOLVED
THAT:
The
Corporation
declare
a
dividend
of
FOUR
HUNDRED
DOLLARS
on
each
common
share
of
the
Corporation
presently
issued
and
outstanding
payable
as
of
today’s
date
to
Shareholders
as
of
record
of
today’s
date.*
The
accountant
for
Adamin,
Mr
Gerald
Rabinovitch,
CA,
testified
that
his
firm
advised
Adamin
to
"reverse”
the
payroll
records
of
Mr
Adam
and
his
son
for
1982
so
that
the
amounts
paid
to
them
in
the
year
would
be
dividends
and
not
salaries.
Mr
Adam,
who
also
testified,
stated
that
on
the
advice
of
his
accountant
he
instructed
his
bookkeeper
to
"reverse”
the
payroll
records
accordingly.
It
should
be
noted
that
there
was
no
corporate
resolution
authorizing
Adamin
to
"reverse”
the
salaries
paid
during
the
year.
I
do
not
propose,
however,
to
consider
the
significance
of
this
omission.
No
dividend
was
paid
by
Adamin
prior
to
1982;
the
sole
source
of
income
of
Mr
Adamin
and
his
son
was
from
the
company
by
way
of
salary.
At
the
end
of
1982
Adamin
had
modest
retained
earnings
available
for
distribution
as
dividends
to
its
shareholders.
Mr
Rabinovitch
recalled
that
the
budget
of
November
12,
1981
proposed
a
12
/2
per
cent
tax
on
dividend
distributions
by
small
business
and
by
a
release
dated
June
28,
1982
from
the
office
of
the
Deputy
Prime
Minister
and
the
Minister
of
Finance
it
was
announced
that
the
12
/2
per
cent
tax
would
be
postponed
to
January
1,
1983.
Then,
in
his
budget
address
of
October
27,
1982,
the
new
Minister
of
Finance
proposed
that
the
12
/2
per
cent
tax
should
apply
only
to
dividends
paid
out
of
corporate
income
earned
in
taxation
years
starting
after
the
end
of
1982
and
that
dividends
paid
out
of
business
income
would
be
considered
to
come
first
out
of
income
earned
after
1982.
Thus,
Mr
Rabinovitch
testified,
his
firm
recommended
to
clients
that
in
order
to
avoid
paying
the
12
/2
per
cent
on
dividends
after
1982
they
reverse
their
payroll
and
take
dividends
in
1982.
In
questions
from
the
Court,
Mr
Rabinovitch
replied
that
the
costs
would
not
have
warranted
the
shareholders
of
Adamin
to
incorporate
a
new
corporation
to
which
they
would
transfer
their
Shares
of
Adamin
and
subsequently,
but
prior
to
1983,
cause
Adamin
to
pay
dividends
to
the
new
entity.
He
also
said
he
did
not
recommend
loans,
instead
of
salary,
be
taken
by
Mr
Adam
and
his
son
during
1982
since
he
feared
they
may
be
assessed
tax
in
accordance
with
section
80.4
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
("the
Act”).
Mr
Adam,
who
is
president
of
Adamin,
was
quite
candid
in
admitting
that
in
each
week
during
the
year
when
salary
was
paid
it
was
the
intention
of
Adamin
to
pay,
and
Mr
Adam
and
his
son
to
receive,
salary.
This
was
confirmed
by
Mr
Rabinovitch.
However
Mr
Rabinovitch
argued
that
since
there
is
no
provision
in
the
Act
prohibiting
the
reversal
of
book
entries,
it
is
permissible
to
do
so.
He
also
submitted
that
a
closely
held
corporation,
such
as
Adamin,
ought
to
be
treated
differently
from
other
corporations
to
permit
the
shareholderemployee
to
decide
at
any
time
the
form
of
income
he
is
to
draw
from
the
corporation.
It
was
admitted
that
during
the
year
Mr
Adam
received
salary.
Adamin
treated
the
payments
as
compensation
for
regular
work
performed
by
Mr
Adam.
When
a
taxpayer
receives
salary
from
his
employer
he
is
taxable
in
the
year
of
receipt
on
the
amount
of
salary
since
this
constitutes
income
from
employment
(section
5
of
the
Act).
The
salary,
once
received,
cannot
for
tax
purposes
become
anything
else.
Mr
Adam
cannot
by
any
“ex
post
facto”
act
alter
the
destination
of
the
moneys,
or
the
purpose
for
which
they
were
paid
to
him
and
received
by
him.
See
Malkin
v
MNR,
[1942]
CTC
135
at
144;
2
DTC
587
at
591;
Alepin
v
The
Queen,
[1979]
CTC
360
at
364;
79
DTC
5259
at
5262.
An
adjustment
to
the
books
of
account
of
a
taxpayer
cannot
render
null
that
which
has
transpired.
Past
events
cannot
be
ignored.
That
is
not
to
say
a
taxpayer
cannot
make
entries
in
his
books
of
account
to
reflect
adjustments
to
his
accounts
as
and
when
they
take
place.
For
example,
in
corporations
the
size
of
Adamin,
it
is
not
unusual
for
a
shareholder-employee
to
draw
money
as
loans
from
the
corporation
throughout
the
year
and
at
the
end
of
the
year
the
shareholder-employee
and
the
corporation
decide
as
to
the
mix
of
dividends
and
salary
the
shareholder-
employee
is
to
receive;
the
loan
account
would
then
be
adjusted
accordingly.
However
no
taxpayer
has
the
right
to
retroactively
alter
events
when
it
best
suits
his
purposes
although
there
is
no
question
he
may
prospectively
plan
events
to
suit
these
purposes:
this
is
sometimes
called
tax
planning.
While
I
may
sympathize
with
Mr
Rabinovitch’s
desire
to
minimize
his
client's
taxes
and
the
uncertainty
in
tax
law
during
1982,
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
retroactive
adjustments
to
accounts
is
not
a
valid
tax
planning
scheme,
and
I
must
therefore
dismiss
this
appeal.
I
wish
to
raise
the
question
whether
Mr
Rabinovitch
should
have
represented
Mr
Adam.
In
situations
where
an
accountant,
agent
or
solicitor
was
an
actor,
in
whole
or
in
part,
in
events
leading
to
the
income
tax
assessment
it
should
be
recognized
that
a
potential
conflict
of
interest
exists
and
in
most
cases
that
person
ought
not
to
undertake
to
act
as
counsel
or
representative
for
the
appellant.
While
in
this
case
the
agent
did
nothing
improper,
it
is
the
view
of
this
Court
that
acting
for
the
appellant
in
such
circumstances
is
not
advisable
and
is
to
be
discouraged.
(See
Tanaka
v
MNR,
[1985]1
CTC
2333;
85
DTC
305).
Appeal
dismissed.