Taylor,
TCJ:
—This
is
an
appeal
heard
in
Calgary,
Alberta,
on
August
20,
1985,
against
income
tax
assessments,
for
the
years
1978,
1979
and
1980
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
claims
of
$10,500,
$12,604
and
$14,155
respectively,
allegedly
for
losses
incurred
by
the
appellant
in
a
farming
operation.
At
the
hearing
counsel
for
the
Minister
noted
that
the
Minister
was
prepared
to
allow
the
"restricted"
farm
loss
up
to
the
maximum
of
$5,000
for
the
year
1978.
The
Court
did
not
pursue
the
basis
for
the
Minister’s
decision
and
irrespective
of
what
else
may
arise
out
of
this
matter
that
will
be
done.
Also
at
the
hearing
—
having
accepted
the
Minister's
allowance
regarding
1978,
the
agent
for
the
appellant
notified
the
Court
that
his
client
would
only
be
pursuing
a
claim
for
the
same
"restricted"
farm
loss
for
the
remaining
two
years
in
issue.
The
simple
question
therefore
before
the
Court
was
whether
the
appellant
could
demonstrate
that
a
“reasonable
expectation
of
profit”
existed
in
the
operation.
The
assertion
of
the
appellant
was
spelled
out
in
information
attached
to
the
notice
of
appeal:
I
am
in
the
business
of
buying,
training,
showing,
and
selling
horses.
The
horses
are
not
used
for
personal
enjoyment
nor
as
a
hobby.
I
am
in
the
process
of
enlarging
and
expanding
my
farm
business
to
include
becoming
involved
with
race
horses.
It
is
my
understanding
that
it
is
not
abnormal
for
beginning
farmers
to
incur
losses
in
the
first
several
years
of
business.
My
farm
business
is
an
economically
viable
enterprise
and
is
well
on
its
way
to
becoming
an
income
producing
business.
For
the
Minister
the
situation
was:
—
that
the
Appellant
was
employed
on
a
full-time
basis
as
a
commission
sales
representative
in
the
said
taxation
years;
—
that
the
Appellant
farmed
by
carrying
on
horse
training
activities
in
the
said
taxation
years;
—
that
the
Appellant
owned
no
lands
or
stables
in
which
the
horse
training
activities
were
carried
on;
—
that
for
the
taxation
years
here
in
in
issue,
the
Appellant’s
inventory
of
stock
consisted
of
no
more
than
two
horses;
—
that
the
horse
training
activities
of
the
Appellant
were
carried
on
in
his
spare
time
in
the
said
taxation
years,
as
the
Appellant’s
full-time
employment
constituted
the
major
career
direction
and
preoccupation;
—
that
amounts
deducted
on
account
of
purported
expenses
of
the
farming
business
in
the
said
taxation
years
were
personal
or
living
expenses
of
the
Appellant
and
not
made
or
incurred
for
the
purposes
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property
of
the
Appellant;
—
that
the
farming
activities
of
the
Appellant
in
the
said
taxation
years
were
not
carried
on
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
and
as
such
did
not
constitute
the
carrying
on
of
a
business
by
the
Appellant
in
the
said
taxation
years.
The
Minister
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
sections
3,
18(1)(a),
18(1)(h)
and
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148
as
amended
by
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
s
1
as
applicable
to
the
1978,
1979
and
1980
taxation
years
of
the
Appellant.
In
testimony,
Mr
Zichy
reiterated
his
long
standing
interest
in
horses
—
his
father
also
had
trained
horses
—
and
he
regarded
the
activities
under
review
as
simply
part
of
his
program
to
engage
in
such
activity,
at
some
time
in
the
future,
on
a
full-time
basis,
and
earn
a
living
from
it.
He
agreed
he
had
earned
little
revenue
—
in
1978,
about
$175,
in
1979,
about
$355
from
show
prizes,
and
in
1980,
$1,500
as
a
commission
for
the
sale
of
another
person’s
horse.
In
contrast
his
typical
on-going
expenses
(as
shown
on
the
1980
financial
statement)
were:
|
Expenses
|
|
|
Boarding
|
$
3,900.00
|
|
Gas
and
Oil
|
320.00
|
|
Extra
feed
|
150.00
|
|
Car
repairs
|
598.00
|
|
Insurance
|
152.00
|
|
Plates
|
30.00
|
|
Horse
shoeing
|
480.00
|
|
Veterinary
Fees,
Medicine
and
Breeding
Fees
|
950.00
|
|
Show
expenses
|
850.00
|
|
Entry
fees
|
2,250.00
|
|
Training
|
1,200.00
|
|
Accounting,
Legal,
Office,
Advertising,
|
|
|
Memberships,
Subscriptions
|
200.00
|
|
Equipment
|
525.00
|
|
Electricity
(farm
share)
|
499.00
|
|
Heating
Fuel
(farm
share)
|
100.00
|
|
Custom
and
Contract
work
and
|
|
|
Machine
Rental
|
115.00
|
|
Show
care
|
650.00
|
|
Advertising
|
177.00
|
|
Purchase
of
horse
|
1,234.00
|
|
Entertainment
|
250.00
|
|
Paint
|
725.00
|
|
Braiding
|
300.00
|
|
TOTAL
EXPENSES
|
$15,655.00
|
It
was
evident
to
the
Court
that
when
Mr
Zichy
spoke
of
“making
a
profit”
on
a
sale
of
a
horse
he
spoke
in
terms
of
selling
the
horse
for
more
than
he
had
paid
for
it.
The
concept
that
—
for
example
—
a
$2,000
horse,
kept
for
a
year
at
a
cost
of
say
$10,000
(see
example
of
1980
expenses
above)
and
then
sold
for
$6,000,
actually
showed
a
$6,000
loss,
not
a
$4,000
profit
did
not
to
be
part
of
his
business
orientation
when
those
points
were
discussed.
In
the
same
manner,
on
a
theoretical
basis,
if
he
had
purchased
a
horse,
again
say
for
$2,000,
spent
$10,000
in
keeping
the
horse
for
a
year,
and
had
not
sold
the
animal,
that
it
now
might
be
argued
he
had
a
horse
which
had
cost
him
$12,000,
appeared
to
be
foreign
to
his
concept
of
the
undertaking.
Essentially,
it
was
the
position
of
the
appellant,
and
his
agent,
that
Mr
Zichy
had
suffered
a
string
of
bad
luck,
but
he
might
just
as
easily
have
managed
to
get
a
horse
that
would
have
been
worth
(or
earned)
tens
of
thousands
of
dollars.
The
agent
for
the
appellant
cited
certain
case
law
for
the
Court,
notably:
Casimir
Van
Straubenzee
v
MNR,
[1981]
CTC
2692;
81
DTC
552
(TCC),
Bio-Test
Laboratory
Inc
v
MNR,
[1983]
CTC
2348;
83
DTC
295,
Clément
Rivest
v
MNR,
[1985]
2
CTC
2031;
85
DTC
436,
which
appeared
to
the
agent
to
support
the
appellant’s
position
in
this
matter.
Counsel
for
the
Minister
also
cited
certain
case
law
including:
William
Moldowan
v
The
Queen,
[1977]
CTC
310;
77
DTC
5213
(SCC),
The
Queen
v
Paul
E
Graham,
[1985]
1
CTC
380;
85
DTC
5256
(FCA),
The
Queen
v
Fred
Juster,
[1973]
CTC
410;
73
DTC
5325
(FCTD),
Peter
B
Ward
v
MNR,
[1985]
1
CTC
2085;
85
DTC
98
(TCC),
Doug
Smith
Holdings
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1985]
1
CTC
2320;
85
DTC
265
(TCC),
Ambrose
J
Lewis
v
MNR,
[1984]
CTC
2306;
84
DTC
1267
(TCC).
It
was
pointed
out
to
the
agent
that
the
same
Court
and
adjudicator
which
produced
Van
Straubenzee,
Bio-Test
Laboratory
Inc,
and
Rivest
(supra)
upon
which
he
relied,
and
allowed
the
appeals
in
those
cases,
also
produced
Lewis
(supra)
and
gave
the
following
comments
therein
at
2310
(DTC
1270)
:
Therefore
one
must
not
even
contend
to
anticipate
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
with
only
one
mare;
it
is
a
hobby.
However,
with
only
one
mare,
the
Court
thinks
with
the
inherent
risk
of
losing
the
foal,
the
expectation
of
profit
is
not
reasonable.
The
agent
for
the
appellant
disagreed
completely
with
these
two
statements
from
Lewis
(supra)
but
was
unable
to
reconcile
the
conflict
which
arises
when
Lewis
(supra)
is
compared
to
Van
Straubenzee,
Bio-Test
Laboratory
Inc,
and
Rivest
(supra).
In
my
view,
a
quotation
taken
from
Steven
Gorjup
v
MNR,
[1985]
2
CTC
2194
at
2198;
85
DTC
530
at
533,
is
applicable
to
the
present
situation:
Therefore,
while
examining
a
question
such
as
that
before
the
Court
in
this
appeal
one
may
find
some
assistance
in
Moldowan
(supra),
the
basic
question
to
be
addressed
—
entitlement
to
“restricted”
farm
loss
—
is
not
specifically
addressed
therein.
One
might
therefore
usefully
vault
over
all
the
intervening
case
law
and
arrive
at
the
recent
case
of
The
Queen
v
Paul
E
Graham,
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
wherein
that
which
might
be
gleaned
from
Moldowan
(supra)
regarding
“restricted
farm
losses”
is
reviewed
and
certain
perspectives
attained,
since
it
can
reasonably
be
asserted
that
some
current
pertinent
and
different
illumination
has
been
provided
to
the
lower
courts,
in
Graham
(supra).
I
would
also
make
reference
to
Hall
v
MNR,
[1985]
2
CTC
2314;
85
DTC
624.
Mr
Zichy
was
“farming”,
as
that
term
should
be
understood
arising
out
of
the
definition
under
section
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
the
activities
and
operations
described
to
the
Court
were
conducted
by
him
for
his
own
personal
enjoyment
or
pleasure
—
albeit
that
he
may
have
gained
some
personal
satisfaction
from
doing
so.
His
stated
objective,
and
his
pursuit
of
the
venture
were
in
the
belief
that
the
golden
grail
of
profit
awaited
him
right
after
the
immediate
catastrophe
had
been
overcome,
whatever
it
was
—
a
broken
leg,
a
winded
horse,
a
muddy
track,
a
poor
jockey,
or
whatever.
And
once
attained,
that
goal
and
resultant
gain
would
erase
not
only
all
the
bitter
and
difficult
memories,
but
also
the
financial
losses
he
had
suffered.
It
might
be
argued,
that
he
was
naive
and
misguided
—
perhaps
even
deluded
about
the
prospects,
but
I
am
unable
to
distinguish
in
this
case
a
demarcation
line
which
would
clearly
allocate
this
“farming”
to
the
“hobby”
side
of
the
equation,
as
opposed
to
“business”
on
the
other
side
(see
Gorjup
(supra)).
As
noted
in
Hall
(supra),
perhaps
the
lesson
to
be
learned
from
Graham
(supra)
is
that
the
utmost
discretion
and
caution
should
be
used
before
attaching
the
appellation
“hobby”
from
Moldowan
(supra)
to
any
“farming”
activity.
Or
in
other
words
“farming”
is
a
“business”
not
a
“hobby”
unless
the
facts
point
conclusively
to
the
latter
designation.
That
more
charitable
view
of
the
requirement
may
have
fallen
somewhat
into
disrepute
during
the
immediate
past,
(see
Stewart
I
Cooke
v
MNR,
[1975]
CTC
2296;
75
DTC
223,
and
Fred
S
Goring
v
MNR,
[1976]
CTC
2255;
76
DTC
1202,
both
referenced
in
Johnson
v
MNR,
[1984]
CTC
2656;
84
DTC
1513),
but
resurrection
and
refurbishing
could
be
on
the
horizon.
It
may
not
hold
true
for
all
enterprises
at
this
point
in
time,
but
it
would
appear
to
hold
true
for
farming
now.
The
criteria
required
to
identify
a
“farming”
operation
as
a
“business”
—
with
a
“reasonable
expectation
of
profit”
—
may
not
be
too
clear
in
the
instant
case,
but
the
operation
conducted
by
Mr
Zichy
under
review
by
the
Court
was
not
a
“hobby”
as
I
comprehend
the
recent
jurisprudence.
I
would
only
add
the
note
of
caution
regarding
the
“revenue”
versus
“capital”
allocation
demonstrated
in
the
recent
Federal
Court
case
of
Armstrong
v
The
Queen,
[1985]
2
CTC
179;
85
DTC
5396
and
reference
in
the
Tax
Court
case
of
Hall
(supra).
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
attached
reasons
for
judgment.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
party
and
party
costs.
Appeal
allowed.