Brulé,
T.C.J.:
[ORALLY]—In
the
matter
of
George
A.
Cornelius
v.
M.N.R.,
the
facts
are
not
in
dispute.
Mr.
Cornelius,
who
was
a
vice-principal
of
a
school,
in
his
income
tax
return
for
1982
made
a
claim
for
$1,096.57
as
expenses
in
connection
with
the
use
of
his
automobile
for
purposes
connected
with
the
school
and
the
Board
of
Education.
Mr.
Cornelius
said
he
used
his
automobile
as
was
required
in
his
work
to
reach
such
places
as
the
administrative
centre
and
computer
office,
to
attend
meetings,
often
in
the
evening,
to
attend
the
professional
development
courses
where
he
was
often
the
instructor
or
leader,
and
also
to
transport
students
to
athletic
events
or
to
their
homes
when
ill
or
for
medical
attention.
This
was
all
carefully
documented.
The
principal
objection
by
the
Minister
to
the
deduction
of
these
expenses
was
that
they
did
not
fall
within
the
provisions
of
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
the
appellant’s
contract
of
employment
did
not
provide
for
these
undertakings.
It
was
suggested
that
his
employer
should
have
reimbursed
him
or
he
should
have
proceeded
by
way
of
a
grievance.
The
appellant
admitted
that
the
contract
of
employer,
or
collective
agreement,
between
the
Board
of
Education
and
the
Ontario
Secondary
School
Federation
did
not
cover
this
particular
necessity
for
the
appellant
to
use
his
own
vehicle,
but
in
evidence
it
was
obvious
that
the
agreement
did
not
enter
into
details
of
job
descriptions
of
the
various
categories
of
members.
It
was
argued
by
the
appellant
that
the
agreement
was
not
the
only
contract
regulating
his
employment,
albeit
the
general
one.
There
was
introduced
in
evidence
a
letter
saying
that
the
appellant
was
required
to
travel
as
the
need
arose
and
he
was
provided
with
a
T2200
form
each
year
indicating
that
he
was
required
to
pay
his
expenses
in
the
performance
of
assigned
duties.
In
addition,
as
a
driver,
he
was
covered
by
insurance
provided
to
him
by
the
Board
of
Education
whenever
he
transported
students.
The
Minister
relied
on
three
cases:
The
Queen
v.
Henry
Cival,
[1983]
C.T.C.
153;
83
D.T.C.
5168,
William
T.
Betz
v.
M.N.R.,
[1984]
C.T.C.
2889;
84
D.T.C.
1766
and
Phillis
I.
Moore
v.
M.N.R.,
[1984]
C.T.C.
2508;
84
D.T.C.
1452.
In
the
Cival
case
the
Court
held
that
the
appellant
could
have
entered
into
an
individual
contract
“‘so
long
as
the
contract
was
not
inconsistent
with
the
terms
of
the
collective
agreement”.
I
believe
in
this
case
the
appellant
had
such
an
extension
with
the
letter
referred
to
above
and
the
T2200
form.
In
the
Betz
case
the
Court
did
not
have
any
evidence
other
than
the
bargaining
agreement
and
held
that
the
appellant
was
not
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
duties
of
employment
away
from
the
school.
The
letter
produced
in
evidence
in
this
case
refutes
this
point.
In
the
Moore
case,
also
involving
a
school
principal,
again
the
bargaining
agreement
did
not
require
the
appellant
to
make
trips
or
be
paid
expenses.
The
Court
said
at
2511
(D.T.C.
1454):
If
such
was
the
intention
of
the
parties
to
the
agreement
I
am
sure
it
would
have
been
specifically
provided
for.
Here
the
agreement
did
not
make
any
specific
provision,
but
the
letter
to
the
appellant,
which
was
more
specific
than
the
collective
agreement,
did
include
the
requirement.
All
of
these
cases
can
be
distinguished
on
the
particular
facts
of
the
present
case
and
I
believe
that
the
appellant
was
properly
required
to
use
his
automobile
from
time
to
time
to
carry
out
his
duties,
and
accordingly,
his
appeal
in
respect
to
his
1982
taxation
year
and
the
claim
of
$1,096.57
is
allowed.
The
matter
will
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
in
accordance
with
these
reasons
for
judgment.
The
appellant
is
allowed
his
costs,
if
any.
Appeal
allowed.
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