Christie,
A.C.J.T.C.:—This
appeal
relates
to
the
appellant’s
1980
and
1981
taxation
years.
The
question
to
be
answered
is
whether
the
gain
of
$20,866
on
the
sale
of
two
lots
(Nos.
23
and
24)
in
the
appellant’s
1980
taxation
year
and
the
gain
of
$37,150
on
the
sale
of
two
lots
(Nos.
20
and
21)
in
its
1981
taxation
year
is
capital
in
nature
or
business
income.
The
appellant
was
incorporated
in
1979
under
laws
of
British
Columbia
to
receive
and
manage
the
assets
of
Mr.
Paul
A.
Turner
and
his
wife
Sylvia.
They
transferred
assets
of
considerable
value
to
the
appellant,
most
of
which
were
in
the
form
of
securities
and
real
estate.
The
bulk
of
the
shares
were
issued
to
Mr.
Turner
and
his
wife.
Their
four
children
were
relatively
minor
shareholders.
Turner
was
president
of
the
appellant.
Its
counsel
described
him
as
the
appellant’s
"operating
mind
and
management".
The
appellant's
taxation
year
was
June
1
to
May
31.
From
1973
to
1979
Turner
was
vice
president
and
general
manager
of
British
Columbia
of
Engineered
Homes
Limited,
a
subsidiary
of
Genstar
Corporation.
It
built
homes
and
also
purchased
and
developed
lands
on
which
it
built
homes
for
sale.
It
was
a
business
of
significant
magnitude.
Turner
retired
at
the
beginning
of
1979.
In
1979
and
1980
the
appellant
acquired
12
residential
lots
on
Lancelot
Drive
in
Central
Saanich,
near
Victoria.
All
had
been
the
property
of
Engineered
Homes
at
the
time
Turner
was
an
officer
of
that
company.
Four
lots
had
foundations
at
the
time
of
purchase.
One
of
the
lots
(No.
30)
was
purchased
by
Turner
from
Engineered
Homes
and
then
transferred
to
the
appellant.
The
remaining
11
lots
were
purchased
directly
in
groups
of
eight
and
three.
The
appellant
constructed
homes
on
five
lots
which
were
then
sold.
This
was
done
over
a
period
of
six
years.
The
appellant
treated
and
reported
the
gains
from
these
sales
as
business
income.
Lots
23
and
24
were
sold
in
1980
prior
to
May
31.
Lot
23
was
sold
to
a
Mr.
Hanson.
Lot
24
was
sold
to
a
contractor
named
Desuzo.
Lots
20
and
21
were
sold
in
1980
after
May
31.
One
was
sold
to
a
carpenter
named
Wisener
and
the
other
was
sold
to
a
Mr.
Callaghan.
Lots
20
and
21
had
foundations.
Wisener
and
Callaghan
worked
for
the
appellant.
Subsequently
two
more
lots
were
sold
and
one
lot
remained
with
the
appellant
at
the
time
of
the
hearing.
This
accounts
for
the
12
lots.
Turner
said
that
when
these
lots
were
acquired
it
was
not
intended
that
the
appellant
would
construct
houses
for
sale
on
all
of
them.
Further
it
was
not
intended
to
construct
homes
for
rent
on
any
of
the
lots.
He
said:
"It
was
not
a
rental
area
out
there.
It
was
a
single-family
residence,
residential
area.”
He
described
the
lots
as
a
"good
investment".
The
may
well
have
been,
but
not
necessarily
in
the
strict
sense
of
the
word
"investment",
i.e.
expenditures
on
capital
assets
the
profit
from
the
sale
of
which
would
be
a
capital
gain,
which
is
requisite
if
this
appeal
is
to
succeed.
In
M.N.R.
v.
Valclair
Investment
Co.
Ltd.,
[1964]
C.T.C.
22;
64
D.T.C.
5014,
Mr.
Justice
Kearney
of
the
Exchequer
Court
had
before
him
the
question
whether
the
profit
on
the
sale
of
farm
land
was
a
capital
gain
or
business
income.
He
concluded
on
the
particular
facts
of
the
case
that
it
was
a
capital
gain.
He
said
this
at
28
(D.T.C.
5018)
regarding
the
meaning
of
investment:
.
.
.
in
the
absence
in
the
Act
of
any
definition
of
“investment”
I
think
recourse
must
be
had
to
dictionaries
and
jurisprudence;
the
following
definition
of
the
word
“investment”
is
found
in
The
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
3rd
ed.,
p.
1040:
5.
Comm.
The
investing
of
money
or
capital;
an
amount
of
money
invested
in
some
species
of
property,
b.
A
form
of
property
viewed
as
a
vehicle
in
which
money
may
be
invested.
In
respect
of
jurisprudence
I
think
it
indicates
that
when
a
purchase
is
made
—
such
as
in
the
instant
case
—
in
order
for
it
to
qualify
as
an
investment,
the
object
purchased
must
be
at
least
susceptible
of
yielding
an
annual
return
such
as
rental,
dividends
or
interest.
To
my
mind
it
must
be
a
rare
result
to
regard
the
proceeds
of
disposition
of
real
estate
as
other
than
business
income
in
circumstances
where
a
taxpayer
acquires
either
building
lots
meant
for
homes
that
are
not
rental
units
or
lots
unencumbered
by
that
restriction
with
no
intention
of
constructing
such
units,
and
commences
to
dispose
of
them
within
a
relatively
short
period.
I
am
satisfied
on
the
evidence
that
when
the
appellant
acquired
the
12
lots
it
was
Turner's
intention
that
some
be
used
in
the
appellant’s
business
of
constructing
and
selling
homes
and
the
rest
sold
whenever
it
was
regarded
as
financially
advantageous
to
sell.
Having
regard
to
Turner's
relationship
to
the
appellant,
this
intention
is
attributable
to
it:
Leonard
Reeves
Incorporated
v.
M.N.R.,
[1985]
2
C.T.C.
2054
at
2058;
85
D.T.C.
419
at
421.
It
follows
that
the
proceeds
from
the
sale
of
Lots
20,
21,
23
and
24
in
the
appellant’s
1980
and
1981
taxation
years
is
business
income.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.