Galligan,
J.
[Orally]:—Argued
together
were
two
motions
which
were
many
branched
attacks
on
the
action
instituted
by
the
plaintiffs.
At
the
conclusion
of
the
argument
by
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
I
indicated
that
I
did
not
have
to
hear
counsel
for
the
defendants
on
the
issue
of
whether
or
not
the
statement
of
claim
disclosed
a
cause
of
action.
I
must
say
at
the
outset
that
a
very
substantial
argument
and
indeed
a
very
interesting
argument
was
addressed
to
me
on
many
points.
These
brief
reasons
Will
not
in
any
way
do
justice
to
the
very
competent
arguments
that
were
made.
I
feel
that
because
of
the
nature
of
this
case
it
is
appropriate
to
give
judgment
immediately.
It
seems
to
me
that
the
essential
issue
upon
which
all
others
turn
is
a
relatively
narrow
one.
The
crucial
issue
in
the
case
and
which
must
be
resolved
in
the
plaintiff's
favour
before
it
becomes
necessary
to
consider
the
other
issues
is
whether
the
statement
of
claim
discloses
a
cause
of
action
that
has
any
chance
of
success.
While
it
has
several
facets,
the
plaintiffs’
action
is
based
essentially
on
alleged
Charter
violations.
In
the
absence
of
any
such
violations
I
cannot
find
in
the
statement
of
claim
any
conceivable
cause
of
action.
For
example,
even
the
plaintiffs’
claim
to
recover
taxes
is
based
upon
the
suggestion
that
the
tax
laws
under
which
certain
deductions
are
allowable
are
invalid
because
they
violate
the
Charter.
The
same
is
true
of
the
action
in
so
far
as
it
is
said
to
be
an
action
for
discovery,
because
the
wrong
alleged
is
a
Charter
violation.
The
essence
of
the
plaintiff's
claim
that
there
are
violations
of
the
Charter
is
found
in
paragraphs
10
and
11
of
the
statement
of
claim.
I
quote
those
paragraphs:
10.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
and
the
Minister
of
Revenue
for
Ontario
have,
subsequent
to
April
15,
1982
when
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
came
into
effect,
permitted
certain
taxpayers
to
deduct
payments
to
the
NCC
as
allowable
business
expenses
under
Section
9
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
Section
12
of
the
Ontario
Corporations
Tax
Act,
in
computing
income
for
1982
and
subsequent
taxation
years,
so
as
to
reduce
taxes
otherwise
payable
on
business
income.
11.
The
Income
Tax
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63
and
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.O.
1980
c.
213
do
not
permit
taxpayers
with
employment
income
but
no
business
income,
including
the
Plaintiffs,
to
deduct
contributions
to
organizations
whose
primary
objective
is
the
advocacy
of
political
or
ideological
views,
so
as
to
reduce
taxes
otherwise
payable
on
employment
income.
Obviously,
on
a
motion
such
as
this,
I
must
and
do
accept
that
those
allegations
are
capable
of
being
proved.
I
also
keep
in
mind
the
certainty
which
a
court
must
have
that
an
action
cannot
succeed
before
it
can
be
dismissed
at
this
stage.
The
plaintiffs'
submission
is
that
the
circumstances
set
out
in
paragraphs
10
and
11
of
the
statement
of
claim
are
capable
of
showing
violations
of
the
fundamental
freedoms
of
expression
and
association
guaranteed
by
section
2
of
the
Charter
and
equality
rights
provided
for
under
section
15.
Section
2
of
the
Charter
provides
that
everyone
has
the
following
fundamental
freedoms:
(b)
freedom
of
thought,
belief,
opinion
and
expression,
including
freedom
of
the
press
and
other
media
of
communications;
(d)
freedom
of
association.
Subsection
15(1)
provides:
Every
individual
is
equal
before
and
under
the
law
and
has
the
right
to
the
equal
protection
and
equal
benefit
of
the
law
without
discrimination
and
in
particular
without
discrimination
based
on
race,
national
or
ethnic
origin,
colour,
religion,
sex,
age
or
mental
or
physical
disability.
I
will
consider
first
the
submission
that
the
circumstances
disclosed
in
paragraphs
10
and
11
of
the
statement
of
claim
show
a
possible
violation
of
freedom
of
expression.
I
have
given
the
matter
as
careful
thought
as
I
am
The
National
Citizens
Coalition
Inc.
et
al.
able
to
and
I
cannot
see
how
different
tax
treatment
of
certain
taxpayers
as
alleged
in
those
paragraphs
could
affect
the
freedom
of
a
taxpayer
to
express
herself
or
himself.
The
same
really
holds
true
about
the
allegation
of
a
violation
of
the
freedom
of
association.
I
am
unable
to
understand
how
different
treatment
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
or
other
taxing
statutes
in
any
way
affects
a
person's
freedom
of
association.
Shortly
stated,
I
can
find
nothing
in
those
allegations
which
could
in
any
way
impinge
upon
the
freedoms
guaranteed
by
section
2
of
the
Charter.
The
argument
advanced
with
respect
to
subsection
15(1)
is
that
the
circumstances
disclosed
in
paragraphs
10
and
11
of
the
statement
of
claim
show
that
certain
taxpayers
could
be
disentitled
to
equal
benefit
of
the
tax
laws.
I
have
some
difficulty
in
understanding
how
tax
laws
can
be
said
to
bestow
benefits
on
taxpayers.
But,
having
said
that,
it
is
clear
that
some
taxpayers
are
entitled
to
certain
deductions
from
their
income
while
others
are
not.
The
Income
Tax
Act
is
full
of
examples
where
one
taxpayer
for
certain
reasons
has
certain
deductions
which
another
taxpayer
does
not
have.
Also,
certain
taxpayers
are
called
upon
to
pay
more
taxes
than
others.
Some
taxpayers
are
called
upon
to
pay
taxes
at
a
higher
rate
than
others.
The
Charter,
as
it
has
been
said
in
many,
many
cases,
too
numerous
to
mention,
is
an
important
piece
of
legislation
which
constitutionally
protects
important
rights
and
freedoms
of
people
who
live
in
this
country.
It
seems
to
me
that
it
comes
very
close
to
trivializing
that
very
important
constitutional
law,
if
it
is
used
to
get
into
the
weighing
and
balancing
of
the
nuts
and
bolts
of
taxing
statutes.
I
am
prepared
to
hold,
and
do
hold
that
the
fact
that
a
taxpayer
who
earns
his
living
by
operating
a
business
is
entitled
to
a
deduction
which
is
not
available
to
a
taxpayer
whose
income
is
earned
by
way
of
wages
or
salary
does
not
amount
to
that
denial
of
equal
benefit
under
the
law
which
is
contemplated
by
section
15
of
the
Charter.
I
am
convinced
that
the
allegations
contained
in
paragraphs
10
and
11
of
the
statement
of
claim
do
not
show
even
the
possibility
of
a
Charter
violation.
Since
violation
of
the
Charter
is
the
cornerstone
of
any
conceivable
cause
of
action,
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
statement
of
claim
discloses
no
cause
of
action.
I
think
that
the
plaintiffs
have
no
chance
of
success
and,
thus,
their
action
must
be
dismissed.
At
the
conclusion
of
Mr.
McGilp’s
capable
and
I
may
say,
very
interesting
argument,
he
made
the
submission
that
in
these
early
days
of
Charter
litigation
it
might
be
next
to
impossible
for
a
court
on
a
motion
such
as
this
to
say
that
a
piece
of
Charter
litigation
has
no
chance
of
success.
The
ingenuity
of
the
people
of
this
country
and
of
their
legal
advisors
is
such
that
there
is
a
substantial
amount
of
Charter
litigation.
Some
may
call
it
a
flood
tide.
I
think
that
in
order
to
prevent
the
courts
from
being
completely
bogged
down
in
Charter
litigation,
it
behooves
a
judge
if
he
or
she
is
convinced
that
there
is
no
Charter
violation
to
say
so
at
the
earliest
time
possible.
If
a
judge
comes
to
the
conclusion
that
Charter
violations
cannot
possibly
be
established,
it
seems
to
me
that
the
appropriate
time
to
stop
the
litigation
is
at
this
stage
of
the
proceedings.
In
addition
to
claiming
that
the
statement
of
claim
did
not
disclose
a
cause
of
action,
the
defendants
made
their
motions
on
the
basis
that
this
action
is
frivolous,
vexatious
and
an
abuse
of
process.
The
fact
that
I
do
not
agree
with
the
plaintiffs
about
whether
there
has
or
has
not
been
a
Charter
violation
does
not
mean
that
they
acted
improperly,
frivolously,
vexatiously
or
abusively
in
putting
their
views
before
the
court
for
determination.
While
I
am
dismissing
the
action,
I
am
dismissing
it
on
the
ground
that
no
cause
of
action
is
disclosed
in
the
statement
of
claim.
I
am
not
dismissing
it
on
the
basis
that
it
was
frivolous,
vexatious
or
an
abuse
of
the
process
of
the
court.
Motion
granted;
action
dismissed.
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