Bonner,
T.C.J.
[Orally]:—The
applicant
seeks
an
order
under
section
167
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
extending
the
time
for
objecting
to
an
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
1983
taxation
year.
The
assessment
was
made
on
April
21,
1986.
The
90-day
period
prescribed
by
subsection
165(1)
of
the
Act
expired
on
July
20,
1986.
The
application
was
sent
to
the
Registry
of
this
Court
on
March
31,
1987,
that
is
to
say,
about
250
days
after
the
expiration
of
the
90-day
period.
In
essence,
the
applicant's
position
was
that
the
decision
to
seek
leave
to
object
and
to
object
if
possible
was
triggered
by
a
belated
discovery
that
evidence
was
available
to
support
the
applicant's
assertion
that
the
assessment
was
wrong.
The
assessment
disallowed
a
claim
to
deduct
payments
which
the
applicant
said
he
made
in
cash
to
his
spouse
for
her
maintenance
and
for
the
maintenance
of
his
children.
The
payments
totalling
$500
a
week
were
called
for
by
a
written
separation
agreement.
The
applicant's
evidence
was
that
shortly
after
the
assessment
was
made
he
met
with
Revenue
officials
and
was
told
by
them
that
the
only
way
he
could
support
his
claim
to
the
disputed
deduction
was
with
documentation
showing
that
the
payments
in
fact
were
made.
The
applicant
stated
that
he
contacted
his
spouse
two
or
three
times
in
an
unsuccessful
effort
to
get
her
to
acknowledge
receipt
of
the
money.
In
November
of
1986
the
applicant's
solicitor
received
a
letter
from
the
spouse's
solicitor
acknowledging
that
the
spouse
had
in
fact
received
some
payments
from
the
applicant.
That
letter
reads
in
part:
Mrs.
Ellis
acknowledges
that
Mr.
Ellis
did
pay
her
some
monies
in
1983,
but
apparently
there
is
some
considerable
confusion
as
to
how
much
he
in
fact
paid
to
her.
Mr.
Ellis
was
apparently
re-establishing
his
business,
and
Mrs.
Ellis
was
assisting
him
in
that
regard.
As
I
understand
the
situation
Mrs.
Ellis
was
more
or
less
receiving
a
combination
of
both
salary
and
support.
To
further
complicate
matters,
Mrs.
Ellis
states
that
she
was
paying
some
of
her
husband's
bills.
The
applicant
subsequently
retained
the
solicitor
who
now
acts
for
him.
He
recognized
that
the
letter
might
help
the
applicant
to
establish
his
claim
and
this
application
was
then
launched.
The
applicant
testified
that
he
would
have
objected
in
time
if
he
had
received
the
letter
within
the
90
days.
On
cross-examination
the
applicant
testified
that
when
he
received
the
notice
of
assessment
he
was
unaware
of
the
90-day
limit
and
that
he
did
not
read
the
statement
on
the
back
of
the
notice
indicating
that
there
was
such
a
limit.
In
his
application
which
commenced
this
proceeding
the
applicant,
through
his
counsel,
stated:
Mr.
Ellis
received
the
subject
Notice
of
Assessment
in
April,
1986
and
—
since
he
has
never
objected
to
any
other
Notice
of
Assessment
—
was
entirely
unaware
of
the
90
day
limit
for
filing
the
Notice
of
Objection.
Ignorance
of
the
90-day
rule
cannot
help
the
applicant.
The
limitation
contained
in
subsection
165(1)
applies
both
to
those
who
are
aware
of
the
law
and
those
who
are
unaware
of
it.
The
previously
mentioned
meeting
with
Revenue
officials
appears
to
have
been
arranged
not
for
the
purpose
of
challenging
the
assessment
but,
rather,
for
the
purpose
of
arranging
for
payment
of
the
tax
assessed.
The
Revenue
officials
with
whom
the
applicant
met
were
persons
responsible
for
collection,
not
for
assessment.
The
applicant
said
that
it
"came
out”
at
the
meeting
that
there
was
no
hope
of
getting
the
deduction
without
documentary
evidence.
The
applicant
did
not
suggest
that
he
made
any
attempt
to
secure
professional
advice
as
to
how
to
overcome
a
problem
of
proof
which
had
cost
him
a
$26,000
tax
deduction.
I
find
it
strange
that
the
applicant,
who
appears
to
be
an
intelligent
and
successful
businessman,
would
be
content
to
accept
the
opinion
said
to
have
been
expressed
by
Revenue's
collection
people
when
the
result
of
that
opinion
was
both
painful
finan-
cially
and
patently
unjust.
I
therefore
doubt
that
the
applicant
told
the
whole
truth
in
relation
to
the
delays
in
challenging
the
assessment.
I
observe
that
the
applicant
did
not
call
his
former
spouse
in
an
effort
to
establish
that
she
had
received
the
money,
that
the
payments
were
in
fact
maintenance
and,
finally,
that
she
refused
requests
for
receipts.
It
was
not
suggested
that
Mrs.
Ellis
was
unavailable
or
that
she
had
refused
to
give
evidence.
I
am
not
satisfied
on
all
of
the
evidence
that,
but
for
the
lack
of
receipt
or
documentary
proof
of
payment,
the
applicant
would
have
objected
within
the
90-day
period.
Subparagraph
167(5)(c)(i)
of
the
Act
therefore
prohibits
the
granting
of
the
order
sought.
The
application
will
therefore
be
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.
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