Couture,
C.J.T.C.:—These
appeals
are
in
respect
of
the
appellant's
1981
and
1982
taxation
years
and
deal
with
the
perennial
problem
of
whether
the
appellant's
farming
activities
were
carried
[on]
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
within
the
meaning
assigned
to
these
words
by
the
pertinent
jurisprudence.
The
appellant
gave
this
evidence.
He
is
a
butcher
by
trade
and
has
been
a
full-time
employee
for
the
past
twenty-three
years.
Since
the
age
of
eight
he
was
brought
up
by
his
grandmother
who
was
a
widow
living
on
a
farm
at
Erin,
Ontario.
She
passed
away
in
1975
and
left
him
the
farm.
He
married
in
the
late
sixties
and
at
that
time
he
built
a
house
on
a
parcel
of
farm
land
given
to
him
by
his
grandmother.
Prior
to
the
time
that
the
appellant
started
to
live
with
his
grandmother
she
was
engaged
in
farming
so
from
an
early
age
he
worked
at
farming.
This
continued
until
about
1965
when
she
sold
her
cattle
and
retired.
The
appellant
kept
pigs
and
chickens
after
his
grandmother's
retirement.
Between
1972
and
1976
he
had
a
herd
of
some
30
Aberdeen
Angus
and
raised
calves
during
that
period.
In
1969
he
bought
a
two-year-old
standard-bred
mare
which
he
raced
from
1970
until
1975
when
it
developed
problems
with
its
knees.
It
was
then
bred
and
the
first
foal
named
Star
Vista
was
born
in
1976.
The
horse
raced
in
the
Ontario
Sires
Stakes
Circuit
for
two-year-olds.
This
circuit
covered
southern
Ontario.
The
horse
raced
for
about
two
years
and
it
was
sold
in
1981
for
$2,050.
This
was
the
only
revenue
from
farming
reported
for
that
taxation
year
by
the
appellant.
After
this
sale
the
appellant
did
not
engage
in
further
racing
activities
during
the
taxation
years
under
appeal.
In
1979
a
second
foal
was
born
and
named
Star
Nadir.
In
1981
this
horse
was
being
trained
by
a
professional
trainer
because
the
appellant
had
no
experience
in
training
horses
and
he
intended
to
race
it
as
a
two-year-old.
How-
ever,
in
1981
the
horse
developed
a
physical
condition
described
as
bows
and
on
the
advice
of
a
veterinarian
it
was
returned
to
the
farm
for
the
balance
of
the
year
so
that
it
could
recover
from
this
ailment.
In
1982
the
appellant
once
more
placed
the
horse
with
the
trainer
and
this
time
it
contacted
a
virus
that
required
that
it
be
returned
to
the
farm
again
to
cure
this
problem.
The
horse
never
did
race.
Between
1975
and
1980
a
crop
was
never
produced
on
the
farm.
The
appellant's
activities
were
restricted
to
horse
racing
and
by
his
own
admission,
he
never
profited
from
this.
In
1980
he
reported
$1,257
of
purse
money
against
which
he
claimed
expenses
and
capital
cost
allowance
of
$9,665.91
and
$595.23
respectively
for
a
total
of
$10,261.14.
Following
his
unsuccessful
horse
racing
venture
in
1982
he
directed
his
efforts
to
an
unrelated
farming
activity.
He
bought
a
tractor
to
clear
land
and
place
it
in
a
condition
to
produce
crops.
Nothing
was
planted
in
1982.
He
built
a
greenhouse
and
in
1982
he
began
growing
geraniums
on
a
commercial
basis.
Unfortunately,
the
plants
were
infected
with
a
disease
and
the
whole
crop
had
to
be
destroyed.
By
the
spring
of
1983
he
had
cleared
and
ploughed
approximately
12
acres
of
land
in
which
he
planted
squash
and
pumpkins.
He
reported
sales
of
$3,376
and
a
profit
of
$910
from
this
source
in
1983.
In
1984
he
reported
a
profit
of
$18.50
from
the
sale
of
vegetables
and
flowers.
In
1985
the
appellant
suffered
a
loss
from
his
vegetable
and
flower
operations
due
to
problems
related
to
fertilizer.
Also,
his
greenhouse
burned
down
at
the
end
of
October.
It
was
full
of
geraniums
that
were
being
nurtured
for
the
following
selling
season
so
he
did
not
expect
a
profit
for
1986.
However,
he
has
replaced
the
greenhouse
with
a
new
one
nearly
three
times
in
size
and
he
expects
a
substantial
profit
in
1987
from
his
greenhouse
operation.
Apparently
geraniums
are
easy
to
grow
and
they
are
much
in
demand.
It
is
obvious
that
the
appellant
has
not
been
fortunate
in
his
farming
ventures
since
he
inherited
the
farm
in
1975.
Whether
his
change
of
direction
in
1982
from
horse
racing
to
the
cultivation
of
vegetables
and
flowers
will
be
more
successful
remains
to
be
seen.
Whether
such
operations
constitute
the
carrying
on
of
a
business
is
a
question
that
will
have
to
be
answered
later.
The
issue
before
the
Court
is
whether
during
the
1981
and
1982
taxation
years
the
appellant
carried
on
a
business
in
relation
to
his
horse
racing
operations.
Very
little
was
placed
in
evidence
with
respect
to
the
appellant's
racing
activities
between
1976
and
1980,
beyond
that
it
was
established
that
one
horse
actually
raced
during
that
period.
We
do
not
know
how
often
that
horse
raced
during
each
year,
the
amounts
of
its
winnings
or
the
expenses
incurred.
With
respect
to
Star
Vista
we
know
that
this
horse
raced
for
two
years,
but
there
is
no
information
regarding
its
winnings,
if
any.
It
was
then
sold
for
some
unexplained
reason.
Selling
the
only
potentially
incomeearning
asset
of
an
alleged
business
is
inconsistent
with
a
serious
intention
of
carrying
on
that
business.
As
far
as
Star
Nadir
is
concerned
it
never
raced
during
the
years
under
appeal
or
in
subsequent
years.
Its
trainer
who
gave
evidence
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
asserted
that
Star
Nadir
was
a
much
better
horse
than
Star
Vista
and
had
greater
potential
as
a
race
horse.
He
said
that
it
had
the
possibility
of
winning
$100,000
a
year.
This
was,
of
course,
pure
speculation
on
his
part.
Whether
the
horse
could
have
won
$100,000
in
a
year
was
more
in
the
nature
of
hope
on
his
part
than
reality
considering
that
it
had
never
been
entered
in
a
race
and
no
data
existed
to
support
such
a
claim.
There
are
a
great
number
of
reported
decisions
pertaining
to
paragraph
31(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act)
and
the
question
regarding
what
constitutes
a
business
for
the
purpose
of
the
Act.
Paragraph
31
(1)(a)
presupposes
the
existence
of
a
business
before
the
limited
losses
prescribed
therein
can
be
deducted.
While
the
abundance
of
jurisprudence
on
these
questions
is
most
useful
as
authority
for
principles
of
general
application
each
case
must,
in
the
last
analysis,
be
decided
having
regard
to
the
particular
facts
placed
in
evidence.
I
am
not
satisfied
that
training
and
racing
a
single
horse
over
a
few
years
on
a
somewhat
casual
schedule
even
with
the
assistance
of
a
professional
trainer
is
sufficient
to
characterize
such
an
activity
as
a
"business"
for
the
purpose
of
the
Act.
The
impression
that
I
am
left
with
is
that
this
horse
racing
enterprise
was
carried
on
in
a
somewhat
unorganized
or
ad
hoc
fashion
much
more
akin
to
a
hobby
than
a
business.
It
was
an
activity
that
was
enjoyed
by
the
appellant
during
his
hours
of
leisure.
The
[D.T.C.]
headnote
in
Magee
et
al.
v.
The
Queen,
[1987]
2
C.T.C.
17;
87
D.T.C.
5282
(F.C.T.D.)
reads:
The
taxpayers,
who
were
husband
and
wife,
purchased
a
race
horse
and
an
80-acre
parcel
of
land
in
1977.
They
invested
small
amounts
of
money
in
the
acquisition
of
buildings
and
the
construction
of
paddocks.
Over
the
next
nine
years,
the
taxpayers
suffered
consistent
losses
from
their
farming
activities.
They
had
no
experience
in
breeding
or
training
horses
and
they
never
owned
more
than
three
or
four
horses
at
a
time.
The
taxpayers
deducted
their
losses
from
business
income
for
the
1981
and
1982
taxation
years.
The
Minister
disallowed
the
deductions
and
the
taxpayers
appealed
to
the
Federal
Court
—
Trial
Division.
Held:
The
taxpayers’
appeals
were
dismissed.
The
Court
found
that
the
taxpayers
did
not
have
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
in
the
taxation
years
in
issue.
Mr.
Justice
Strayer
said
at
page
19
(D.T.C.
5284):
Certainly
in
1981
and
1982
it
would
have
been
unreasonable
to
have
expected
a
profit
either
at
that
time
or
in
the
foreseeable
future.
Nor
am
I
able
to
see
any
clear
plan
which
existed
then
or
now
for
making
the
venture
profitable.
The
maintenance
of
one
brood
mare
on
a
farm,
with
perhaps
two
or
three
offspring
of
that
mare
racing
each
year,
even
with
the
sale
from
time
to
time
of
the
latter,
does
not
seem
to
me
to
involve
such
a
plan.
I
therefore
conclude
that
this
farm
is
not
a
"source
of
income”
and
thus
the
plaintiffs
are
within
category
3
as
mentioned
above:
namely,
they
are
engaged
in
hobby
farming
and
none
of
their
net
farm
losses
are
deductible
from
other
income.
In
Hammond
v.
M.N.R.,
[1971]
C.T.C.
663;
71
D.T.C.
5389
Mr.
Justice
Pratte
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
had
to
decide
whether
a
taxpayer
who
engaged
in
racing
horses
was
taxable
on
his
prize
winnings.
He
held
that
he
was
not
for
the
reason
that
he
was
not
engaged
in
an
undertaking
that
could
properly
be
regarded
to
be
a
business.
He
said
at
page
667
(D.T.C.
5392):
The
fact
of
purchasing
and
racing
a
horse
is
not,
in
itself,
a
trading
venture
because
it
is
normally
made
with
a
view
to
profit.
For
this
reason,
purses
won
by
a
race
horse
cannot
be
considered
as
income
from
a
business
except
in
exceptional
circumstances
showing
that
the
owner
of
the
horse
had
so
organized
his
activities
that
he
was
in
fact
conducting
an
enterprise
of
a
commercial
character.
From
the
evidence
adduced,
I
am
not
satisfied
that
the
appellant
was
"conducting
an
enterprise
of
a
commercial
character".
Consequently
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.