Hughes,
J.:—The
respondents
were
charged
jointly
on
December
3,
1986
with
one
count
of
unlawfully
evading
the
payment
of
income
tax
and
three
counts
of
unlawfully
making
false
or
deceptive
statements
in
Print
Three
Inc’s
income
tax
returns,
contrary
to
paragraphs
239(1)(d)
and
239(1)(a),
respectively.
The
respondent
Benquesus
was
similarly
charged
with
respect
to
his
own
returns.
On
April
8,
1987,
the
Attorney
General
of
Canada
elected
to
proceed
by
way
of
summary
conviction
these
charges
and
trial
was
fixed
for
November
23
of
the
same
year
in
the
Provincial
Court
at
Toronto.
In
the
meantime
on
November
4,
R.
Lewin,
J.P.
on
the
application
of
the
respondents
issued
a
subpoena
ad
testificandum
to
the
Director
of
Taxation
at
Toronto,
James
R.
Giles,
who
moves
before
me
to
quash
it
because
of
the
combined
effect
of
subsection
626(1)
of
the
Criminal
Code
and
subsection
244(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63.
The
former
section
of
the
Criminal
Code
reads
as
follows:
s.
626(1)
Where
a
person
is
likely
to
give
material
evidence
in
a
proceeding
to
which
this
Act
applies,
a
subpoena
may
be
issued
in
accordance
with
this
Part
requiring
that
person
to
attend
to
give
evidence.
and
the
latter
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act:
s.
244(4)
An
information
or
complaint
under
the
provisions
of
the
Criminal
Code
relating
to
summary
convictions,
in
respect
of
an
offence
under
this
Act,
may
be
laid
or
made
on
or
before
a
day
5
years
from
the
time
when
the
matter
of
the
information
or
complaint
arose
or
within
one
year
from
the
day
on
which
evi-
dence,
sufficient
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister
to
justify
a
prosecution
for
the
offence,
came
to
his
knowledge,
and
the
Minister's
certificate
as
to
the
day
on
which
such
evidence
came
to
his
knowledge
is
conclusive
evidence
thereof.
The
respondents
in
proper
form
have
raised
a
constitutional
issue
as
to
the
validity
of
subsection
244(4)
in
light
of
sections
7,
11(a)
and
15
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
I
had
no
difficulty
in
dismissing
this
on
the
ground
that
it
should
be
raised
at
trial
and
Mr.
Du
Pont
was
given
leave
to
do
so.
I
also
dismissed
the
motion
to
quash
because
trial
was
set
so
soon
after
the
hearing
before
me
and
undertook
to
provide
short
reasons
in
dye
course
for
doing
so.
It
has
been
held
that
subsection
244(4)
is
conclusive
as
to
the
fact
of
the
Minister's
knowledge:
see
Fee
et
al.
v.
Bradshaw
et
al.,
[1982]
1
S.C.R.
609;
[1982]
C.T.C.
201;
68
C.C.C.
(2d)
426,
a
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
and
James
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
C.T.C.
672;
84
D.T.C.
6570,
a
judgment
of
Griffiths,
J.
These
authorities
do
not
deal
with
the
quashing
of
a
subpoena
and
I
am
reluctant
to
prevent
enquiry
which
might
be
directed
to
relevant
matters
other
than
the
conclusiveness
of
the
Minister's
certificate.
It
is
indeed
arguable
that
Mr.
Giles’
evidence
could
shed
some
light
upon
the
operation
of
a
section
which
appears
to
deprive
income
tax
debtors
of
the
customary
period
of
limitation
of
actions
enjoyed
by
other
debtors
similarly
situated,
and
assist
a
court
in
the
application
of
section
15
of
the
Charter
not
considered
in
James
v.
The
Queen,
supra.
The
respondents
will
have
their
cost
of
the
motion
to
quash.
Motion
denied.
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