Teskey,
T.C.J.:—These
appeals
concern
the
valuation
of
inventory.
The
facts
are
not
really
in
dispute.
What
is
in
dispute
is
“the
proper
way
to
calculate
the
appellant's
income"
for
the
taxation
years
1979,
1980
and
1981
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Subsection
10(1)
of
the
Act
and
section
1801
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations
made
thereunder
provide:
"10(1)
For
the
purpose
of
computing
income
from
a
business,
the
property
described
in
an
inventory
shall
be
valued
at
its
cost
to
the
taxpayer
or
its
fair
market
value,
whichever
is
lower,
or
in
such
other
manner
as
may
be
permitted
by
regulation.
1801.
Except
as
provided
in
section
1802,
for
the
purpose
of
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
(a)
all
the
property
described
in
all
the
inventories
of
the
business
may
be
valued
at
the
cost
to
him;
or
(b)
all
the
property
described
in
all
the
inventories
of
the
business
may
be
valued
at
the
fair
market
value.
The
appellant
is
a
businessman
who
owns
and
operates
a
retail
jewelry
shop
as
a
sole
proprietor.
When
it
comes
to
the
sale
of
jewelry,
he
is
a
"wheeler-dealer".
This
is
not
said
in
any
derogatory
sense,
but
only
in
a
descriptive
sense.
He
does
not
maintain
a
fixed
“bottom
line”
sale
price
on
his
merchandise.
On
all
merchandise
there
is
a
small
paper
tag
showing
two
prices.
The
one
price
is
what
he
represents
to
his
customers
as
what
the
article
would
sell
for
in
a
high
priced
top
of
the
line
jewelry
store
such
as
"Birks".
The
second
price
is
his
asking
price.
On
the
back
of
the
ticket,
in
code,
is
the
original
cost
of
the
item.
Exhibit
A-1
is
a
trade-in
ring
showing
two
prices
$1,100
and
$600
and
in
code
the
cost
at
$30.
The
$1,100
figure
is
the
"Birk's"
figure,
the
$600
figure
is
his
asking
figure.
The
appellant
expects
his
customers
to
negotiate
with
him
and
he
is
quite
prepared
to
sell
all
items
at
substantially
less
than
the
asking
price.
On
new
jewelry
purchased
from
a
manufacturer,
he
tries
to
negotiate
a
sale
at
twice
the
original
purchase
price.
On
used
jewelry
such
as
Exhibit
A-1,
he
calculates
what
the
ring
would
cost
from
a
jewelry
supplier
and
doubles
the
figure
to
arrive
at
what
he
hopes
to
be
his
bottom
line.
He
would
hope
to
sell
Exhibit
A-1
for
$180.
However,
there
is
no
"set
bottom
line”
figure
as
it
will
change
as
circumstances
change.
What
he
attempts
to
do
is
make
as
much
money
as
possible
out
of
each
transaction.
In
the
appellant's
own
words:
The
price
is
always
negotiable.
As
long
as
I
am
making
a
good
mark-up,
—I
sell.
I
am
in
the
business
to
make
money
as
much
as
possible.
There
certainly
is
nothing
wrong
with
any
of
these
statements
or
motives,
our
society
functions
on
the
independent
businessman
making
a
profit.
The
appellant's
sales
can
be
broken
down
into
three
types:
(1)
Cash
(2)
Straight
Exchange
(3)
Part
cash
and
part
exchange
or
trade-in.
In
this
case
we
are
only
dealing
with
those
sales
that
are
for
part
cash
and
part
exchange
or
trade-in.
The
jewelry
that
he
takes
in
on
exchange
or
as
a
trade-in
also
falls
into
three
categories,
namely:
(1)
jewelry
he
takes
into
inventory
and
re-sells
over
the
counter
such
as
Exhibit
A-1.
(2)
jewelry
he
takes
into
inventory
and
keeps
for
the
purpose
of
repairing
items
of
jewelry.
Exhibit
A-4
is
an
example.
(3)
jewelry
that
he
describes
as
scrap
jewelry
or
scrap
gold.
Exhibit
A-3
is
an
example.
This
case
only
deals
with
the
jewelry
that
falls
into
category
3
above
and
referred
to
as
scrap
jewelry
or
scrap
gold.
The
scrap
jewelry
or
gold
are
saved
in
separate
containers
and
from
time
to
time
are
refined
into
gold
bars.
The
appellant
did
not
take
this
"scrap
gold”
into
inventory
and/or
income
because
he
says
it
has
no
value.
The
respondent's
position
is
that
this
"scrap
gold”
should
be
valued
and
shown
in
his
year-end
inventory
and
therefore
the
appellant
did
not
bring
into
computation
of
his
income
all
income
received
by
him.
The
type
of
sale
that
we
are
dealing
with
herein
is
where
the
appellant
sells
an
article
for
more
cash
than
he
would
have
been
prepared
to
accept
plus
a
trade-in
of
jewelry,
i.e.
"scrap
gold”.
An
example
of
this
is
Exhibit
A-1.
Since
his
theoretical
bottom
line
is
a
selling
price
of
$180
and
if
someone
offered
him
$375
cash,
he
could
accept
the
offer
or
if
he
was
offered
$375
cash
plus
a
trade-in
piece
of
"scrap
gold",
he
again
would
accept
the
offer
and
take
the
"scrap
gold"
in
at
a
NIL
VALUE.
Thus
the
appellant
is
saying:
"that
since
I
sold
the
item
with
a
cash
portion
for
as
much
or
more
than
my
theoretical
bottom
line
would
have
been,
the
trade-in
is
valued
at
NIL
as
the
trade-in
piece
of
jewelry
is
an
extra
bonus
and
of
no
cost
to
me".
It
is
obvious
that
if
inventory
is
understated
then
the
revenue
is
understated.
Also
the
reverse
is
true
that
if
inventory
is
overstated
the
revenue
is
overstated.
The
appellant
called
Mr.
Ira
Abrams,
a
chartered
accountant,
who
gave
evidence
as
to
his
interpretation
of
"generally
accepted
accounting
principles"
and
how
in
his
opinion
he
would
apply
those
rules
to
the
facts
set
out
within
his
report.
However,
the
facts
he
sets
forth
are
not
entirely
accurate
and
this
Court
cannot
accept
his
conclusions.
The
type
of
transactions
that
we
are
dealing
with
herein
are
“barter
transactions".
They
are
no
different
than
any
new
car
dealer
selling
new
and
used
cars
and
taking
trade-ins.
The
accountant
admitted
he
did
not
have
any
experience
with
any
car
dealers.
The
only
difference
I
can
conclude
would
be
the
sloppy
and/or
non-existent
records
the
appellant
keeps.
It
is
quite
obvious
the
appellant
knows
the
value
to
him
of
the
so-called
"scrap
gold"
at
the
time
of
the
sale
or
exchange.
The
exchange
of
scrap
jewelry,
i.e.
"scrap
gold”
is
an
integral
part
of
the
deal.
For
the
appellant
to
say:
Il
know
I
am
getting
$70
worth
of
scrap
gold
in
this
sale,
but
because
the
purchaser
is
paying
me
an
amount
of
cash
equal
or
more
than
I
actually
would
have
sold
the
item
for,
the
value
of
the
scrap
gold
is
NIL”
is
not
acceptable.
I
am
satisfied
that:
(1)
"Asset"
means
anything
of
value
that
is
owned.
(2)
“Market”
means
the
cost
of
replacing
an
asset
on
the
open
market.
(3)
"Revenue"
means
assets
received
by
an
entity
in
return
for
services
performed
or
goods
sold.
“Gross
Revenue"
as
defined
by
section
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is:
gross
revenue—of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
means
the
aggregate
of
(a)
all
amounts
received
in
the
year
or
receivable
in
the
year
(depending
on
the
method
regularly
followed
by
the
taxpayer
in
computing
his
income)
otherwise
than
as
or
on
account
of
capital,
and
(b)
all
amounts
(other
than
amounts
referred
to
in
paragraph
(a)
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer's
income
from
a
business
or
property
for
the
year
by
virtue
of
paragraph
12(1)(o)
or
subsection
12(3),
(4)
or
(8)
or
section
12.2.
"Amount"
as
defined
by
the
same
section
is:
amount.—means
money,
rights
or
things
expressed
in
terms
of
the
amount
of
money
or
the
value
in
terms
of
money
of
the
right
or
thing,
except
that
the
"amount"
of
any
stock
dividend
paid
by
a
corporation
is
(a)
in
the
case
of
a
dividend
described
in
subsection
112(2.1),
(2.2)
or
(2.3),
the
greater
of
(i)
the
amount
of
the
increase
in
the
paid-up
capital
of
the
corporation
by
virtue
of
the
payment
of
the
dividend,
and
(ii)
the
fair
market
value
of
the
share
or
shares
paid
as
a
stock
dividend
at
the
time
of
payment,
and
(b)
in
any
other
case,
the
amount
of
the
increase
in
the
paid-up
capital
of
the
corporation
by
virtue
of
the
payment
of
the
dividend.
In
a
barter
transaction,
the
general
rule
is
that
the
transaction
should
be
recorded
as
a
figure
representing
the
market
value
of
the
thing
acquired.
I
am
satisfied
the
transactions
in
question
are
barter
or
part
barter
transactions.
Gold
bars
are
as
marketable
as
government
bonds,
or
stocks
listed
on
a
stock
exchange.
The
accountant
claims
that
gold
should
be
treated
differently.
There
is
no
valid
reason
to
treat
the
gold
any
differently
than
a
government
bond
or
a
traded
stock
such
as
Bell
Canada.
The
appellant
knows
each
time
he
acquires
"scrap
gold”
the
approximate
amount
of
refined
gold
he
will
derive
therefrom,
the
costs
to
do
so
and
the
market
value
of
gold
that
day.
Gold
prices
are
published
daily
and
fluctuate
the
same
as
stock
prices
do.
By
not
bringing
into
inventory
the
market
value
of
the
"scrap
gold”,
the
appellant
is
understating
his
income
by
the
value
thereof.
It
is
obvious
from
the
evidence
that
at
inventory
time
a
good
portion
of
the
"scrap
gold”
has
already
been
converted
into
gold
bars.
It
was
admitted
that
during
the
three
years
in
question
the
market
value
of
refined
gold
fluctuated
between
$200
and
$600
an
ounce.
The
respondent
in
his
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
under
the
heading
"Statement
of
facts"
alleges
that:
"in
each
of
the
relevant
taxation
years,
the
lower
cost
of
and
fair
market
value
of
gold
acquired
by
the
appellant
was
not
less
than
$120.00
an
ounce."
I
accept
the
appellant's
testimony
at
face
value
and
find
that
he
is
a
hardworking
businessman
and
that
he
truly
felt
that
when
he
took
in
on
a
trade
"scrap
gold”
that
there
was
not
any
cost
to
him.
If
he
had
structured
his
deals
to
show
a
trade-in
allowance,
he
could
have
established
"a
cost
of
the
asset".
Since
he
did
not
do
so
he
has
been
unable
to
meet
the
onus
to
disprove
the
respondent's
position.
Having
accepted
the
respondent's
evidence
as
to
what
he
thought,
although
I
dismiss
his
appeal
in
regards
to
the
assessment
of
this
gold
at
$120
an
ounce,
I
am
satisfied
that
penalties
ought
not
to
be
imposed
under
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
Therefore,
I
allow
this
appeal
in
part
by
deleting
the
penalties
and
the
interest
thereon
and
refer
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
Since
the
results
herein
are
divided
and
also
because
the
notice
of
appeal
was
not
specific
in
appealing
the
penalties,
there
will
be
no
order
as
to
costs.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.
T.C.C.